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CHAPTER I 
JNTROOOCTION 
E. H. CRlJMP - Ruler of Memphis for almost hal£ a century, Mr . Crump brought 
progress to a river city. He perpetuated his state-wide control through 
extension of Negro suf'frage. His death produced a split in the city govemm.ent 
and divided voter loyalty, allowing a wll organized Negro ticket to make a 
serious bid .for public office. 
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For nine decades voters in the South have cast their ballots 
in a spirit of defiance to the union . Since 1876, the eleven Confederate 
States have segregated themselves from the rest of the nation by their 
extreme faithfulness to the Democratic Party. After reconstruction, the 
Party became the only effective voice of the section in national affairs, 
and more important, the primary means of limiting the political strength 
of their newly acquired colored citizens . Thus two recent studies of the 
politi cal South, Southern Politics in State and Nation by V. 0 , Key, Jr . , 
and A Two-Party South? by Alexander Heard, have been founded on the 
assumption that the "politics of the South revolves around the position 
of the Negro . n1 If this is true, and my observations certainly agree with 
their findines, then it seems crucial that we 11identify ["and eXDJninif the 
points of low resistance to Negro participation in politics : they may 
indicate future trends . ••2 
It is the purpose of this essay to examine one of these 11points 
of low resistance to Negro participation in politics" in the hope that it 
will shed some light on the future political status of the Negro in the 
South. Since Negro voting has traditionally occurred most frequently in 
the large metropolitan areas, it seemed approptiate that this essay be an 
analysis of Negro voting behavior on the municipal level. Memphis, 
Tennessee, was chosen for this project , not only because it is a truly 
Southern city, being located in the heart of the Arkansas, Mississippi and 
Tennessee delta, and having one of the largest Negro populations of any city 
in the nation, but also because it is the only city in the South in which 
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Negroes have voted continuously since the turn of the century. Of 
further importance in the selection of Memphis as a topic of study 
was my swmner• s employment with the city• s largest newspaper, 'Which 
gave me the opportunity to view first hand the Negro participation in 
the city• a municipal election of August, 1959. 
The reason for approaching this topic from the local level is 
seen more clearly, perhaps, when we realize that it is here that the Negro, 
and the lower income citizen generally, comes in closest contact with his 
government. 'lherefore, it is in the distribution of municipal services 
that the right of suffrage is felt most acutely. As John Dollard expresses 
in his study of Southerntown: 
Voting is concerned with whether the streets in a given part of 
town are paved and whether the town spends money for lighting 
those streets. Voting detennines the treatment that the citizen 
may get from the courts • •• since the voter always has in reserve 
the threat of helping oust from office those who misuse him ••• 
The voter is more likely to receive the full protection of the 
law in regard to the sanctity of his home and person; that is the 
.fUnction of peace officers, to heed the needs and 'Wishes of those 
who elect them. The voters, and the successful voters of course, 
share in the spoils of office; the non-voters naturally do not. 
The last one is an important consideration for the middle-class 
Negroes who would naturally receive many elective offices if 
Negroes could vote . Then there i s the matter of taxes 'Which are 
always most discriminately levied when the voters have control 
~~s~~~:t l~Jl~~f c~~:;!~ ~;;~e~tie~~~~ who cannot vote 
Atypical of the South, however, the Negro vote in Memphis has 
been welcOJlled and courted by machine politicians for more than half a 
century. Principal use of the Negro ballot was made by E. H. Crump, 
Memphis political boss from 1910 Wltil 1954. Filtering the mayor1 s 
o£fice against a well entrenched machine, Crwnp needed the Negro support 
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to gain and maintain his office . When his organization was finnly 
established and his candidates were guaranteed election, the Negro vote 
played an important part in his control of state politics. Although no 
one will deny that the Crump machine exploited the Negro ballot, it is 
impossible to overlook the services the Negroes gained in return . Sheilds 
J'icilwa:ine, in his book Mery>his Down in Dixie, clearly shows this by 
contrasting the benefits the Negro received from his Republican leaders 
and the benefits given him by Crwnp. In speaking of Robert Church, for 
many years the foremost Negro Republican in Tennessee, Mr. Mcilwaine 
said, "the crowning irony of his career is that his bacldng of the Crump 
machine has done more for the welfare of Memphis Negroes (absence of the 
free ballot not withstanding) than all of his Republican efforts. "4 
Throughout this report, reference will be made to the services 
received by the Memphis Negroes for their support of the Crurap candidates . 
Negro police , for instance, have been seen on Beale str~et for almost 
twenty years, while other Southern Negroes still list the absence of 
colored policemen as a major grievance against their municipal goverrunents . 
City-operated John Gaston Hospital provides free and low-cost medical and 
dental services for the Memphis Negro, and Negro housing in Memphis is 
probably the best in the South . Other benefits include superior schools; 
abundant parks and swimming pools ; and available library, zoo, fair, and 
museum facilities . It is inconeivable that these benefits would have come 
in absence of the right to vote . 
Certainly Mr. Crump was reared in the tradition of the Old South 
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and believed that he had a duty to protect and provide for the Negroes 
and poor whites under his charge . Yet it is doubtful that paternalism 
and benevolence can account for the unprecedented progress made by the 
Memphis Negro . ''It would take an inhuman fairness on the part of 
administrative officers to distribute burdens and perquisites fairly 
when the element of coercion by voting is lacking. n5 Mr , Crwn:p was not 
inhwnan; he knew that his tenure of office depended, in part, on the 
Negro vote, and that this vote could only be maintained by holding a 
friendly attitude toward the colored citizen.s between elections. 
Since the Crump machine was responsible for maintaining the 
Negro vote in Memphis, several chapters of this essay deal with the 
Cru.mp era and the early history of the city. In reporting the period 
of Crump domination, it is necessary to show that Mr . Crump was an honest 
political leader, and not the dEll.'logogue pictured by some who have written 
about him. Physical violence was seldom a part of his rnachine•s tactic::~ , 
and he never u::~ed political influence to further his financial interests. 
A lmowledge of the progress made under his leadership is a prerequisite to 
understanding the gains made by the Negro citizen in Mer:tphis , 
Because the right of participation in ballot box decisions was 
granted to the Memphis Negro without a fight, he has been able to mature 
politically and gain at least a portion of the self- respect accompanying 
full citizenship. This political maturity can be seen by the activity of 
the Negroes in the 1959 municipal election. A slate of four well qualified 
candidates made the first large scale attempt by Southern Negroes to gain 
public off'ice since reconstruction. But this was not a campaign of protest, 
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nor a demand for additional civic benefits . Instead it was a Negro 
declaration that they had reached poll tical maturity and were Beeking 
courthouse posi tiona as representatives of their caste . This can be 
demonstrated by the offices they were seeking : Commissioner of Public 
Works , Judge of the Juvenile Court, and members of the Board of Education . 
Despite l!td. tc protest to the contrary, none of these posi tiona could have 
altered white- Negro social relations had the candidates been elected. The 
extremely moderate integration policies favored by all candidates, although 
each listed desegregation as a long- range goal, further demonstrated that 
the election was for representation rather than social change . A fifth 
Negro candidate, seeking the office of tax assessor, did not adhere to this 
policy and was not allowed membership in the Negro poll tical organization. 
But while Crump had given the Negro his right to vote, the 
emergence of an effective Negro political organization to support the 
candidates of their caste, rested, ironically, on the decline of machine 
rule in Hernphis . During the Crump era the city prospered under the leadership 
of one organization, and undivided voter loyalty prevented the establishment 
of any noteworthy opposition . But with the death of the dictator , the 
organization was incapable of settling its internal differences and lacked 
Crump ' s vision and popularity . Thus the organization split into several 
factions . With divided popular support, many candidates in the post- Crump 
elections saw the possibility of gaining public office for the first time. 
Of course, their platfonns generally appealed to the majority of the city' s 
voters , the white citizens. 
Left without a benevolent dictator to provide for them, the 
( 
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Negro had to look elsewhere for the services Crump had provided , He saw 
in the political confusion after 1954, a possibility of electing a member 
of his caste through a split of the white vote . Negro candidates in the 
elections of 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1958, provided experiments by which the 
colored citizens could test t.'fleir strength . In 1959, therefore, with the 
experience of seven Negro candidates behind them, the Negroes were able to 
organize a Volunteer Ticket with support considered by many to be sufficient 
to elect several of its candidates . 
Because of the development of the Volunteer Ticket, the 1959 
election is considered the most important in the city since the 1909 
election of E. H. Crump. It is my belief that this election could have 
occurred only in Memphis, where the Negroes had a long tradition of ballot 
box participation, demonstrating that the right to vote is the first step 
in developing civic responsibility. If followed, the election can serve 
to demonstrate to both the white and colored citizens of the South that 
racial issues are best settled peacefully through universal suffrage. 
CHAPTER II 
AN INTROOOCTION TO 1l!E MlJNICIPAL ELECTION, 1959 
NEW FACES ON 'IKE CITY OOMMISSI~ - Seated (left to right) are: Mayor 
Henry Loeb, lli; Conunissioner of Public Works, William Farris; Conmrl.ssioner 
of Finances and Institutions, James Moore; and Commissioner of Public 
Service, John T. Dwyer. Claude .Arnlour, Colmllissioner of Public Safety 
and Vice-Mayor, is not shown. 
- 6 -
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A. 
In its history, Memphis has witnessed three great crises . 
Yet, since 1819 the city has risen from a muddy Mississippi River 
village to one of the most important metropolises in the South. Her 
population has climbed from JOB frontiersmen to more than half a 
million "friendly citizen.s 11 • Civil war and resonstruction, the great 
yellow fever epidemic of 1876, and the recent death of Edward Hull 
Crwnp, have all left their marks on the city and on the minds of its 
inhabitants. '!he first, needless to say, imposed on the city the 
unity of thought which has characterized the Southern mind to this day. 
The second impoverished the city, changed the base of population from 
German to &lglish descent, and paved the way for the refom tllOVement 
at the turn of the century. With the last, in 1954, came the end of an 
era in Memphis politics. 
Many political analysts have interpreted the elction of ~tes 
Kefauver to the United States Senate in 1948 as a defeat of the Crump 
machine, and consequently, a rejection of his dictatorship by the 
citizens of Termessee. This is not correct. For while the 1948 
election greatly damaged his state-wide control, Crurap 1 s leadership 
at home remained intact during the following six years. 'Thus when his 
death brought an end to almost half a century of machine poll tics in 
Memphis, it did not bring with it the knowledge, ability, or desire 
necessary for the citizens to take over the reins of their government. 
The city had depended so long on Boss Crwnpt s leadership, and on his 
ability to make the decisions for them, that they were incapable of 
( 
( 
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self-directed thinking, 
Crump's lieutenants, who were ill-prepared to manage the 
headless organization, lacked the ability to grasp the opportunity 
for agressive leadership necessarJ to perpetuate their rule, and thus 
could not fill the void left by the death of Ed Crump. The remaining 
organization was tmable to decide on a mayoralty candidate for their 
1955 slate of city offices . With this internal disunity, the Shelby 
County Political Organization was capable of returning only two of 
its men to office, surrendering the other three posts to civic minded 
individuals v!ho were novices in the art of politics. The result was 
a perpetual battle among the city officials in which all action died 
on the conference table. Therefore, the citizens looked ldth hope 
toward the municipal election of 1959, to solve the dilemma of the 
past five years. 
The importance of tlds election cannot be underestimated, 
for on it res.ted the chance for political harmony and the re-establislunent 
of an effective city government. But from this campaign came two 
reactions which were to becloud the fundamental issue and pose the 
serious danger that the election would not bring the unity that was 
needed, The first reaction was a feeling in the minds of all to many 
citizens that they were the ones to provide this harmony. Thus 
forty-five candidates, all billed as independents, made a bid for 
fourteen municipal offices, (a great contrast to the days of Crump, 
when any opposition to his slate was considered an oddity). Many 
veteran politicians looked in awe at the unprecedented number of 
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political aspirants, and one re.1narked: 11What the city needs right now 
is a good health examination , Too many folks are suffering from 
auditory hallucinations . They think they hear voices calling them to 
run for off'ice,nl 
The other problem, a more serious threat to the hope for 
unity , was that for the first time in the city•s history, a well 
organized Negro group presented a slate of candidates with a backing 
considered by many to be sufficient for election. This problem was 
to overshadow all other issues and create an explosive drive for 
registration and voting on both sides of the color barrier. The day 
following the election, the New York Times caught this side of tho 
contest when it reported, 11 The issue--clearly a white versus Negro 
battle--was settled at the polls in an overwhelming turnout of voters 
of both races . n2 Associated Press and United Press International 
bulletins released similar information to the major newspapers across 
the country. 
While this was not the only outcome of the election, its 
publicity was not ill-founded. Total registration had risen from 
159 , 513 for the 1955 election to 187, 541 eligible voters in 1959 . 
Based on the figures for the election of Commissioner of Public Works , 
the contest in which a Negro candidate held the greatest chance of 
success, 129, 286 persons cast their vote , representing 68 .9 percent 
of the registered voters . This was a substantial increase over the 
previous high in 1955, when only 54 percent , or 86,370 persons , went 
to the polls . Also significant is the fact that Negro registration 
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rose from 38,847 in 1955 to 57,100 in 1959, or from 24.3 per cent 
of the total registration to 30.4 per cent.3 Yet one must remember 
that 11 the record vote reflected not only the tremendous campaign 
conducted by the Negro Volunteer Ticket, but also shows that the 
challenge of the five Negro candidates stirred a tremendous response 
among the white citizens.•!4 
The dependence of this high vote on the Negro issue is seen 
clearly by the total returns for the various offices. As previously 
noted, the hotly contested Public Works race drew the unprecedented 
total of 129, 286 votes. Second in number of 1lotes cast, w:i th a 
126,217 vote total, was the contest for Judge of the Juvenile Court, 
in which a Negro was given a good possibility of victory over the 
four white candidates. The usually neglected race for City Tax Assessor 
drew 113,103 votes because of a Negro entry. The relation between the 
high vote and the Negro candidates can be seen more readily, perhaps, 
in the contests for the four Board of "Education posts . For _positions 
II and III, in which Negroes were candidates, 117,129 and 110,833 
persons voted, respectively. For positions I and IV on the Board, 
in which no Negro was entered, the voting was only 82,973 and 80,948. 5 
For the position in -which no Negro was a participant, the voting 
varied according to the colored interest and support of the white 
candidates. In the mayor • s race, for instance, where Negroes were 
fighting to defeat the strong white candidate, the vote turnout ran 
to 122,745 while only 93,169 persons cast their ballots for Commission'er 
of Public Safety and Vice-Mayor, which was the only seat on the commission 
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for 'Which the Negro VolW1teer Ticket did not endorse a candidate . 
While the total vote changed according to Negro interest, 
the variation in voter participation was reflected more in the 'White 
than in the Negro wards , The Cor.unercial Appeal reported that 'While 
the city average gave almost a 69 per cent voter turn out, "this 
percentage is some eight points higher than that for the predominantly 
Negro precincts . n6 However, a 61 per cent turnout of Negro voters is 
remarkable, even in Memphis , the longtime 11voting oasis for Negroes 
in tho entire South. 11 7 Since the majority of all Negroes in both the 
North and South, are employed in positions of cootmOn labor , it is often 
difficult for them to find the time or opportunity to vote . And one 
must also remember that the less educated, poorer classes, generally 
vote less frequently than do their more educated and richer neighbors . 
Tennessee, however, distinguished from other parts of the South, has no 
poll tax to restrict voting , no literacy test, and the polls remain open 
until 7: 30 p . m. to give all workers ample time to exercise their voting 
privilege . 
Some Negro leaders felt that the clear, 90 degree weather on 
election day, August 20th, subtracted from the potential Negro vote . 
Many Memphis Negroes are employed in the cotton fields of rural 
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee , and are outside the city during 
most of the cll\vlight hours . Rev . Roy Love , a Negro candidate for the 
Board of Education had asked his supporters to pray for rain on 
election day to keep the cotton trucks from going out . 8 Another Negro 
campaigner warned the colored voters "They will pick you up in busses 
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and promise you twice as much money as you ever made before picking 
cotton to get you out of the city on election da;y. n9 "Miss those 
truckB tomorrow, 11 they urged, "and vote . 11 
'While the Negroes were unable to place a person of their 
race in the courthouse, the Volunteer Ticket saw each of its candidates 
win second place. Still it would be an error to interpret this failure 
at the polls as a complete loss for the Negro citizens. For the 
election accomplished more than that, and perhaps more than it could 
have if a Negro had been elected. First, it created an awareness 
among the white citizens of the need to "distribute civic responsibility 
and leadership to Negro leaders in the Negro communit;y , 1110 Second, it 
increased the self- respect of the Negro citizens through ballot box 
participation and showed them that their vote was meaningfUL Third, it 
built an effective Negro political organization capable of becoming an 
important element, as a balance of power, in future elections. And 
.fourth, it demonstrated to the city leaders the needs and desires o.f the 
Negro conununity without creating the race hatred incurred in the Montgomery 
bus boycott or the Little Rock school crisis. 
B. 
Under the long domination o.f the Crwup political machine, 
opposition candidates in Memphis were seldom seen. V.O. Key, Jr. , and 
other interpreters of Termessee politics, believed this lack o.f opposition 
was the result o.f Crump' a use of physical violence, which deterred any 
potential threat to his maintenance o.f power . While I am sure that the 
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fear of intimidation was ilnportant in the anti-Crump camp, I believe 
that the actual use of force 1i8.S unnecessary. Furthermore, if 
violence had been used, it would be an impossible task to prove. 
Rather, I feel that the mere announcement of Crump backing would 
guarantee a candidate a sufficient quantity of votes to render it 
foolish for any opposing candidate to compete against him. Also, since 
candidates supported by Crump were generally the most acceptable to the 
business comnnmity, and were men of character and honor, it would have 
been hard to find a slate of capable men who were not in sympathy with 
the Crump selection. Under Crump, the city sirrq:>ly witnessed an 
exaggerated form of a trait inherent in all one-party systems, the 
"extreme difficulty in maintaining an organized opposition~ 11 
After the failure of the Shelby Cotu1ty poll tical machine in 
the 1955 election, and the realization that its bacld.ng did not 
guarantee the results that it had under Crump, politically minded 
cit izens began to refuse as sociation with the organization. The 
drive to shun all 11tickets 11 , lest they be considered offensive, 
produced a deluge of inexperienced, independent candidates who hoped 
to give the city unity in 1959 without the binding connection of a 
nan.e, a party, or a ticket. 
To solve the problem of selecting candidates from this long 
and ununited list, a problem new to the citizens of Memphis, independent 
groups of individuals and non-political organizations began to endorse 
the various candidates . Host endorsements came as a slate presented to 
the public in the name of unity and hamony. Most inq)ortant in this 
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endeavor was the Dedicated Citizens Committee who posed a "Unity 
Ticket", which they claimed would minimize the political strife 
present in the past administration. However, their efforts were 
hindered because they refused to reveal the membership of their 
group, and because of the outlandish nUlllber of other organizations 
who also jumped into the endorsement business. Slates were presented 
by the Home Builders Association, the Mortgage Bankers Association, 
The Memphis Real Estate Board, the Shopping Center Owners Association, 
the Business and Professional l-Ien and Women, and the Downtown Association. 
Other endorsements came from various Negro organizations, several 
Veterans groups, half a dozen labor councils, both newspapers, the Parent 
Teacher Association, civic councils, politicians of all shap:s and sizes, 
and even a couple of religious groups . One newspaper remarked, "Where 
there are two or more assembled these days, you likely will get an 
endorsement for a ticket.'! 12 
The political immaturity demonstrated by this movement 
greatly hindered the intelligent and rational selection of any slate, 
since almost all candidates ware endorsed by one or more groups, many 
of them with opposing views . Another hindrance was that many endorsements 
were biased and nrlgged through prearrangementn, l.3 and thus did not truly 
represent the group whose name the endorsement carried. Therefore many 
candidates approached the election with the undue confidence that they 
were tho voters' choice. 
To make natters worse, The Colllllercial Appeal attempted to 
straighten out this hodge- podge by conducting a poll of the voters . 
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However, since their poll was poorly managed and badly biased, in an 
attempt to muster white support behind one white candidate in the 
important Public Works race, the only opinion it expressed was that of 
its authors . Other groups also entered the public opinion field and a 
restaurant went so far as to put ballots on its men u.s and published the 
results as the 11People ' s choice11 • 
The movement toward independent candidates actually began 
during the 1955 campaign, 'When Edmund Orgill, then 56, exchanged his 
office as president of a large hardware finn for that of Mayor of Memphis . 
Henry Loeb III , another notable independent candidate, became Commissioner 
of Public Works at the age of 34. He vas secretary of the ci ty1 s 
largest laundry and had m.o.de his first move in politics by defeating a 
member of the former Crump machine for the politically important 
commandership of Post No . 1 of the American Legion. 
These two men vied :for the mayor' s office in the 1959 election 
and promised one of the hottest political battles in years . The primary 
issue of the race revolved around the general theme of harmony and the 
ability to co- operate with other city, county, a.rrl state politicians . 
Mr. Orgill was hindered by the poor record of the past administration, 
although the blame was only partially his , and Henry Loeb was still 
considered by many to be too young and brash :for the office. 
Unfortunately for the campaign, Mr. Orgill became ill early in the 
swn:r.~er, "while shaking hands", and withdrew from the campaign when he 
entered the hospital. Mr. Loeb, left without serious opposition, won 
an easy victory f'or the position. 
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The withdrawal of Edmund Orgill from consideration in the 
mayor1 s race left the Hemphis Press-Scimitar, the city' s crusading 
evening newspaper, somewhat embarrassed. Noted for its ability to 
avoid moderation, in any form, and for its hasty decisions , the paper 
had given its full support to Mr . Orgill much too early in the campaign. 
Thus when he withdrew it tm.s forced to endorse the man it had criticized 
most severely. A sind.lar situation occurred with the continuance of 
the Orgill campaign organization . The body formed a new group lmo'Wl'l as 
t.'le Dedicated Citizens Committee, lolhosc chief purpose was to endorse a 
slate of officers they felt could work ha.rrnoniously together and prov:ide 
the city with the much needed internal unity . Of course, their support 
of Mr. Loeb raised protests from the anti-Loeb camps . A Negro candidate 
remarked that he was in doubt as to what the Dedicated Citizens were 
dedicated to . They had done a "flip- flop 11 , he said, 11 and endorsed the 
candidate they were dedicated to opposc. nl4 
The entrance of James W. IJimmyl 1-Ioore in the car.tpaign for 
Commissioner of Finances and Institutions was probably the biggest 
name among the political newcomers . Mr . Moore, a handsome realty 
dealer, had been a major league outfielder and president of the local 
Yellow Cab Company. While he proclaimed that he was no politician, 
which several of his later actions proved, he had the personality, 
chann, and drive for action that his opponent lacked. His campaign 
theme centered around the waste and inaction under the past 
administration. 
In the race for Commissioner of Public Works, tho position 
( 
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vacated by Henry Loeb, William Farris, William Fowler, and John Ford 
Canale drew the greatest attention among the white voters . The young, 
agressive Mr. Farris had been persotmel director and administrative 
assistant under the past three mayors and presented a hopeful picture 
of potential leadership. Mr. Fowler, the oldest candidate in the race, 
was the veteran city engineer. A member of the old Cl'Wllp organization, 
he campaigned on his lmowledge of the Public Works Department. Mr. 
Canale, a funeral director, entered the race with two strikes against 
him. He was the executive assistant to the pro- Crump Shelby County 
Cormdssion and thus drew attack from the anti- organization citizens 
and from those 'Who believed that he would f'avor the county in the 
present city- county struggle for division of school funds . Mr. Canale, 
who was a Catholic, also would have violated the unwritten law allowing 
only one Catholic on the City Commission. Jolm T. Dwyer, assured of 
re- election as Colll11issioner of Public Service, had already filled this 
religious position. All three candidates for the post, as well as the 
labor candidate Sam Chambers, ran as independents . 
The spirit of independence ran so hot during the campaign 
that Claude Armour, seeking re- election as Commissioner of Public 
Safety, and Mr. Dwyer, both of whom had been elected in 1955 under 
the label of the old Crwnp machine, ran separately as independents . 
Stanley Dillard, who was opposing Jilnn\Y Moore for Corrrnissioner of 
Finances and Institutions, also declared his independence. He had 
been elected to the post in 1955 on an anti-organization ticket, but 
had joined the pro- Crwnp group after election, giving it a 
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trouble-causing three to two 11working rnajori ty11 , Mr . Dillard drew 
Negro protest for his support of segregated public facilities . In 
the school board contest, the incumbents, as a. body, refUsed to 
campaign and waited for the newspapers to defend their group policies , 
A dual conflict arose in the heated contest for Juvenile 
Court Judge, where a strong Negro candidate was pitted against four 
whites, and where two capable white men were o~osing incumbent Miss 
Elizabeth McCain and contender Mrs . Ila Huff . In the other judgeships 
incumbent Beverly Boushe was opposed by Negro-supported Ray Churchill 
for Division II of the City Court . Some Negroes did not feel that 
they received equal justice before Mr . Boushe . Two minor candidates 
opposed Judge William B. Ingram, Jr ., for re- election to Division III 
of the City Court . Judge Ingram, whose court handles traffic offenses , 
had been running a continuous battle with the police department . 
While some of his actions were justified, others seemed foolish , 
spiteful, and even dangerous . 
Aside from the prevailing theme of unity, and the white V3rsus 
Negro issue, the major problems facing the commission candidates were : 
a possible change in the form of government; settlement of the city 
county dispute over division of school funds and the possibility of 
combining the two school systems; annexation of neighboring villages; 
and continued progress on the major city improvements, namely: the 
system of expressways , a new jet- age airport , a civic center, and the 
pending downtown redevelopment study. A call for equalization of 
assessments and for the adoption of a "Little Hatch Act", governing 
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the political activity of city employes, was also heard. 
The attempt to change the commission form of government, 
an idea that had helped put Mayor Orgill in office in 1955, had the 
endorsement of the major candidates in the 1959 race, The lack of 
action and political disunity prevalent during the 1955 term brought 
the question again to light as a possible answer to the problem of 
political unrest, The mayor-council or strong mayor form of 
government and the city manager plan were thought to be more 
effective for group action in a city the size of Memphis than the 
present system . There was also discussion of combining the city and 
country governments into a !!Greater MemphiB 11 area, 
c. 
While the Negro Volunteer Ticket pushed its campaign around 
the slogan 11This is a crusade for freedom", the equally emotional 
whites had no official theme . Fearful that if a Negro was elected 
it would disrupt racial harmony, they unofficially rallied under the 
label 11Keep Memphis 'White~ n 15 The importance of this fear, the 
existence of which, as I indicated in Section A of this chapter, was 
demonstrated by the election, brings to mind the story of an election 
in another Southern town. This town, much smaller in size, was 
holding an election for mayor, in which a 'White and Negro citizen were 
running. Being in the black belt area, where Negro voting is generally 
restricted, the town had only two Negro voters against one thousand 
eligible 'Whites. The day following the election a visitor from a 
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neighboring town inquired about the outcome of the contest. "'h, n 
the local informant said, "the white candidate won a thousand to two'' . 
"Well," replied the visitor, "you might have known those niggers would 
bloc votet " 
The application of this story to the Memphis election seems 
very real. For, as I shall show in a later chapter, unity of the 
'White vote seemed more cohesive against the Negro candidates than did 
the Negro vote for these men, The simple explanation here is that the 
Negroes have divided loyalties while the 'Whites do not . In the 1959 
election, Sarn Chambers, representing organized labor, drew votes fran 
Negro workers despite the fact that Russell Sugarman, Jr. , a Negro, 
was campaigning for the same post . It was also believed that some 
Negro votes went to white candidates because certain lower class 
Negroes resented Sugarmon1 s Harvard education. The Negroes then are 
capable of crossing the race barrier when they are dissatisfied with 
the candidate of their caste, or when they feel that a white candidate 
offers theta more . The Wite voter, on the other hand, is incapable 
of such action. Negroes must always consider the merits of white 
candidates, Wile no white voter is expected to view a Negro 
candidate aa anything other than a threat to white supremacy. 
Generally, the most effective political weapon in the hands 
of a minority group is the bloc vote. This, and its specialization 
as single shot voting, "implies voting for one or several candidates 
according to instruction regardless of qualificat ion. n 16 This 
definition assumes that group support of a candidate is irrational, 
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that it gives the candidate votes arbitrarily, on the merit of his 
race , and disregards his ability to fill the office. But, 11by 
rational action we mean action which is efficiently designed to achieve 
the consciously selected political or economic ends of the actor.nl7 
'lbus the Negro is perfectly rational in his decision to support a 
candidate of his race. In the recent municipal election the chief 
goal of the colored people was "participation in government and not 
paternalism with a handout, [8. desirg to join the community and be a 
part of the community' s institutions. n18 Presenting a slate of Negro 
candidates was the most "efficient" and thus the most rational means 
of achieving this nconsciously selected" goal. The racial understanding 
gained by the campaign further illustrates this rationale. 
We also note that the definition of bloc voting gi vee a 
misleading interpretation to the word 11instruction11 • To me, the word 
11instruction11 would mean a concentrated effort by the Volunteer Ticket 
to increase Negro registration, voting, and understanding about the 
issues involved in the contest. This is quite different from the 
implied meaning of docile subjection to the will of a pro100ter as seen 
in the given definition. We must remember also that the whites were well 
11instructed" so that they would know the Negro candidates by name and 
could avoid casting a vote for them by mistake or ignorance. 
Of the five Negro candidates in the election, three were 
ministers, two l awyers, and one was taking extension courses in 
accounting. All had some college education. Reverend H. C. Bunton 
- 24 -
and Roy Love were candidates for the Board of Education, while the 
Reverend Ben L. Hooks, who is also an attorney, was seeking the 
J uvenile Court Judgeship . Attorney Russell Sugarman, Jr. , by far 
the most significant of the Negro candidates, was entered in the 
six man race for Commissioner of Public Works . Eliehue Stanback, 
the only Negro candidate not a member of the VolWlteer Ticket, 
(although they did endorse him), was attempting to oust veteran 
Tax Assessor Joe S. Hicks from his office. All five were members of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
I was interested to note that the Negro candidates ranked in 
education and in color according to the importance of their office, 
Hr . Sugarmon was a Harvard Law graduate, having received his 
bachelor' s degree at Rutgers; was a representative of the Negro upper 
class; and could almost have passed for a Caucasian. Mr. Stanback, on 
the other hand, was barely literate, althou.gh he had attended a local 
Negro college. He represented the lower, middle class Negro and was 
the most radical member competing for the Negro vote. His color -was 
coal-tar black. The other candidates varied between these eXtremes 
in the order of the importance of their campaign position. John 
Dollard in his Caste and Class in a Sou.thern Town indicated that 
Negroes have more respect for the light skinned members of their race 
than for the pure blacks, He also suggested that theBe "high yellows" 
were more acceptable to the whites on an equ.al basis than were the darker 
Negroes . However, Mr. Sugarmon attached no political significance to 
his light color 'When I questioned hi.Jn abou.t it during an interview. 
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The efforta of the Volunteer Ticket, and of the white 
opposition to the Negro candidates, centered around Mr. Sugarman's 
b'id for Public Works Commissioner. With no incumbent to buck, since 
Mr. Loeb was moving into the mayor1 s office, and with three or £our 
comparatively strone candidates to split the white vote, the election 
of Mr. Sugarmon seemed quite possible. Some courthouse officials 
felt that the Volunteer Ticket was purposely channeling attention into 
the Public Works race to allow the similar situation in the Juvenile 
Court contest to go unnoticect.19 However, the strong position of the 
incumbent judge, Miss Elizabeth f.tcCain, minimized scattering of the 
ldli te vote and thus reduced the chance for Reverend Hooks election. 
The possibility of a Negro candidate, representing a 
minority of the city's voters, being elected to any post, rested on 
the absence of a run-off voting law. Under the present voting laws 
candidates ran for specific posts on the City Commission, or Board 
of Education, with the highest vote determining the winner. Since 
there was no run-off election, a candidate, theoretically, could gain 
office with only a one vote plurality. The threat then was that the 
almost equally strong white candidates would split the white vote and 
allow the sole Negro candidate for each office to be elected by a 
small plurality. Should a majority be required for office, and a 
run-off election held, a white candidate would be assured election, 
since the contest would be reduced to the racial issue . 
Several attempts were made to obtain a special run-off 
election for this campaign, but when the governor failed to call a 
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special session of the Tennessee legislature to consider the proposal, 
other strategies had to be used. The final, and most important, 
movement to restrict Negro voting strength was 11to try to persuade 
' weak' candidates in the Public Works Commissioner and Juvenile 
Court Judge races to withdraw in favor of one ' strong' candidate.n20 
Until five days before the election, however, 11this strategy had not 
worked because of lack of agreement over who was the t strong' 
candidate in each race, 1121 On August 15, in the midst of an almost 
frenzied attempt to get any candidate to idthdraw, William Fowler 
removed himself from competition in favor of William Farris, ltlo had 
the backing of both newspapers and the "Unity Ticket11 • This, of 
course, prevented Mr . Sugannon .from winning the election, and helped 
start the bandwagon necessary to put Mr. Farris into office. 
While it is still too early to \mow the real significance 
of the 1959 election, there is room for much speculation on the 
subject. Being the first completely free election in Memphis since 
Crump took office in 1910, the election gave the people an understanding 
of their duty as citizens. The drive for unity, and the election of 
the candidates supported by the Dedicated Citizen's "Unity Ticket" has 
already shown signs of improved county and state relations with the 
municipal goverrunent. The campaign pointed out a weakness in the 
state' s election laws and will probably enable the adoption of run-off 
laws for the metropolitan areas . 
More important, however, will be the ultimate effect on the 
Negro voters because of their participation in this election. Much 
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talk during the campaign was concerned with giving the Negroes minor 
executive positions in the city government to allow them an opportunity 
to develop civic responsibility, I am sure the pressure on both white 
and Negro political leaders will see that advancement is made along 
these lines. The election will also serve as an example to other 
Southern cities that both whites and Negroes can work peacefully toward 
their goals through use of the ballot box , Emotionalism, although still 
present, was restrained, allowing Memphis to boast of not only the most 
significant, but also the llquietist11 election in years . 
C!!APTZR III 
WE GROW!l! OF MEMPIIIS 
Memphis on the mighty Missia sippi 
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A. 
Before continuing furtller in our discussion of Memphis 
politics, I feel that we should view the city ' s history, culture, 
and record of economic growth. Each of these, while not directly 
related to politics, stands back of every governmental decision. 
These facts have determined the thought patterns of the Memphis 
citizen, and consequently are of paramount importance in directing 
the behavior of the people . We cannot overlook their influence, for 
without them we would not have a full understanding of the importance 
of the recent municipal election. 
11Born in 1819 of the weBtward movement and of cotton, 111 
the city was strategically located on the down- river end of a series 
of four high bluffs, which stretch for a hundred miles along the 
Tennessee shore of the 11ississippi River . 11Bluffs were always at a 
premium along the river, for they were safety f'ro:n the spring flood, n2 
and the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff at Memphis was the highest and thus 
most important of all . After a series of French, Spanish, and 
American forts had occupied the bluff, plans for a city were laid 
out by three Nash ville land speculators . Judge John Overton, a 
former Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court, obtained a large 
tract of bluff land in 179b and sold half of his claim for $100 to a 
young Nashvil le la'Wj'"er and associate of his , Andrew Jackson. James 
Winchester, a retired army general of the Wm- of 1812, was the third 
party involved in the plans for the new city. Seven years later , on 
December 9, 1826, Memphis was incorporated with a population of )08 
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frontiersmen. 
The city began to grow, and by 1850 was the central cotton 
market for Arkansas, Mississipp~ and Tennessee, and had become an 
important rail and steamboat center. The city had had telegraph lines 
to New Orleans and Nashville for four years , free public schools for 
two, and in another six years would erect the first five story building 
in the state. Cotton was becoming increasingly important, and in the 
years between 1840 and 1860 the city' s cotton sales rose from $1, 400,000 
to $16, 000,000. 
Despite this reliance on cotton, 11there is ample evidence 
that the Memphis of those boom decades was considered nationally, as 
well as locally, a Western town. A gateway to Texas and the far west 
over the only route open the whole year round, it recai ved considerable 
attention from the war and naV'J departments for defense of the frontier 
against possible agression from Mexico and the gul!. 113 As another part 
of its link with the West, Memphis became, 11in September, 1858, 
the '.EaStern terminus of the Overland Mail to California . ~,4 
Gerald Capers in his excellent Biography of a River Town 
explains this dual orientation of Memphis . 
No metropolis, not even New Orleans, typifies more clearly 
the character of the lower west than Memphis. Bound to 
the upper valley by the Mississippi and by trade, and allied 
with the lower seaboard because of cotton and the Negro, this 
city on the middle Mississippi has always been bot..~-). South and 
West ••• it displays traits of both its progenitors; and 
when it ultimately favored secession in 1861, its decision 
was dictated more by emotion than by reason. Socially and 
economically it has resembled Chicago far more than it has 
resembled any Southern town. Figuratively and literally, the 
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the Sou t~ met the West in Memphis . 5 
Economically, the settlement on the bluff was West before 
it was South; it did not become rabidly Southern until it 6 
was caught in the emotionalism of the early months of 1861. 
Certainly this was so, for in 1834 , the candidates from 
Memphis to the state constitutional convention were all abolitionists , 
favoring gradual emancipation and coloniali::.ation . 7 And fUrther , it 
was not until the following year that extremists in the state were able 
to remove from the free Negro his right to vote . Even after the 
excitement of Lincoln ' s 8lection in 186o, Memphis and Tennessee had not 
made up their minds on the questions of slavery and secession. In a 
state- 1dde vote on February 9, 1861, to dete:nnine whether or not the 
state should hold a convention to consider secession, the Unionists 
won 91 , 803 to 24,749 . And in Memphis the Unionists carried by a 722 
majority . 8 
But as the year progressed, the spirit of secession grew 
increasingly feverish in the cotbn capitol. On April 15, President 
Lincoln asked Tennessee to contribute her share of the three-month 
volunteers needed •• to put down the rebellion." Two days later he 
called for a blockade of Southern ports and suspension of tho -writ 
of habeas corpus . Emotionalism had grown too strong in Memphis , 
and some of the citizens considered withdrawing from the state and 
joining already seceeded Mississippi unless Tennessee left the Union 
innnediately. On June 8, the state again voted for secession, this 
tiMe in the affirmative . In Memphis only five votes were cast against 
the move . The city had formally joined the South. 
( 
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Immediately the city became important to the South as a 
supply and hospital center for the Mississippi and western campaigns. 
But its usefulness in this line ended on June 6, 1862, when the 
Federal fleet captured the city after a brief waterfront battle . The 
city remained under military control until July 3, 1865; one year 
before Tennessee re-entered the Union. 11During its occupation, 
Memphis succeeded in maintainine trade and commWlications ·ID. th the 
lower South, and served as an entrepot for most of the contraband 
trade between the North and the South . n10 General William Tecumseh 
Sherman, who Has briefly in command of I1emphis , was convinced that 
because of this trade the city was worth more to the Confederacy 
after its capture than before . 11 In any case, all evidence points 
to the conclusion drawn by Mr. Gapers, that 11few Southern to1ms 
suffered as little from the four years war as did Memphis•' 1! 12 The 
P~yt.IIOI..I'fi"AL 
damage that was done was chiefly ~' rather than physical or 
economic, and left the city vr.i thout effective leadership to meet 
the post-l~.r demands. 
Before the slow job of recovery could complete its course , 
the second tragedy of the generation struck with a force much more 
devastatins than any war . In August, 1878, yellow fever broke out 
in the city, spreading panic and fever at an epidemic rate . Within 
less than two weeks emigration had reduced the city from 40, 230 
(the 1875 population) to 19,600, of whom 14,000 were Negroes . Of 
the remaining 5, 6oo whites , 4, 204 died, while death claimed only 
946 Negroes . 13 When the population returned, they were reduced in 
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numbers, bankr upt, and incapable of solving their problern.s . On 
January 31, 1879 the city surrendered its charter and became a 
taxing district of the state . 14 According to the laws of Tennessee, 
Memphis ~~as nonexistant for the next twelve years, and the tax 
district was governed by a state- .:l.ppointed president. 
The epidemic also affected the cultural and economic base 
of the river city. Before the war, the city resembled Cincinnati 
or St. Louis in the composition of its population. In 1860, 37 per 
cent of its citizens were of foreign origin, mostly of Gennan and 
Irish descent. The favorable econonic conditions which existed in 
Memphis during the War did little to change this picture. But with 
the outbreak of yellow fever, much of the wealth and culture of the 
city, represented by the German element, moved North and remained 
there, permanently. The Irish, who on tho whole were too poor to 
move, remained, and 11the extent to which they were reduced in nwnbers 
by t.l-te epidemic is suggested by the fact that of the eight thousand 
who died, nearly hall were Gatholic. 1!15 Thus by 1900 only 15 per 
cent of the population were foreign born, or were the children of 
immigrants .16 
The change in population, however, had begun at the end of 
the liar . The freedmen from the delta regions of I1ississippi and 
Arkansas began to flood into Manphis with the hopes of a new life. 
"The Negro population of Memphis, which in 186o had numbered 3, 882, 
increased so rapidly durin8 the post- war years that by 1870 it 
amoW1ted to 15, 471· 1117 From this influx, Beale Street emerged as 
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the Main Street of Negro America, a position it still maintains . 
As the century drew to a close, the city, with its bright lights 
and factory jobs, drew increasing nwnbers of rural families to its 
doors . What was left of the 11 city•s cultural heritage became a 
minority, outnwnbered by the newcomers from the country.''18 And 
in addition to the attractions Memphis offered the newly freed 
Negro and the red- neck in search of a job, the city provided an 
immense variety of vice and corruption to draw the transient river 
gambler and fun seeking tourist to its tenderloin sections . 
During the decade of the 18801 s, Memplrl.s took part in the 
tremendous burst of industrial eJqJansion that characterized the 
New South. The city almost doubled its population between 1880 and 
1890, jumping i'rom 33, .592 citizens to 64, 49.5 . It woo.ld be 102, 320 
by 1900. 11 The percentage increase in invested capit.al from 1880 
to 1890 was .304, while the increases for Atlanta, Nashville, and 
Richmond were 285, 2, 154.5, and 142 . 4 respectively.nl9 The value 
of manufactured products increa.sed from $4,413,422 to $13,244,538, 
and climbed to $39, 593, 146 by 1919. 20 Located in the heart of the 
still Wltouched hardwood forests of the mid-Mississippi Valley, the 
city became the "first hardwood market, and ,second larges t general 
[f.umbe;.7 market in the worldn by 1900. 21 
The city' s second largest industry, the manufacture of 
cottonseed products, also boomed. The organization of the Memphis 
Cotton Exchange in 1874 to control the marketing of cotton, grew 
into one of the most important agencies in the South, annually 
( 
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handling $100,000,000 in cotton by 1920.22 
Much of this industrial expansion was due to the efforts 
of James T. Harahan, vice- president of the illinois Central Railroad, 
who was instrumental in making the city "one of the railroad• s most 
illlportant terminal and supply centers1~ 23 (A bridge bearing his name 
was completed across the Mississippi River in 1909 . The Frisco 
Bridge, the first to span the river, was built in 1892.) Also 
instrumental in bringing diversified industries to MemphiB was E. B. 
Miller, secretary of the Industrial League for attracting new industry. 
Mr. Miller argued against the popular cry of the New South for large 
cotton mills in favor of smaller manufacturing plants. "Cotton mills", 
he said, "employ the cheapest labor to be found • • • An ordi.nary 
$100,000 spinning mill will employ .froM. 100 to 125 hands at 75 cents 
per """' ('1rdlfl ••• a $10, 000 pottery plant will employ 100 at $2 
per day~'' ~4 Others followed his advice and Memphis, where cotton 
was king, avoided the mass unemployment which met other cotton to'Wlls 
in the depression which followed the First World War. 
But in their early drive for industri al power, the physical 
appearance of the city was neglected. Only twelve of the city' s 1?5 
miles of streets were hard surfaced by 1900, and sewers were virtually 
nonexistent. Parks were unheard of. The police force was drastically 
undermarmed, over-worked, underpaid, and plagued by the instability of 
a political foundation. Fire fighting equipment was less than half 
that required by the insurance underwriters . 
Memphis was also unique for the extensiveness of its crime. 
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'nlere were .504 saloons in 1903, most of which were hot-beds of the 
city• s Ullderworld.2S Prostitution and gambling vere not only wide 
open, but were so entrenched in the political circles that reform 
from the top lolaS unthinkable . '!he murder rate was on a continual 
rise, reaching 134 in 1916. This was 89.9 homicides per hundred 
thousand population, almost triple its next competitor, Atlanta, 
with 31.. 26 
Memphis had made more progreas during this period of its 
growth than it had in any span of prerious history. It had been 
transformed .from a small river town into a booming industrial city. 
"But the progress was economic, materialistic, produced by the 
machine, and while it solved some problems it created new ones. 
To deal with them the city turned increasingly to social and 
political reforma in the sprit of the progressive era. 1127 
Part of the reform centered around the need for rucpansion 
and the annexation of new territory. To aid this cause John J . 
Williams vas elected mayor in 1898, having von 11probably through 
the manipulation of an estimated two thousand Negro vote.s•n28 The 
threat of a new fever epidemic in the late summer of 1898 turthared 
the cry of armexation. Despite l'Di.nor resistance by neighborhood 
villages, Memphis, in January, 1899, extended its boWldaries to 
include 16. 77 square miles, a sizeable increase over the 4.64 
square miles that had ccmprised the city since 1870. (See Map 1) 
But there followed the problem of providing municipal services. Sewers 
t.ook precedence, because of the health issue, and between 1899 and 1901, 
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eighty-eight miles were added to the city sewer system,29 
Despite the efforts of Mayor Williams, and his successor 
James H. Malone, to cope with the problems of industrial expansion, 
little was accomplished, Roads were still muddy and unlighted in 
most parts of the city, health remained a major problem, and crime 
and vice continued to rob the population . The reform impulse needed 
more than intellectual justification. It needed leadership and 
popularization, qualities that would be lacking until the election 
of Ed Crut11p as mayor in 1909, Crump rose out of the progressive 
spirit and became the focal point of the entire movement . He alone 
cannot be given credit for the change that occurred, yet the city 
became ..mat it is today because of his ability to carry the passion 
for reform into the municipal government. 
B. 
During the decades of the Crump regime, a gradual, but 
persistant change took place in the composition of the city, and in 
the minds of its citizens. As Memphis grew in size, it also grew in 
understanding and in culture, so that by the time of Boss Crump ' s 
death, the city had emerged from the hovel of its past and was 
recognized as one of the most progressive cities in the nation, and 
the unmistakable leader in the Mid-South. The river town that had 
once been famous for its sway and swagger, for its sin and vice, now 
became famous for opposite reasons. And while it is difficult to 
speak of this change in Memphis without appearing to be a mouth-piece 
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:for the Chanber of Commerce, some recognition of the city' s 
achievements must be made . 
It is through this recognition that we understand the 
political achievements of the city' s Negro population, and the 
subsequent social and economic goals that they have obtained. It 
is evident that the growth of the city and the recognition of Negro 
political rights spr ans from the same source : the Cri.Ullp era . Thus 
it is impossible to view the rise in Negro rights without rGcognizing 
the ot.fter and related accomplishments of the Crump machine. The mind 
of the Memphis white, over the past fifty years, has been conditioned 
to accept the higher status of the city ' s Negroes only by a continued 
effort on the part of their political leader to bring the city out of 
its provincial past and to work into its blood the progressive vieHs 
of the rest of the nation. 
This change can easily be seen by the awards the city has 
taken in recent national contests . For the past fifteen years Memphis 
has been recognized as America ' s Quietist City, has twice been named 
the Nation' s Safest City, has won first place in the National Fire 
PrGvention Contest nine out of the last nineteen years, and has 
fourteen first place trophies as America' s Cleanest City . 30 This 
is a far cry from days at the turn of the century, and achievements 
that could only have come with progressive leadership . 
The cultural advancement in the city is equally apparent . 
There are noH one hundred ten public parks, covering three thousand 
acres , located throughout the city (see map 2) . While the large parks 
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are generally reserved for the 'Whi. te ci tizen.s, or in the case of the 
Fairgrounds and Overton Park, are open to Negroes one day per week, 
the neighborhood parks are fairly well divided betoreen the white and 
colored areas . The free Overton Park Zoo is a favorite with children 
throuettout the Mid-South, and is the only zoo of notable size in that 
section of the country. There are six public and three private 
:nd.Mmi.'lg pools for whites and four public pools for Negroes. The 
shel tcrcd waters of McKellar Lake provide excellent boating, sailing, 
and water skiing facilities . The Memphis Park Commission also maintains 
seven public golf courses, Wile an additional five courses are 
operated by the city' s country clubs. 
Other marks of the ci ty1 s culture are found in its museum, 
:ll't gallery, art school, Sinfonietta, the outdoor Shell in Overton 
Park for su.'7l!ner musical performances, and libraries. Special notice 
should be given to the Goodwyn Institute, which offers a complete 
reference library and maintains a free educational lecture series, 
and to the newly remodeled 3llis Auditoriwn, with a combined seating 
capacity of nearly ten thousand in its two halls . Of recent 
importance, Memphis has become headquarters for the World Literacy 
Fowtdation, headed by Dr. Frank Laubach, world-known for his 
each-one-teach- one method . The city• s educational television station 
~-IKNO is closely linked with the Foundation, and has taken a great 
step toward reducing the high illiteracy rate in that section of the 
country. Shelby United Neighbors, better known as SUN, the city' s 
community chest program, is viewed with pride by Menphis citizens, and 
( J 
considered by many to be the most effective com . 'nunity welfare program 
in the United States . 
Since the days of \-1 . C. H.::mdy, who made Beale Street hor..a 
of the blues, Memphis has been a center of popular music . This is 
one of the few areas where the crudeness of the past, although 
presented in modern terns , is still seen. Presently the home of 
Elvis Prasley, most rock- and- roll and country music of the South is 
first recorded in Memphis . Today there is even question in some 
minds over who is, or was, the city• s most famous citizen, Mr . Crump 
of Mr . Presley (although bot."rl were born in Mississippi) . 
Memphis was a pioneer in giving full recognition to the 
importance of a city' s appearance . One of the roost significant steps 
taken by the Crwnp machine to 11clean up" the city, was the creation 
of the City Beautiful Cornr:rl.ssion in 1930 as the first such official 
group in the United States . 31 Much of the beauty of the city, and 
certainly that part which draws immediate attention from newcomers and 
visitors, is the fine system of parkways . These large, four lane 
streets with their broad, tree covered boulevards, run for more than 
six miles around the former boundaries of the city (See Map 2) . 
Four interstate highways pass beautiful Overton Park on East Parkway, 
and the five highways that enter Memphis via the Memphis -Arkansas 
Bridge pass several blocks of ornamental parks on Crump Boulevard. 
Almost every highway enters the city through beautiful residential 
sections with neatly kept lawns and large shady trees . 
Part of the city• s cleanliness has come through its 
( 
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intelligent approach to industrialization. Unlike the steel mills 
of Birmingham, Memphis industry is comparatively clean and is 
located some distance from the center of town. Host of the ci ty• s 
industry is found in the northern part of the city, in wards 39, 40, 
and 41, along the Trlolf River, and in the south and southeast along 
the railroad yards and HcKellar Lake . Only the cotton rrarehouses, 
which dominate Front Street, are in the downtown section. Here 
again the Crump leadership has left its mark on the gro;rth of the 
city, for it was during his political domination in 1948, that 
plans were laid for the $50,000,000 President• s Island Industrial 
Park.32 Through the creation of this, and other industrial parks, 
the city has been able to provide 960 acres (there wlll be 7,800 
acres when the project is completed) for the expansion of heavy 
industry. Since all sites are served by 11rater, rail, and truck 
transportation, and are provided with all city utilities, the Park 
has helped drati new industry to Memphis. 33 
By examining Map 3 we can see that the areas of Negro 
concentration are confined primarily to the industrial sections of 
the city, as defined above. While the map is not based on 
population figures, but on the more recent distribution of registered 
voters, I feel it gives the most accurate picture of non-white 
residential areas nmr available. I base my reasoning on several 
points, First, continued expansion in Memphis and the present 
trend for Southern Negroes to move to the industrial centers of 
the North have contributed to a declining proportion of Negro 
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residents in the city. Although the city has seldom been over 50 
per cent Negro, it was reported to have been almost at that level 
in 19)0. The 1940 census listed a non- -white population of 41.5 
per cent of the total, and in 1950, tho census said only 37.1 per 
cent of the population was Negro . A special U. S. census conducted 
in Memphis in 1958 showed the city to be 35. 4 per cent Negro, having 
the eighth highest proportion of non- white residents in the country. 
Thus Negro registration in August, 1959, accounting for 30 . 4 per 
cent of the total eligible voters docs not seem far out of line . 
Second, the importance of the election to both white and colored 
citizens brought about an extremely high registration in all areas, 
further justi.f'ying our reliance on these figures . And third, it 
would be very difficult to correlate the federal census tracts to 
our map, since they do not follow ward botuldaries . 
Striking in the pattern of Negro concentration is its 
separation fror:~ the central b.lsiness district . Essentially, 
minority groups of com:non origin tend to locate in the heart of a 
city and be walled off from further expansion by restrictive codes 
and prejudice feelings . In Memphis , however , the dominant Negro 
areas lie to the north and south of the central business region . 
By comparison with Map 2, it can be seen that much of the present 
Negro housing lies outside the limits of the old city, as marked 
by the three Parkways . This, I believe, would not have taken place 
without the Crump era, and is closely linked with the provisions 
made for industrial expansion away from the city' s heartland . 
( 
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The location of Negro areas has also had considerable 
effect on the expansion and annexation pattern of the city. By 
comparison with Ma!) 1 we can see that since 1900 Memphis has grown 
more rapidly toward the east than toward ei thcr the north or south. 
The Wolf River on the north and Nonconnah Creek on the south have 
been considered natural barriers to further expansion in those 
directions. The city1 s major highways and rail routes also run in 
an east-west direction, giving the city some incentive to move 
outward along their routes . However, of no little consequence is 
the psychological barrier presented by the Negro concentration along 
the north and south boundaries. 
There is soma indication today that these barriers are 
being overcome, as seen especially by the 1957 annexation of 
all-ldrl.te Frayser (wards 69 through 72) and the present talk of 
annexing the Whitehaven area to the south , When this latter area 
is annexed, the city will take on the fan- like appearance typical 
of most river cities. The low-lands of Arkansas, across the 
Mississippi, are often flooded and consequently provide no hope for 
industrial or residential development . While this may hinder the 
city1 s later expansion, it provides Memphis with a perpetual front 
door view of farm and woodlands, a pleasure impossible in other 
large cities. 
Since the turn of the century Ner:~phis has increased in 
size from 16.77 square miles to 140.68. This expansion is due 
primarily to the aggrcssi ve policy of annexation held by the Crump 
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politicians . An early recognition of the need for armexation has 
prevented the city from being stifled by the wall of small fringe 
municipalities Wich endanger the growth of most large cities. I 
am sure that the continued expansion of the city under Crwnp has 
helped to broaden the mind and outlook of its citizens, as American 
imperialization of the same period did throughout the country. 
Indirectly, then, the annexat:iors since 1900 arc partially 
responsible for conditioning the mind of the Menphis citizen so 
that five Negro candidates in the 1959 election could be accepted 
without protest. 
Clear-cut class divisions are not present in Memphis 
housing. Yet, some general observations about the city can be 
made. The older area, as previously noted, is located within the 
Parkways. Most of the homes east of East Parkway arc new, with tho 
northern section, north of Poplar Avenue, being predominantly the 
higher priced homes . The new hones south of Poplar, generally have 
been in the $10,000 to $20, (X)() bracket. On the whole, the suburban 
movement has not been characterized by the silk-stocking class or 
even the younc executives, but has depended heavily on tho veterans 
and the subsequent population boom of the early fifties . Since 194.5, 
82,874 new homes have been built in Memphis . Chickasaw Gardens, and 
the area around Manphis Country Club (the 45th ward), is one of the few 
distinctly elite sections . While the rich are found in almost all 
wards, the predominately white areas, of course, arc the center of 
the city' s wealth. 34 
( 
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The pride in a beautiful city, spurred by memories of 
pre-Crump days, has brought a constant anti-slum drive which has 
eliminated much of the city' s poorer housing. State and national 
goverrunents, as vrell as the city itself', have done a great deal 
to eliminate below-standard housine: by constructing large multi-unit 
apartments, Some of the ci ty1 s notable housing developments are: 
Hurt Village (D-8 on Hap 3), Dixie Courts (F-9), Foote Homes (H-7), 
Lamar Terrace (H-10), and LeHoyne Gardens (I-8). A new 258-unit 
housing project for Negroes in ward 39, Hhich opened this fall, is 
typical of the city's anti-slum program . This project, in 
thirty-seven t't'I70 and three story buildings, ranges in size from one 
to five bedroom apartments. Rent rates are low and are determined 
by the income of the tenants. J5 
Equally important, if not more so, is the progress being 
made in providing decent homes for the upper class colored citizen . 
Normally neglected by city planning, the upper class Negro must 
usually be content to live at the standard maintained by his lower 
class brother, Any attempt to obtain better homes often brings 
race prejudice, protests, and at minimum, refusals of sale. In 
Hemphis, however, many nice homes for the well-to-do Negroes are 
available, those located along Bellevue Boulevard and South 
Parkway East in ward 28 and precincts 26-2 and 6o-3 are the most 
notable.36 Again the availability of nice residential sections for 
Negroes rests on the location of Negro areas around the central 
business district rather than in its center . 
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The Lakeview Subdivision for Negroes on Horn Lake Road)? 
is an excellent example . The 6lL- lot subdivision is divided into 
four sections depending on the price of the homes , which range from 
$7 , 000 to $18, 000 . When the subdivision officially opened on Labor 
Day, 1959, ninety homes had been built and sold , The focal point 
of Lakeview is a private country club, with automatic membership for 
purchasers of homes in the $10,000 plus bracket , and membership 
available to purchasers of the lower priced units at a small monthly 
fee . The club has a five- acre lake, badminton and croquet courts, 
a playground, and this sult11'ler will add an eighteen- hole putting 
course, tennis courts, and a switnrdng pool. The clubhouse provides 
a cocktail lounge , a dining and ballroom, and four meeting rooms 
for its ~rembers . Lakeview School has been built in the subdivision 
and two church sites and a shopping center location arc provided. 38 
The growth of MeJiilhis can be seen by its pattern of 
industrial development . It is significant to note that no one 
industry has characterized the growth of the city. Rather, it has 
become a center for rilany important, but varied, concerns . Because 
of this, MeJI¥lhis has escaped the overnight booms and severe depressions 
that have become a part of the one- industry towns like Birmingham. By 
the same token, the silk- stocking class in Memphis is not dependent 
upon the rise of any one industry , A city based on varied industries , 
as a rule draws its elite from different sections of the country, 
giving a wider range of experience and social views than possible 
under a strict hierarchy of local aristocracy. The unparalleled 
( 
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IN T)ol~ So~<Ji 
social status of the Me:rrphis Negro'\is , I am sure , partially dependent 
on the fact that Memphis has a wider variety of industry than other 
Southern cities . 
Being in the center of the South ' s cotton belt, the city 
is the largest spot cotton market in the world, normally selling 
more than one- third of the nation ' s cotton crop, and is the world ' s 
largest interior cotton warehousing center . Memphis has become 
the largest livestock and meat- packing center in the South, the 
South ' s largest producer of mixed-feeds , and has the largest trade 
area of any Southern city . 39 Hemphis is also the hospital and 
medical center of the Mid- South and is the location of the large 
University of Tennessee I1edical Units . 
Nuch of the city' s economic "t.lelfarc is dependent on its 
retail and "Wholesale trade . Hany of the nation1 s largest wholesale 
and distributing houses are located in Hemphis, and the city has 
become the 1.fuolesale trade center of the South 1-ri th the tenth 
largest sales area in the country, being exceeded only by New York, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Los Angeles , San Francisco, Detroit, 
Cleveland, and St. Louis , The trade area of the city covers a 
primary market of 175,052 square miles olith 286 counties in seven 
states . 40 This area alternates behreen the 150 and 200- mile radii 
of the city, as seen in }1ap 4, and generally extends farther to the 
south and west than in the other directions . 
While speaking of local business , it would be an error to 
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neglect the commercial concerns controlled by the Negro population. 
Until the mid-19201 s prostitution, gaM.bling, liquor, and dance halls 
wre the chief source of Negro wealth. Since the days of C:r'Ump, 
however, Beale Street has lost ooch of its former color and has 
become a respectable district noted for its clothing stores, pawn 
shops, and Jewish merchants . Today, banking, insurance, and real 
estate draw thC3 cream of the Negro talent . (Several candidates 
in the 1959 election were cormected 'With Mutual Federal Savings and 
Loan Association. ) Some of the first Negro theatres in the country 
were established in Mern.phis . 41 Professional men, barbers, 
beauticians, and morticians, are also sources of Negro self- employment. 
Since World War II, almost four hundred new industries have 
located in Memphis. This rapid industrial growth has been the principal 
reason for the substantial post- war population increase. Shelby County 
has quadrupled its population since 1890, while the city of Memphis 
has had a six- fold increase to 506,050 in December, 1959. The growth 
rate of both the city and the county have been considerably greater 
than that of Tennessee or of the nation. The average rate of increase 
each ten years since 1890 for Shelby County has been 30 per cent 
cor.tpared with a 45 per cent increase in Menphis . Between 1940 and 1950, 
the population increase in Memphis accounted for 27 . 5 per cent of the 
population rise for the entire state . Ranked thirty-second in the 
nation in size in 1940, the city rose to be the twenty- sixth largest 
by 1950. "2 
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Much of the industrial growth of the city has depended on 
the available sources of inexpensive utili ties, adequate transportation, 
skilled and unskilled labor, and available land for expansion. The 
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, one of the largest municipally 
o"Wned utility companies in the United States, distributes its services 
at rates far below the national average. The city1 s strategic 
location as the South ' s pre- eminent center of river, rail, and highway 
transportation has placed :Hemphis industry within easy reach of 
natural resources and given it an immediate link with an expanding 
market area . The abundant labor supply and the afore mentioned 
President ' s Island Industrial Park have also influenced the expansion 
of the ci ty1 s industry. 
Of chief importance, however, has been the favorable 
attitude that the city and county officials have held tOward the 
business community . The Crwnp machine, while progressive in 
municipal refonn, has always held the conservative labor and 
business views of the 11Newn South. Business has been felt necessary 
for the growth and prosperity of the city, so furthering this end has 
always been a Crwnp goal. Compared with the ninety-four principal 
cities in the nation, Memphis has constantly held tho lowest property 
tax rate in the country. 43 The city utility rates have generally 
favored b.lsiness, and the official city policy, until recent years, 
has been strongly anti-union. It is very doubtful that the re.cent 
industrial expansion in Memphis would have taken place had the Crump 
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admini5tration not been recognized for providing honest and efficient 
government at bargain rates . The Crwnp record for eliminating the 
vice and corruption that had been so much a part of the earlier city 
also won industry' s .favor. Again, the progressive movement in 
Hemphis and the leader that it brought into office are greatly 
responsible for the economic and physical growth of the city. And 
without this growth the corresponding rise in understanding and 
acceptance of Negro rights would have been impossible; all began with 
Crump, and to him the city owes its envied position. 
IV 
THE CRUY.tP ERA 
THE RED SNAPPER - This photograph of iliward Hull Crump , taken in 
1910 shortly after his election as mayor of :hemph1s , was the only 
photograph for which he ever posed . In later years , however , he 
had no objection to news photographers recording him in action. 
- 51 -
- 52 -
No political analysis of t>.emphis would be complete with-
out a chapter on the Crump era. This period of hen-.phis history 
entered with the progressive movement at the turn of the century 
arrl flourished through alir.ost five decades of W1paralleled city 
growth and expansion. The man who was responsible for this chapter 
of the city ' s history, and who had been the dominate power in 
Tennessee politics, was &tward Hull Crump. Called Eel by his asso-
ciates, E. H. Crump in the J..emphis newspapers, and hister Crump by 
the citizens of the town, he was known throughout the country as 
the "last of the great city bosses. ,l 
Numerous magazine articles have been written about Crump 
and his administration, some of them by reporters who had spent as 
much as a day in the city. .f<.ost of these articles attempted to link 
Boss Crump with corruption and intimidation which had become an 
accepted part of the Hague, Curley, Pendergast , and other large city 
political machines . One article reported that he 11practiced inti.mida-
tion on a scale which makes New York' s Ta.Illr.lal1Y Hall look holy by 
comparison, n2 while another compared the Crump era with Germany under 
Nazi rule. J On the whole these reports have been totally unfounded or 
exaggerated, and have greatly hindered the attempts of honest reporters 
to recreate the past fifty years. Assuming I had come to town with a 
preconceived notion of Crump as a tyrant, city and coW1ty officials 
imn:ediately jumped to the defensive when I q~stioned them about their 
city's heritage. In the Crur.~p obituary issue of The Gom.J~ercial Appeal , 
my feelings are adequately expressed: 11The Commercial Appeal has never 
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racogniz.ed the }XIlitical. boss and the tight political machine as 
necessary adjW'lcts of the American way of life . They are not . That 
this must be said even oow does not preclude recognition of the many 
great contributions which t.r . Crump made to the progress of J. .. emphis to 
which he was genuinely devoted. n4 
Ed Crump came to l>'.emphis in 1892 from Holly Springs , 
Nississippi , a farming cor.ll11.unity forty- five mil es south of the city. 
He was born on a small farm seven miles north of Holly Springs , and 
was one of three children of a Confederate veteran. His father died 
in the yellow fever epidemic of 18?8 , when he was 4 , and left the 
family impoverished. In attempts to supplement the familY income , 
Crump sold fruit to passengers at the depot and quit school at an 
early age to become a printer ' s devil on the local weekly. 5 
11Yom1g Crump , like mal\V another boy of the rural South whose 
ambition had rot been dulled by poverty , concluded that the land offered 
no hope for a better life. He turned cityward , .. "6 arriving in 
1-lemphis at the age of eighteen. He was a bookkeeper and cashier , and 
at 2) became secretary- treasurer of the \.'loods Chickasaw Conpany, a 
buggy , harness , and farm implement finn . Within six years , in 190J , 
he became owner of the business and it changed to E. H. Grump Buggy 
& Harness Company , which he retained until becoming mayor in 1909. 
Further recognition of his success in Jo.emphis was registered in 1902 
by his marriage to socially prominent Bessie hcl.ean . 
In 1921, while county trustee , with "a high income from fees 
and tax collections , 117 hr . Grump returned to business . He joined with 
Stanley Trezevant , a former Un1 ted States marshal, to form Crunp & 
Trezevant , Inc., an insurance and mortgage brokerage. The firm grew 
rapidly so that by 1929 it had branches in St. louis , Pittsburgh, and 
Little Rock. On a trip to Boston in 1929, Crump became convinced that 
the economy was unsound and that further expansion would be foolish. 
He closed the existing branches , and the company remained financially 
sound throughout the depression. i·lr. Crump was as proud of this 
business decision as of any of his political mane<Ners. Trezevant 
left the company in 19)6, and it was reorganized as E. H. Crump & Co., 
with his three sons as officers. The company grew steadily and in 
1947 took over a three story buil.ding on the corner of !-~ain and Adams . 
From his office in this building , J-lr. Crump ruled the city, hence 
giving him the name: 11the man on the corner. 11 
Although Crump had won his first election while living in 
Holly Springs , when he was named captain of hother Hubbard' s baseball 
team, he did not enter politics until 1901.8 In that year he was 
elected a delegate to the county De100cratic convention, and in 1905 
won a seat on the city Legislative Council with the backing of re-
formers . How a reform candidate could be elected from 11the bloody 
Fourth, 11 as the Fourth Ward where Crump lived was then known, is one 
of the political miracles of the city. It was one of the toughest 
wards in the city an:l controlled by "a bunch of killers JYibiJ hung 
out at the old Turf J!ialoo~. n9 
Fourrled on the Judaic- Christian convictions, the progressive 
movement assumed the natural goodness of the common man. The devil.s 
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of the urban reformer tended to be political institutions and city 
bosses rat her than man himself. The way to reform, then , •,o~as to "de-
limit the powers of elected officials and make the people u.ore directly 
responsible in the aff'airs of government. , lO Thus the creation of the 
commission form of government in 1908. 1n which Crump played a leading 
role . was ''not only a means to progressive achievement . but an attai.n-
ment of a progressive objective, ull 
The then existing foi'lll of government , providing for a Legis-
lative CoW1cil which met wi.th the mayor to enact l aws , had proven 
itself inadequate for the growing city. The government had also £allen 
into the political manipulation of }.ayor J . J . lr/illiams, a reactionary 
to the progressive movement , and it seemed apparent that a change in 
the form of government was necessary to give hemphis "home rule , " 
instead of political bossism. The extensiveness of cri..me in the city 
at this time has been previously mentioned . Its entrenchment in the 
municipal government need not be described in this essay, but the 
knowl edge of its existence is important. William }ri.ller, in his in-
formative book, hemphis During the Progressive Era , has devoted almost 
two hundred pages to this subject. 
Early in 1905, Kenneth D. 1-.cKellar, later to become United 
States senator with Crump support , and other progressives in the 
Jackson Club , were able to obtain the govein:lr ' s signature on a set of 
Amendments to be incorpor ated into the city' s charter. The 1905 Charter, 
as it became known , provided for a yearly a001t of the city ' s books , 
placed restrictions on franchises granted to public service corporations 
( 
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within the city, and gave the mwli.cipal government power to "regulate , 
control , and supress gaming houses. nl2 The bill also provided for a 
change in the structure of the city government . The Legislative 
Council became a bicameral body, with the five- member Board of Fire 
and Police Commissioners becoming the upper house , and the Board of 
Public Works , composed of ten members , becoming the lower house , "The 
mayor was made ineligible for re- election and his term of office was 
extended from two to four years. nlJ 
In the fall el ection, a slate of candidates proposed by 
J . T . Walsh , who apparently viewed the re:form movement only as a 
ticket to public office , challenged the Hllliams power . A weak , but 
respected lawyer , James H. }!alone was the T..J'alsh candidate for mayor , 
while Walsh himself ran for Fire and Police Commissioner and vice-
mayor. One of the ticket's choice for the lower house was the yoW'lg , 
red- haired buggy dealer , E . H. Crump. The success of the ticket , how-
ever , was short lived , for in 1907, after the election of halcolm 
Patterson as governor , the Williams f action was able to secure a 
repeal of the 1905 Charter , retiring }.ayor haJ.one and the Legislative 
CoW1cll to pri vate life. On Nay 4 , the new city council appointed by 
the governor , took office under the former unicameral system. "Pre-
siding ;.•as J. J . Williruns, and at his side , filling the vice-president 1 s 
chair was the ubiquitous John Walsh . .. 1 4 !·.alone and his group took the 
governor ' s action to the state supreme court , received a favorable 
r uling, and resu;ned their offices on JW1e 22 . Walsh, then , exchanged 
the vice- president ' s office for that of vice- mayor. 
( 
- 57 -
In the sUilli:ler of 1907 , before he had obtained p:~li tical 
importance , Crump, because of his mother ' s influence, resigned from 
the Legislative Council and declared that he was leaving politics . 15 
But , within a week , he was back in the game and announced that he 
would oppose Williams in the November 5 election to fill a vacancy on 
the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. Once elected , he i.mmedi-
ately ordered a crack down on the city 1 s vice rings . When the police 
did not act fast enough for him, 11 he personally conducted three raids 
with twenty specially deputized officers • •• TannounciniJ ' If Chief 
o •naver and his rr.en cannot suppress gambling in this town , I can .• nl6 
While Crump ' s anti- sin campaign was short lived , he had created a name 
for himself' as the ' Red Snapper ' and had shown that he was not afraid 
to act . 
Throughout this period , Crump was also stumping the city as 
the "f'orerrost advocate of commission government . ,l? Under the proposed 
commission system , the fifteen member Legislative Council was to be 
replaced by five elected commissioners , one being mayor , who would head 
the various departioonts in the city government , the mayor •s term now 
being reduced to two years . The issue carne to a head with the 1908 
election for state legislators . An innovation in }:.emphis elections was 
introduced at this tir..e , when Crump secured the backing of a faction of 
the city officials for a con:.plete slate of legislative candidates favor-
ing corm:ission government . Using the slogan "business government for 
business men , ,.lS the Crump slate was elected and the new form of 
government became a reality on January 1 , 1910. 
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It was no surprise when Ed CrUll'!p announced that he would 
run for mayor in 1909. His fame as a reformer had won man,y friends , 
while his opponent, J . J. Williams , despite his influence 1n the 
business community, had passed his prime in the political market . 
Since Crump had been in the minority on the Police Cozr.mission , many 
of his newly appointed police officers had been .fired by the political 
opposition and some of the incompetent policemen he had fired had been 
rehired . Such harassment to prevent refoi'IIl made civil service an 
important issue in the 1909 election. The campaign, which brought the 
first political advertisements in the city, was one of the closest 
fought political battles in 1-.emphis history . When the twelve thousarrl 
ballots had been counted , hr. Crump had won 11by only seventy-nine votes , 
the margin being from a single ballot box. nl9 
The election , of course, was contested. The ballot boxes 
were impounded and taken into court for a recount . The judge began 
the count with the wards in which Williams believed foul play had 
lost him votes , but the count was never completed . The way Joir . Crump 
told it , when the count reached a majority of JlJ for him , instead of 
the earlier figure of 79 , Williams "arose , withdrew his contests and 
stated in open cow-t that the election had been •painfully honest . 1 n20 
When Crump took office on New Year ' s Day , 1910 , the first mayor under 
the conunission system arxl one of the city ' s youngest executives , he 
became a cog in the political wheel and a necessary element in every 
political decision for the next forty- five years . 
I think that it is significant to note the action taken by 
the commission government under the early Cr\Uilp administration. The 
- ( 
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first acts of the new mayor were spectacular and enabled the Red Snapper 
to gain the public support needed to popularize the progressive movement . 
110ne of the first actions of his administration was to hold a series of 
conferences with the officials of railway lines running into the city , 
to secure the building of street underpasses . n21 When one railroad had 
r efused to fulfill its part of the contract by 1911 , Crump issued an 
ultimatum. If immediate construction was not begun on the Lamar Street 
underpass , the city would tear up the railroad 1 s tracks crossing that 
street . Similar blunt tactics were used to improve service on the 
1<1emphis Street Railway Company . The trolley line had been giving poor 
service with outdated equiprrent for w.any years . Crump ordered several 
changes in the company ' s operation, which they argued would be teo 
costly to undertake . This prompted no sympathy from the new mayor , 
who promised to establish a city- ovmed competing line , unless his 
demands were met . 
Joir. Crump had a genius for action and for gaining public 
approvaL Popular support for municipal reform required that the 
public become aware of their government as a service institution 
rather than a clan of saloon and brothel keepers . To help achieve 
this goal , Crump had all the ci ty 1 s trucks , wagons , and carts painted 
a bright yellovr , a color they carry W this day . The color was selected 
because it was 11 so distinctive that everyone would !mow it was city 
property and every city employe would know that he was under observa-
tion by the general public . 11 22 Throughout his years as political 
leader , l'Jr. Crump kept a scrutinous eye on all public property. He 
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continuously knew more about streets than the street commissioner, and 
more about street lights than the comn:issioner of utilities . The story 
is told that during his early term as mayor he made frequent inspections 
of the city mule barns, and "many a garbage collector would go without 
his breaki'ast to beat the mayor to the stables . 11 2J 
"Under Cri.UTip, official declarations favoring mw'licipal owner-
ship became more frequent . The po\orer co!':lpanies were accused of meddling 
in local politics , mt co-operating with the city government. and 
charging exorbitant rates in order to line the pockets of New York 
capitalists , n24 The favortism that had existed in the city 1 s taxing 
procedure was also eliminated. The first uniform tax rate in the city 
was established in 1906, at $2 .16 per $100 of assessed property , By 
equalizing the assessments of private and corporate property, Crump 
was able , in 1911 , to reduce the tax rate to $1.58 , the lowest it had 
been in 1-..emphis history . 25 
Despite the reduction in the tax rate , the Crump government 
*'was spending an average of two and one- half times more on ml.ll'U.cipal 
services in 1914 than !Jiad been speiif] in 1902. For schools , the 
increase was eight times , and for city hospitals, about four times.rr26 
Of course, the commission government improved parks , modernized the 
fire equipment , and effected many changes in the police department . 
In an attempt to curb the soaring murder rate (see Chapter III), 
Crump saw to it that "every Negro found on the streets after midnight 
was arrested, rr27 a measure held against him to this day by out-of-town 
Negroes . 
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But Crump did not let governmental reform stop here . He 
realiz.ed that the progressive spirit he had carried into the municipal 
goverrunent would remain safe only if he could carry the same spirit into 
the County Court. In 1911. Crump made his first step to unite politics 
inside the city with those outside his legal jurisdiction. A carload of 
gravel had been rejected by the city as inferior, but the dealer had , 
nevertheless , managed to sell it to the county. The mayor immediately 
acted, and was the first city official to challenge the power and 
d~nity of the County Court . His attacks on county government con-
tinued , and in 1912, he was able to secure an aclmiiUstrative transfer 
to a three- man County Commission. "There were years of struzgle on the 
fioor of the County Court ••• But in the end , the Court was subdued 
and gradually reduced in power and size until the once all- powerful 
body of fifty- seven men became a group of seven who rr.et in the County 
Conunission office to make up their program before every session. n28 
In his attempt to infiltrate the County government , Crwnp 
decided to run for sheriff in 1914, but on July 28 he announced his 
withdrawal as a candidate "because of the legal d1fficul ty of holding 
tw offices. "29 The m.:cyor then sUpJXlrted J . A. Riechman , a prominent 
businessman, for the JX)St , and precipitated "one of the most colorful 
of all Crump campaigns , uJO On the last day for qualification as a 
candidate , hr. Riechman filed with the Shelby Cotmty Election Commis-
sion. However , as Crump later explained, he filed with the secretary 
instead of the chairn:an of the commission , and when the qualification 
deadline had passed, the anti- Crump body announced that Riechman had 
not qualified, 
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Undaunted, the Crump organization set out to elect t.r. 
Riechman as a write-in candidate. Facing the possibility of losing 
eight thousand favorable , but illiterate, Negro votes, "Crwnp•s boys 
turned pedagogue and unfolded before a startled Hemphis the slickest 
piece of adult education for the underprivileeed in Southern history , nJl 
Scores of blackboards were set up on street corners urging Negroes to 
"Write it Rick , " Beale Street and the Negro wards were plastered with 
signs , and banners everywhere proclaimed the simplified spelling. 
Some old timers contend that the correct spelling had to be used, and 
Crump had said 11'Nrite it Riech • • • place the I before the E," but 
this is debatable . In any event , enough wrote it Rick to elect him 
by a roargin of three to or.e . Some people recall that for many years 
afterwards there were Negroes in the city who signed their X, but 
could write Rick whenever their literacy was questioned, 
During the early period of the Crump regime , the anti-Crump 
forces , lead by editor c . P . J . Jo'.ooney of The CoiTlillercial Appeal , felt 
that the mayor was not the reformer that the city believed him to be , 
and attacked him bitterly. A Tennessee prohibition law had been 
passed in 1909 over strong hemphis opposition. Six weeks after Crump 
took office 1n 1910 he announced that he felt "cleaning up the dive5 
and ridding the city of thieves"32 nx>re important than atte·1pting to 
enforce the prohibition law against the wishes of the local citizens. 
Despite newspaper protests against this deci5ion , Crump was re-elected 
by a heavy majority in 1911 over two- time loser Williams , who could 
only 11me too" the Crwnp reforms. The office , having been changed to 
a four-year term, guaranteed Crump control of the city until 1916, 
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On October 14 , 1915 , ten weeks before his term expired , 
ouster proceedings were filed against him by the attorney general of 
the state in the Shelby County Chancery Court for !'allure to uphold 
the 1909 prohibition statute , The Com..,-,ercial Appeal joyf'ully reported 
that the suit "charged in essence that there was an alliance of politics 
and the business of liquor , gambling. and prostitution in .i·,eMphis . ")3 
In addition to the ouster of Crump , the suit demanded the removal of 
Fire and Police Conunissioner (vice- mayor) Alex (;tley and W. h. Stanton , 
then City Judge . Ouster proceedings also seemed inevitable against 
other Crump commissioners and Sheriff Riechman . 
Crump and his associates imn:adiately filed a denial , and 
charged that the suit was unconstitutional , chief'ly because it did 
not provide for a trial by jury, The legal defenses were over-
ruled by the lower court, so Crump resigned and pleaded gull ty to 
the charges made . The case was appealed to the state supreme court 
on points of law. Throughout the rest of his political career Crwnp 
maintained that 11 the whole point of the appeal and technical admission 
of [iuilf/ . . . was to • • • place the case before the supreme court 
for what was expected to be an affirmative decision granting a jury 
trial . u34 
An additional. aspect of the ouster proceedings presented a 
dlificult constitutional problem. Crump had been re- elected in the 
spring of 1915 .for a third term as mayor in what The Commercial API?Eial 
termed "the deadest election in twenty- five years . n)5 Could he now be 
ousted from an office he had not yet beeun7 It seerood that he could 
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not, In fact, "one of the high points of the tactics was the contention 
that whatever the outcome of the ouster suit , Crump and his associates 
would be ousted only i'rom the term of office they were then serving 
[ir had then resignad fro!E}. They could go back into office January 1 
for the tern:s to which they had been elected in April . n36 
But , on December 29 , the case still pending a court decision, 
anti- Crump forces emerged from the supreme court chamber with an order 
forbidding Crump to take off'ice two days later, The stay order said 
Crwnp should be barred from office since he had pleaded guilty to the 
ouster charges . The Crump forces continued their supreme court battle 
arguing that the mayor had pleaded guilty to the charges , not because 
he was guilty , but to avoid a delay in reaching the high court on the 
legal questions , They contended that prompt action was necessary if 
Crump was to take office January l. On February 12 , the court rendered 
its decision, unanimously sustaining the removal of Crump, Utley , and 
Stanton. The court also ruled that they were not entitled to a trial 
by jury . Yet , the judges held that the 11ouster applied only to the 
term the city officials were serving when the ouster was filed. u37 
Thus Crump was allowed to take office for his third term. 
It was expected that Crump would take office immediately. 
However , on the same day that his decision was rendered , the court 
found in a Nashville ouster suit that officials could be removed from 
office for actions in a prior term of office . Anti- Crump forces in 
hemphis ann:nmced that i1' Crump did take office , new ouster charges 
would be filed on that basis . 11He made no public statement of his 
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intentions, but since the law required that he take office and file his 
mayor's bond within ten days after the l9gal beginning of his term, he 
was obligated to do so by midnight, February 22, or forfeit the office, nJS 
Crump finally took office on the night of February 21 , in a secret meet-
ing at the home of the County Court clerk, The move was not lmown until 
the next mornine when he resigru;,d in a special City Commission session 
at 9,30. 
Within twenty- four hours , hemphis had a succession of four 
mayors , five held the ofT ice within ten days . George Love , a City 
Commissioner • was made mayor in November after the resignation of 
1-..ayor Crtunp and Vice- .'J.ayor Utley. But Love was unfriendly to the 
Crump powers , so he resigned as soon as the court decision was made 
known , whereupon the new vice- ma.ror , W, T. EcLain became mayor. 
\·Jhen Crump took his oath on the night of Febr uary 21 , 11he was harrled 
a check for $679. )1 in back salary. ,.)9 Alex Utley , who had taken the 
oath of vice- ma..vor when Crump took his oath , becave mayor when Crump 
resigned , but he too resigned im:lr!ediately upon taking office . He drew 
only $4)9. 65 for his services to the city. The Crump controlled City 
Commission then elected Thomas C, Ashcrof't mayor of Lemphis , and };cLain 
returned to the vice- mayor ' s post . 
A second ouster suit was immediately filed, but it "became a 
!!lOot question, for he was already out of office by resignation. ,.40 
Since the fir st resignation on t;ovember 4 , Cr ump had maintained his 
city power . Throughout this time he had kept his office in the Court 
House , technically a private citizen, but actually in control of city 
- 66 -
affairs. In the SWlllTler, Crurop announced for the office of county 
trustee , the most profitable job in the Court House under the old 
fee system. He was elected, then re- elected in 1918, 1920, and 
1922. 11};eanti.me his campaign against fees had placed his own 
office on a f'lat salary. rr41 
Crurop•s supporters have incorporated into the body 
of Crump apologetics the assertion that the real power 
behind CrUlllP 1 s ouster in 1916 was the }~rchants Light 
and Power Company. Fearful that the mayor would bring 
about public ownership of power , the company corruptly 
influenced the State Legislature into passing the ouster 
law. ffirump also said that company officials had prom-
ised to see that the ouster charges against h1m were 
dropped if he forgot his fight for public power J 
Apparently the utility company connived at the ouster , 
but basically, Crump was .forced out of office for his 
refusal to enforce the prohibition law, and his refusal 
to do so was grounded in nothing more sinister than his 
unwillingness to take seriously a law whose enforcement 
could only be a farce in hemphis. 42 
B. 
National and international issues pronpted by the war with 
Germany , brought an end to the progressive movement that had character-
ized the first seventeen years of the decade , 
Progressivism had brought Lemphis better water and sewage 
systems. better streets, better fire and police protection 
and a handsome network of parks and playgrounds . It had 
reformed the courts and penal institutions, improved the 
school systeH and laid the foundation for an effective 
public health program. The city government had stood up 
to the COTFOrations and had brought a measw-e of order to 
the city ' s economic life. Through the establishment of a 
connnission forn of government the city h<td achieved a more 
mature political leadership and a rr.ore e:fficient administra-
tion, Zisting institutions had been reorganized and new 
~~:~aie;;!~~s t~/~~; ~=s~£5ectively with many of the 
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Yet all had oot been acco!llplished , Saloons and prostitution 
had been only spasmodically curbed, while viol ence and lawl essness 
continued to distract .from the progress the city had made . Then too , 
the status of the Negro was little better than it had been in 1900. 
The lack of progress in these areas , I believe , rested in the campo-
sition of the city, and not in the leadership of the progressive 
movement. 
"Froro its earliest days . ··-emphis was a 'river town, 1 where 
boatn:en enjoyed a few hours of fast- living after lonely weeks on the 
river , and a ' good- til'le town,' where the fann and tilllber men cele-
brated the end of the season. 1144 And such a town could only exist 
by pr oviding the fast living that its male visitors desired . Thus 
"prostitution arxi dives were necessary features of a man ' s world , 
the kind of world that the Old South believed in. In a way, they 
were even good , because they permitted man to be what he was with-
out his having to desecrate the ideal he had formed for those 
Southern women who laid a claim to respect. u45 
00 one could expect a city to completely surrender its past 
and ass\Jllle the new morals and ideals of the progressives in the short 
span of seventeen years . Indeed hemphis could not make this change 
so quickly. One must also remember that a leader , to exercise any 
control , must not progress faster than his constituency is willing to 
.follow. Thus 1 do not condemn Crump for his early hesitancy in these 
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matters , but praise h1lll for the changes he was able to effect. 
And while Crump was at first reluctant to seek reform in 
areas where his JX)wer could oot be strong enoueh to enforce it, the 
history of the city clearly shows that he did act as soon as it became 
apparent that he could gain the civic suprort necessary. When prostitu-
tion, the city ' s most tolerated social evil, was no longer smiled upon 
by the t.emphis citizen, when the city had outgrown its 1 river town' 
existence , then Crump acted , Joseph "Holy Joe 11 Boyle , who had eanl6d 
his name by expelling all gambling, betting, and booking interests 
from the city, was Police Commissioner when the city 11 closed the lid" 
on the houses of ill fame , On the nie;ht of April 2J, 1940, police 
visited the nineteen known houses in the city and ordered all to be 
closed by ~lay 7. Some could not believe that the Crump powers had 
been levied against thern , others thought that their landlords would 
protect them, and a few started a petition in their defense. But 
after hurried sales of fine rrd.rrors , deep rugs , and flashy lamps , 
the designated date saw all houses closed. None have relit their 
lamps since. 
The same thing had happened earlier with the city' s murder 
rate. When "the traditional Southern attitude toward Negro killing 
scrapes hit off in the old jingle 
Two niggers gi t to fightin 1 • They a in 1 t no 
kin. One kill t ' other . ' T ain ' t no sin."46 
was no longer adequate , the Crump machine stepped in. In 19)5 Police 
Commissioner Clifford Davis , now United States Congressman from Shelby 
County , and sixty- odd t-.;egro leaders swung into action. Anti- murder 
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campaigns were held in most colored churches and in the city ' s Negro 
school s . As a result the city now has a lower homicide rate than 
aloost any city in the nation . The Crump forces also lead in the 
establishment of a juvenile coW"t . It was "his boys" who pushed a 
bill through the state legislature to allow hrs . Camille Kelley , the 
first judge of h~r sex in the South , to become judge of that court 
without a lawyer ' s license , 
Crump took ilr.rJense pride in the reforms that his administra-
tion had brought to hemphis , helping the ' river town ' to be replaced 
by a clean , 1110dern , and industrial city. But this was not enough for 
him , for he carried his fight against ga."llbling into the next county 
and the state of hississiwi . hany of the gambling establishments 
ousted from i·,emphis had relocated just across the county line and 
the state boundr.t , with the blessing of the DeSoto County law 
enforcement o.ff'icers . On December 9. 1940, a large ten by thirty 
foot sign , in three colors , was constructed on Highway 61 , just 
inside the Shelby County line . A large hand pointed down the road , 
and below it followed this warning : 
LOOK • , • DANGER AHEAD 
IXY.-JN THE ROAD IN hiSSISSIPPI ARE GAiiBLING 
D3NS AI'ID DIVES , SH.r~io' ELTON S . BAXTER 
OF DE sara COUNTY , !·:.ISS . , IiliO' ... "S THESE 
THlEVIOO JOINTS ARE RUNNING WIDE OPt.'N. HE 
CAN SfOP TliEi·~ Blf'I' WON 1 T • • • WHY? 
RUN BY THIEV&S • • • TH.i!."Y CJGAT YOU • . 
~~ ~~ ~g~ . ,.,QNE;y T!W SLUG YOU . • • 
i-ihen hississippi authorities threatened to tear down the sign , Shelby ' s 
sheriff , Guy E. Joyner , sent armed deputies to protect the warning , As 
( 
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with many Crump reforms , it was never known whether or not he initiated 
the action , yet it is cartain that it carried his approval . 
While little of the early progressive spirit was devoted to 
bettering the city's Negro population, I again do not blame the Crump 
administration for this omission. The Civil 'dar was still a fresh 
memory on the minds of many of the city ' s leaders , and even the North 
had not yet come to view Negro equality as essential to American 
democracy. Thus it is no worrler that while the Hemphis progressive 
movement was hwnanitarian , }.iller believes that it would be wrong to 
evaluate it on the basis of the attitude of the progressives toward 
the Negro . "For to ju:::lge it on this basis is to invest the movement 
with a quality it did not possess . The movement , being pragmatic , 
subscribed no transcendent principal of morality that required an 
examination of conscience regarding the general American tendency 
to brand the Negro as inferior . u48 
While racial feelings have certainlY not been eliminated 
in l'.ernphis , it seems evident , especially af'ter the 1959 election , 
that they are less intense than in other Southern cities . Because 
it has been a gradual and evolutionary process stemming from a host 
of Crump measures, rather than from a single and dramatic exercise of 
power , it is impossible to ascribe a date to this change 1n attitude 
toward the Negroes . Still the change had its beginning and growth 
during the Crtunp era , and we can only assume that it has come chiefly 
as a payment for the vote the Negroes have given his machine . 
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During the earlY da;ys of the Crump regime , when his reform-
ers needed all the support iliey could muster to gain office , there was 
genuine exploitation of the Negro ballot. There are stories , and I am 
sure there is some measure of truth in tham , about Negroes being herded 
into trucks and taken enmass to the polling booths , and about CrW!Ip 
politicians handine barbecues , cokes , and watermelons to Negroes as 
they left the voting lines . Crump justified these measures by believing 
that it was the most efficient way to impose order on a turbulent society , 
and that the end he sought permitted the means he used. Looking at the 
period in retrospect , I tend to agree with his reasoning . The progres-
sive movement would never have been able to come to power without the 
Negro ballot . 
However , many reporters who view Crump as a tyrannical die-
tator , asswr.e that the Negro has always been a pawn in a p:>litical 
machine , rooved at will and given nothing for his support . George F . 
l'.ilton, in 1927 , took this attitude when he reported in Forwn that in 
t.emphis 
a vicious type of boss domination depends upon the 
purchasable Negro vote to control municipal af'fairs 
• o o I confess freely that the voting Negro in cities 
which have come W1der my observation, has hitherto 
==i=~o~;u;t ~~ ~i~::~c;;n~:;;~49ons • ani 
Ralph J. Bunche , in an extremely biased report on Negro voting in 
t.emphis, took the same attitucie when he said "The introduction of 
rr.odern racketeering methods in elections in the South was first spon-
sored by Crump. u50 Long after Crump ceased to give the Negro element 
a carte blanche to the city 1 s vice rings , which was one of their vote 
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payments in the early days, Bunche said the Crump power still "forced 
the Negroes to continue the alliance because of police pressure, . • "51 
Both of these reports, I think, are unrealistic , and fail to 
recognize the value that the ,.,emphis Negro did recaive by supporting the 
Crump machine . As we shall see in the following chapter, the entire 
Crump machine was built on its po~~er to get out the friendly vote . And 
it is 11ty contention that the hemphis Negro had just as many reasons , 11' 
not more , to support the Crump candidates as did the white citizens ~ 
V. 0. Key, Jr., partially realized this , when he wrote 11Negro votes 
for Crump candidates in hemphis can be explained. The Shelby organiza-
tion controls their votes as it does those of the whites , but it ought 
to be remembered that Crump sees that Z.;eJlly,bis Negroes get a f'airer 
break than usual in public serv1ces. 1152 Further recognition that Crump 
had gained Negro support by providing nnmicipal services is seen in 
Shields hcllwaine ' s J.:emphis Do~m in Dixie. Here i·.clh1aine pointed out 
that "!-:...r. Crump knows that one of the first laws of politics is to give 
everybody sorr.ething . So he calls Negro civic leaders into conference; 
he passes out little jobs; he sends his officials to the Negro civic 
gatherings ; he gives to his colored brethren school buildings , parks 
arxi swimming pools . ,53 
The early Crump attitude tow-ard the city' s Negro elelll6nt can 
be seen in 192J, with the re- election of Rowlett Paine as mayor. In 
this election the Crump faction, supp:>rting l·.r . Paine , faced its only 
real opposition since the election of 1909. Opposition was concentrated 
behind a candidate backed by the Ku Klux Klan , and that organization 
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became the central controversy of the election. The fact that Crump 
supported the anti-Klan candidate gives soPte indication that he did 
not carry the race hatred harbored by other hemphis citizens. Crump ' s 
stand against the Klan was not nnsupported , for The Conunercial Appeal 
had won the Pulitzer Prize in the previous year for its attacks on the 
KKK and their activities in the f..emphis vicinity. 
Ralph BW1che fails to recognize Crump 1 s anti-IQ_an position 
as advantageous to the Negro population, and becon;es inconsistant with 
his goal (to sho·.,. that Crump forced hemphis to become the city" • • • 
where the Black Balance of Power Fails to get the Fruits of Victoryn54) 
when he suggests that a coalition of Negro and Klan votes could have 
overthrown the oppressive Crump regime . Bunche charges that it was 
only by "the single expedient of beating a few nx>re black boys heads 1155 
that Crump was able to keep the coalition from forming o Bunche carries 
his anti- Crump attack to the extreme by quoting an lU'lpublished Ku Klux 
Klan report stating that their candidate had won the election , but 
Crump had stolen the ballots o Even if this were so , and I found no 
supporting evidence that it was , the Negroes should have joined Crump 
in staaling the Klan votes , and not criticize him for so doing . The 
basic fallacy in the Bunche report is that it fails to recognize that 
Crl.ll!lp was the only Southern political leader in the early part of the 
century who rose to power without a demagogic use of the race issue , 
Ironically , further recognition of Negro achievement un:l.er 
the Crump regime can be seen in the BlUlche report itself o In cri ticiz-
ing bemphis , Bunche corr.ments that the city , during the thirties, had 
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only sixteen Negro nurses in the public health department ; had an 
aJ.nk,st all- Negro po,c:;tal force , but restricted the clerical jobs to the 
whites; forced Nee;ro park employes to work under a white supervisor; 
hired only seven Negro policeroon; spent a minimal $) , 272 on Negro 
parks in 19)6; and maintained segregated schools . Yet , in an earlier 
chapter of the same report , Bunche quotes , without editor ializing , an 
article on Negro rights in Atlanta. In 1940, Atlanta provided only 
"one illsupervised park located more than two miles from the center of 
the Negro population, n56 (see ~~p 2 for a comparison 'With modern day 
l-.emphis) . The Negro section was largely responsible for the high 
juvenile deliquency, crill'e , and disease rate in that city. Atlanta 
had only one high school for the Negro citizens , who represented 
almost one- third of her )02 , 288 population; no Negro nurses or police; 
and worst of all had only 2 , lo6 registered Nee;roes out of a colored 
voting potential of 54,155. 57 Bunche partially attributes the lack of 
Negro services in Atlanta to the lack of leadership provided by the 
city ' s weak mayor- council form of government. While deerring Atlanta' s 
mayor a mere figurehead , Bunche overl ooks the fact that it was through 
the strong leadership p rovided by Crump that the f.iemphis Negro could 
fare better than the col ored citizens in any other Southern city. 
Yet , we must realize that Mr . Crump had grown up in the 
tradition of the Old South. "1hile he held a paternalistic attitude 
toward the Negro citizen, it would be an error to assume that he held 
any love for them as a class , or ever considered that white s upremacy 
should be disregarded in Lemphis . This is evidenced by Crump ' s support 
of the State 1 s Rights Party in 1948. 
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The Negro prospered under Crump prilllarily for two reasons. 
First , as a reformer , Cruop was greatly concer ned with providing better 
jobs , l ower taxes , and more services for the city ' s population, He was 
interested 1n beautifying the city through slum clearance and street 
repair , and in protecting its health with municipal hospitals and 
adequate water and sewage systems , All of these were enjoyed most by 
the city' s poorer classes, and , of course , this meant the Negro , Thus 
"because i<.r. Crump hates above all things to be ashamed of }.emphis , he 
would like the Negroes to enjoy the best that the city can afford, , ,n58 
The second reason for continued Negro improvement under the 
Crump machine , and the more important politicall,f , is that public serv-
ices were considered a payment for the votes that Negroes gave his 
organization, J>Jo . Crump realized that a barbecue and coke were not a 
sufficient reimbursement for Negro support , and consequently provided 
the colored citizens with n:ore services , 100re job opportunities , and 
a more congenial attitude than could be gained by the support of any 
other political faction. Throughout his career as hemphis political 
boss , Crump n.::ver hesitated to call Negro leaders into conferences to 
discuss their needs and plans. This to me is a clear recognition of 
the Negro voting power . While Er . Crump did not need the massive Negro 
vote for his control of the city and county after 1923 , it was through 
the additional strength that they provided that he was able to gain 
control of state politics. 
While it has often been said that Negroes did not vote in 
:r-.emphis , that they were 11voted , " I feel that their support of the Crump 
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candidates was no stronger than that of the white citizens , (to whom 
historians have bestol-red the rational capability of conscious political 
selection), and that Negro suPPOrt was rational . The mst :llnportant 
aspect of the Negro voting m1d.er Crump was that it was continual , and 
allowed both the white and colored sections of the city to grow with 
the ballot. Thus in 1959 , when the Negro ' s right to vote was an 
accepted municipal right , the privilege of citizenship could be turned 
to the IJIOre mature form of political activity with the supp:>rt of 
qualified candidates for election. 
c. 
Leaving the Shelby County Trustee 1 s office in September of 
1924 , t.r . Crump held no office until he was elected to Congress in 
19JO. He returned in 1932, but supported his colleague , Walter 
Chandler , for the office in 19)4. Hr . CrUlliP was a delegate to 
national conventions of the De100cratic Party in 1920. 1924, 1928 , 
and. in 1932 , when he was active in behalf of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
He becai'le a member of the National Democratic Executive Committee in 
19)6. 
In city politics , after the second- term election of r-:r . Paine 
in 1923, the mayor lost Crump support and was defeated in 1927 by 
Watkins Overton. Servine as mayor longer than anyone else in the 
history of the city , .·u- . Overton was re-elected in 1931 and. 1935 . 
Crump support was withdrawn in 1938 and hr . Overton was not a candi-
date in 1939. Walter Chandler beca..--ne mayor in 1940 , serving until his 
retira.'l!ent in 1946. Joseph P. Boyle , Sylvanus Polk , and J. J . Pleasants 
- ( 
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were mayors for brief periods W'ltil Crump support of hr . Overton 
was restored , and he returned to the ofi'ice in 1948. But their 
paths soon separated, and i·.r. Overton resigned i.n 1952 allowing 
Frank Tobey, a member of the City Commission , to take the mayor ' s 
seat. 
In 19)9, following the Overton split, it was decided to 
bring Walter Chandler back f:rom Washington as the Crump candidate for 
mayor. 11But the big question of the day was the European War which 
had just started in ?eland. The Roosevelt administration needed the 
Chandler vote to repeal the arms embargo . ,,59 So the Crump organiza-
tion circulated an open petition for mayor , with hr . Crump puttine 
his name 1n the slot at the last rooment, as an elector for hr . Chandler. 
Z..r. Crump took the head of the ticket of thirteen candidates for city 
offices , and opposition failed to appear for airJ position. Without a 
platfonn, or a speech, r.r. CrUlllp and the ticket were elected with 
Jl.BJ5 votes . Crump took ofi'ice on January 1 , 1940, from a plati'onn 
on the rear of' a train, and served one day in oi'i'ice as a spectator 
at a New Orleans football game . When he resigned , the City Com..11ission 
elected hr. Chandler to the post. and Crump returned to his oi'fice on 
the corner of hain and Adams . 
The control that hr . Crump exercised over the mayors of 
1-.emphis can be seen by the story told me by a reporter for The Commercial 
~· Lydel Sims , writing the hllll'Orous "Assignment .hemphis" coluron for 
the paper , was once talking with 1-ir . Crump about how few people knew the 
words to the loiational Anthem. "I'll bet Hr. Chandler knows the words , 11 
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l-:..r . Crump was rep:>rted to say , and in the midst of a busy day tre 
mayor was called to the phone to sing the song that Crump requested. 
Other reports have it that carbon copies of all city business were 
sent to f'.r . Crump as a matter of course . 
During the twenties , the Crump organization moved toward 
statewide power. Governor .Austin Peay was elected to office in 1922 
and 1924 with Crump help , and won another term over Crutnp opposition. 
In the 1928 election , the Shelby CoWlty organization supported Hill 
hcAlister , but Henry H. Horton was elected. Two years later, the 
CrUJDp forces joined with the Lea- Caldwell organization of Nashville 
to re-elect Horton. But the $),000, 000 financial bubble of the lea-
Caldwell organization burst "while the votes were being counted, "6o 
and Crwnp lead the fieht that almost brought about the impeachment 
of hr. Horton. hr . hcAlister again became the Crump candidate for 
governor , and was elected in 19J2 and in l9J4. In l9J6 , the support 
was shifted to Gordon Browning, who won handily, only to lose Crump 
support and the 19J8 election. Prentice Cooper was the recipient of 
ShelbJ County support after the Browning feud , and was elected in 19JB, 
1940. arrl in 1942. Jim ~ance t-.cCord ascended to the governor ' s office 
with Crump backing in 1944 and was re-elected in 1946. The string or 
CrUJDp-supported governors was broken by the election of };r. Browning 
in 1948 and 1950. but resumed in 1952 by the defeat of l>.r . BrOW'ning , 
and the election or Frank Clement. Throughout this period, Kenneth D. 
i'.cKellar maintained his seat in the U. S . Senate with Crump support. 
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In 19)6 , after Shelby County had delivered 59 ,874 votes in 
the democratic primary to elect Browning governor , giving the two anti-
Cr\.llllp candidates a total of 878 votes , 61 Browning sent his famous 
telegram to Crump saying that he had "60, 000 reasons to love Shelby 
County." But soon after taking office Browning spurned the Crump 
support by appointing "Crurnp•s long til'le adversary , Lewis S. Pope , 
special tax investigator. "62 Facing the prospect of 6o,OOO reasons 
why he might not love Shelby County in his race for re- election , the 
governor called a special session of the Legislature in 19)7 to pass 
a bill purging the Shelby County registration books. Another bill. 
which passed 51- 44 (after amendine the two- thirds majority rule to a 
sirople majority), put Tennessee on the county- unit system practiced 
in Georgia. This reduced Shelby County control of 25 per cent of the 
state ' s votes to 13 per cent. Both bills were quickly nullified by 
tha supreme court. 
The e;overnor then threatened to send National Guard troops 
into 1·.emphis to protect the registration of. the city' s voters, but a 
Federal Court order was obtained nwherein the United States marshal 
could recruit deputies to repel the invasion. After being asse•nbled 
in Jackson , the troops were sent to sUltii"'er encampment , and that ended 
the hassle.n6.3 When questioned about the governor ' s activities , Crump 
raported "The sneak has the insane desire to go to the U.S. Senate. 
He would milk his neighbor ' s cow throueh a crack in the fence to 
accomplish that purpose . u64 ~·lhen the votes were counted after the 
19.38 election , Shelby County, at Crump ' s suggestion, had changed its 
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preference for governors, giving 57 ,255 to Crump-supported Cooper , 
and only 9,)15 to Browning. 65 
State-.dde political po\oo-er remained until 1948, when the 
combined forces of Estes Kefauver and Gordon Browning attacked the 
Crump control , and made it surrender two of its most highly regarded 
offices. Kefauver , who had made a favorable impression on Washington 
political writers while a member of Conc;ress , announced for the 
senatorial seat held by Tom Stewart . ttSleepy Tom" was dropped by the 
Grump forces in favor of a political Wllmown , John i•-~.i tchell, whom Crurnp 
had never met but supported because of his impr.::ssive military record. 
Kefauver had solid support from eastern Tennessee , breald.ng Crump' s 
coalition with that area of the s t ate. The Kefauver faction also 
carried their attack into Crump' s homeground, and for the first time 
in modern political times the opposition carried on a strong campaign 
in 1-.emphis. 
Browning returned to the political front by opposing Jim 
hcCord for the governor ' s chair. Crwcp attributed much of the Browning 
vote to organized labor , who were dissatisfied with a recentlY passed 
law outlawing the closed shop in the state. The hcCord administration 
had also put an unpopular sales tax statute on the books . In criti-
cizing Browning in this election, Crump pla ced large ads in the state 
newspapers to write 
• • • that in the art galleries of Paris there are twenty-
seven pictures of Judas Iscariot--none look alike , but all 
resemble Gordon Browni.ng; that neither his head , heart nor 
hand can be trusted ... that of the t~ hundred and six 
bones in his body there isn't one that' s genuine; that his 
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Sharp- tongued , but hWJX)rous , criticism of this type had been a Cru.'l!p 
speciality, yet Browning overcame the difi"icul ty and was elected to 
two terms in office. But Crump mustered his forces and was able to 
defeat the "foe of ' 48 11 in the gubernatorial election of 1952, 
Hhen Crump died in 1954 , he had a record behind him that 
few will be able to bett er . Hcving been elected to office twenty-
five tL"'les , the voters of Tennessee never rejected his name as a 
candidate . A more impressive record, however , was set by the hun-
dreds of oth.1r candidates who gained office with his support . On a 
score card which he kept , there were 118 elections in which all Crump 
candidates won in hemphis and Shelby County . During the twenty year 
period beginning in 1928 , only two precincts in the county voted 
against the CrUJliP selection. 67 
During the four and a half decades thAt Crump controlled 
J·.emphis and Shelby CoWlty politics , "the Tammany Tiger was tamed , 
Pendergast was sent to prison in Kansas City , Kelly was forced to 
the sidelines of the Chicago political game , and Hague was retired 
by the voters of Jersey City . n68 In the words of V. 0 . Key , Crump was 
11 the coWltry boy who came to rule a commonweal th, n69 and he had done 
it with a militant honesty that was respected by his .friends and 
enemies alike . 
Although his keen political acumen may have slipped in his 
later years , thera is little doubt that he had done more for l·.emphis 
in forty- five years than had been done by the entire list of political 
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laaders since 1826. He had changed a muddy , provincial village into 
a clean , proe;ressive industrial and com:nercial center for the hid-
South . He had imposed order on a chaotic political battlefield , a.n:i 
gained popular support for the reform moverr.ent . He had eliJni_nated all 
vice and organized crime in he city and accustomed the people to the 
Negro vote . He had obtained municipal control of al l utilities , 
lowered the tax rate , and helped engineer the building of the uerflphis-
Arkansas Bridge . Although a dictator , his kindness and warmth ware 
acUrd.red by all who came in contact with him. 
The l'lain criticism of the Crump era was that Boss Crump had 
taken the goverrunent in his own hands and had substituted the voice of 
Crump for the voice of the people . }~mphians were thought to have 
surrendered their freedom of choice . But 11 in their enthusiasm [fhe 
anti- Crwr,p force S] too often forgot that de::.ocratic governl'lent requires 
strong party organization and discipline if it is to be effective arxi 
that an unorganized 1will of the people ' needs strong l eadership and 
statesmanship if it is to find expression. 1170 
Too often in our society political control has been taken as 
a synonym for vice and corruption , and honest rr.en are encouraged not to 
enter public service . In the economic field , shet".t size has spelled 
monopoly , and in politics , power has carried the unpleasant meaning of 
goon squads and machine domination . Although the dominate fieure in 
Tennessee politics , Crwr•p was not a racketeer , but an honest and power-
ful political leader . It was once reported that had Cru!np been appointed 
as city man:•e;er in 1909 • instead of elected mayor , he would have been 
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praised throughout the country as the greatest financial bargain 
the city of l'•emphis has ever made . 
( 
C!!AJ"l'ER V 
INSIDE TIE CRlft.P 1-'u\CHINE 
HIS VOTE COUl\"Till - Ed Crump holds one of the ballots that helped 
defeat Gordon Browning in the decisive 1938 election, marking the 
height of Crump ' s statewide power . 
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P~rhaps no moro apt explanation of Crump' s continued political 
success can be gi ven than the one supplied by John Gunther when, in a 
Reader ' s Dir;est article he asserted that l-ir. Crump 1'bribed hemphis with 
good government at a low cost . n1 hernphians were willing to sacrifice 
some of their ele•nental freedoms for the order and efficiency that 
1-.r . Crump was able to supply, Boss Crump hilnself , several years before 
his death , offered another recipe for his unequalled tenure in politics. 
To be a leader , he said, "you mu.c;t h<.ve some courage , vision, real 
character , and honesty of purpose , 112 He added to this the well lmown 
political truth that the public cannot be fooled for any extended 
length of time. Thus anyone who practices the art of deception , whil.e 
h~ may win early support , can count on a short career as a public serv-
ant . .~~.t the time of his death , high officials in Tennessee praised 
Crump as a friend of good government , a genius of organization, and a 
man of honesty and integrity. Governor Frank Clement stated that 
"perhaps Tennessee pol itics have never known a JllOre controversial 
figure , but even hr . Crump ' s bitterest enemies conceded his honesty, 
energy , and ability. These ware fundaJilental factors in his enduring 
leadership.,.) 
Yet his organization required more than a platform of good 
government to perpetuate its term of office. Already mentioned was 
Crump' s militant honesty, Speaking of the Crump machine , V. 0. Key, Jr . 
claimed "its only special characteristic is its insistance that it does 
not steal from the public till, and in:leed, evidence to the contrary 
would be difficult ['"and I would add impossibli7 to find . "4 Crump 
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carried his code of honesty further than many reporters are willing 
to cr.ad.it . Throughout his 11i'e he denied his insurance company the 
right to accept city business , although his sons have now begun to 
write city policies af'ter his death . And not only was he himself 
honest , but he insisted that all city empl oyes carry the same 
principle of public morality . One of the maxims of the Crump gov-
ernrnent was that if anyone of its men went bad, 11particularly if he 
tampered with public funds , no one outside the or~anization could 
move faster or more severly than the organization did in pwll.shing 
the offender to the full extent of Cr1l'linal Court procedure. "5 
In contrast to his tight control of public funds , he gave 
of his own means generously and consistantly. Beginning in 194) he 
sponsored the annual Benefit Football earoe for the blind, matching the 
city' s top two hl.gh school teams at the e nd of their season. With no 
expenses to pay , the total receipts , usually around $500 , 000, were 
divided into cash gifts for the city ' s blind. 6 He annually staged a 
boat ride for orphans and shut- ins , and when the circus came to town 
kr. Crwnp took with him the same boys and girls . Crump Day at the 
Fairgrounds was also an important event in the city. Here his :fans 
consumed JO, 000 hot dogs and 1 , 6oo gallons of' lemonaide 1 ? took ad van-
tage of f'ree rides 1 and sported buttons sa.yine: 11Thank You hr. Crump. 11 
Of course , Benefactor Crump picked up the tab. In spite of this 
showmanship , "his was a Paulian charity in that it was not only freely 
given , but was rr.ore unkrx>wn than known. n8 He was always a :friend to 
\ 
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the poor . and if a house should burn , the owner could coW1t on a check 
or a gift from &l Crump. 
Still , he won the hearts of the people in other ways . Unlike 
the other laree city bosses who appeared at the turn of the century , 
CrtllTlp did not base his organization on the constant influx of rowdy , 
uneducated 1.mm1grant workers , and thus 'WaS able to obtain a measure of 
gemll.ne respectability W1B.vallable to Boston , Chicago , and Kansas City 
political leaders. While he relied heavily , at timds , on the Negro 
vote , and had many friends in all walks of life , it never detracted 
from his acceptance as a Southern gentleman. His strict adher ence to 
the published code of Southern morality and chivalry added 8reatly to 
his personal appeal . 
J>ir . Crump neither drank nor snaked, he nev~r swore , and was 
a strict vegetarian . Ladies found him gracious , warm , and courtly; 
men discovered his sincerity , W1derstan:iing , and political insight . 
He never forgot a friend , and almost everyone in her.:phis could point 
with pride to at l east one instance when Boss Crump had befrierxied 
him . Crump • s character can also be demonstrated by the high regard in 
which his family life was held by the :Kemphis citizens . Everyone con-
sidered the unity and old- fashioned love that bowld the Cr ump family a 
symbol of Ed Crump ' s warmth and affection. The city considered the 
death of his son John in 1939 and of his mother in 1940 to be two of 
the saddest blows that ~ir . Crump ever received , and this endear~ him 
to their hearts . 
( 
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Crump' s gentlemanly conduct , moreover , won the respect of 
his enemies , as well as maintained the support of his friends , The 
reporters on The Commercial APJ?6al al-ways found }.r. Crump courteous, 
even when he called to report a "beef." Only once, I was told, was a 
threat received. balcolm Adams , city editor of the paper, at one time 
rented a house from a Crump firru. And since he worked nights , his wife , 
the good Southern lady that she was , became afraid of prowlers. }.r, 
Adams reported this to his landlord and the next morning a crew was 
there to install a complete set of window guards , A few weeks later 
Ed Crump called t-~r . Adams on the phone to complain about an article the 
paper had printed that was not to his liking. ''Why, lo.ialcolm, 11 he said, 
"I've a good mim to huff and puff and blow your window guards down. n9 
The fact that stories like this can be told about him, and are con-
sidered to be representative by those who !mew him, makes it hard for 
rr.e to believe the sinister characteristics which some articles ascribe 
to him. 
Yet , we must not forg~t that Crump was a political boss arrl 
controlled a machine that outlivad and outperformed all similar organiza-
tions in the country. This required a strong hand as well as a winning 
S1nile. Actually, there was no magic in the Crump machine 1s ability to 
win elections. "Thd formula consisted basically of organization from 
the neighborhood leval up , of hard precinct work , of getting friends to 
register, and finally, on election day, of getting out the friendly vote."lO 
Speeches were not usllal.ly a part of the organization ' s campaign, although 
newspaper ads and public statements would appear during the last few days 
( 
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of the municipal campaign, One of the 100st famous features of Crump ' s 
political operation was , of course , the organization ' s card index 
system. 
The index literally included ever y qualified voter in the 
city, giving name , address , age , and the murher of his registration 
certificate . Typine: the cards for the next election someti:nes started 
before the official figures had been made for the last one . In each 
precinct there was a person in charge of the routine work of keeping 
tab on the voters of that area, Each worker was guided by a gray 
book, listing all fanner voters alphabetically. Late in the CaJilpaign 
this book was replaced with a black one , arranging the names by street 
nu::Jber, At the courthouse, a city official kept the all irr.portant red 
book , listing every political job holder by precinct . By this method 
th.! !l".achine was able to tell which of its friends were registered , arrl 
which still had to be qualifiad. u 
This first stage of the machine ' s election duty , that of 
registering the friendly vote , was aided in several ways . During most 
of the Crump regime , poll tax receipts were required of voters . The 
ore;anization usually saw to it that the tillle for paying the tax erded 
before the opposition had been able to stir up interest or organize 
precinct \oJOrkers. Crump men , of course , had been going from door to 
door long before the deadline came. Even when permanent registration 
was initiated, and the poll tax requirerr:ent removed , registration of 
ne'A voters usually can,e up during a period "absolutely without political 
interest. n12 
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Crump favored a short campaign , usually of about ten days , 
consisting chiefly of door to door work , When this had been completed , 
and the election was on hand , a tray of duplicate cards for each 
qualified voter was taken to every polling pl ace . As each voter 
appeared , a Crump worker pulJ.ed his card from the tray. For those 
whose cards relllained , there were personal visits , telephone calls , 
and offers for transportation until the,/ appeared . The system must 
have been good , for not only did it contribute to Crump 1 s continood 
political success , but it also gained recognition from other political 
organi~ations . 1Nhen an official from Tammany Hall , where the card 
system had originated rr10re than a hWldred years before , looked it over 
on a visit to hemphis , he declared it the most efficient system he had 
ever seen, 
Good as the system was , it depended on two additional elements . 
First , it required the support of the several thousand city job hol ders 
to carry out the multitude of tasks the year round , and on the job 
hol ders and their fa.mil.ies to comprise the inner core of the Crump 
vote on every question . And secondly , it rested on the passive support 
of many citizens who accepted his rule without casting their ballots . 
hemphis usually had a low voting turnout for local elections , and each 
person who remained at home on election day contributed to the continued 
li.fe of the Crump machine . Another source of power was the machine ' s 
complete control of office holders , appointed and elected. "A man 
totally tmkn:lwn , except to his mother , could be elected to a well paid 
position by a connty- wide vote on the [SoliJ recommendation of the Crump 
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ore;anization . .,lJ Such a candidate would be elected without any effort 
on his part , and would be totally dependent on the organization for 
both gaining and retaining his office. Obedience , then, became a prime 
requirement for political success in the organization. 
"It would be naive to conclude that Crump ' s power .•• rested 
on standard machine practices alone, n14 or that its public facade could 
be n1aintained without continuous manipulation behind the scene. Poli-
tics , as we hG.ve learned, is a science of government based on the art 
of cornpronise , and Ed Crwnp was a master at this art . 11He was adamant 
o~ to the point where adamancy ceased to be useful to his purpose."l5 
He demonstrated time and again his willingness to comproMise by taking 
into the organization men who had demonstrated their ability to make 
headway against it. This can be seen by his dealines with organized 
labor. Opposed to the C.I . O. , J·.r . Crump was usually able to keep a 
workinr; alliance with the American Federation of Labor , especially the 
local building trades who deperrled on city contracts and a favorable 
interpretation of the building codes . But when they threatened to 
leave the .fold , the organization promptly added another union man to 
its office holders , often "a man who had shcn.-ed indications of becoming 
a leader of labor . ,l6 Thus Crump was able to take enough wind froo 
their sails to keep the OPPOSition ship from get tine tmderway . 
Perhaps this is just another way of saying that "Crump /Yaf/ 
a shrewd politician . At critical moments he out maneuvered the opposi-
tion ."17 For instance, there was soMe talk after World War II that 
the opposition would be able to split the Crump support by appealing 
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to the veterans with a ticket of G. I. candidates. But before thase 
plans could take forn , Crol"p placed veterans on his tic¥et and 
announced that "the ex-service man played a great part for four years 
in world affairs . They are entitled to great consideration, and I am 
sure Lemphis and Shelby County will accord them the honors they so 
richl,y deserve in future politics. nlB S1mi1.ar tactics were used 
against a threatened break in the usuall.y pro-CrUl'llp business community. 
When opposition arose , 11Crump was always able to adopt for his own 
enough planks from their platform to prevent them from raising a 
strong structure. ul9 
Crump' s genius for organization arXI his ability to co:!!promise 
worked within the organization itself , and was responsible for prevent-
1ne any fragmentation of power. ~fuen he was in a room he dominated it 
by hb attitude , his words , anct his complete belief in his own correct-
ness. 11With him in the lead, case hardened machine men would pull in 
the harness with YOWlB idealists ••• union presidents would share the 
same candidates wi. th executives of .·..emphis 1 s largest businesses , and 
work could be divided between Baptists , Jews , Catholics , and agnos-
tics . u20 Whenever rivalries !leered to be developing into death 
struegles they were taken to t he large desk on the third floor of 
.bain and Adams, where a setUement would soon be r e ached , ',ole should 
also reman1ber that Crwnp often formulated his opinions after weighing 
the advice of many persons , sho\oti.ng that re was open to suggestion. 
Candidates backed by his machine had usually been selected after 
revl9\oting the qualii'ications of many interested in entering public 
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service. Thus he was in essence the personnel manager for the co\Ulty 
political organization, and the arbitrator of all political disputes . 
With an organization as centralized as this , 1 t is little 
wonder that opposition usually failed to develop. Also , as the organi-
zation gathered inertia, and Crump support becrur~e the only visible 
criterion for office , an element of f.::ar was added to its power. Crump 
controlled all p:>lice , deputies , county and state attornies , state 
prosecutors , inspectors of all kinds , and a multitude of other of'fi-
cials , making it easy for him to utilize his power and authority 11to 
b~zy off , to discourage , or to intilnidate opposition and potential 
oPJX>sition. 1121 Thus it was inevitable that those who were inclined 
to question the wisdom of the organization think twice bef'ore they 
risked its wrath. While thl.s wrath was more often than not a figment 
of the imagination. there were enough cases of actual intimidation to 
give soroe justice to the rep:>rts of fear . 
Several examples of his "ruthlessness in dealing with those 
who got in his way or publicly differed with him"22 are mentioned by 
all who review his tactics. But since the same ones are mentioned in 
each report , I am inclined to think that they a re probably about the 
only cases , and not examples typi..fy1.ne general Crump policy. Crump 
was smart enough to know that a few "test cases" would be sufficient 
for his purposes, and that a wholesale display of power would not only 
decrease his backing , but would also give the opposition a cause to 
support. 
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Two of the often cited examples deal with J••emr:his businessmen. 
In the late l9J01 s a Negro druggist , Dr , J . B. f.Jartin , who owned the 
largest prescription pharmacy in hemphis , entered anti- Crump politics 
and soon found police in front of his store searching every customer 
for narcotics , When his business dwindled , he moved to Chicago , and 
was elected to a Cook County trusteeship in 1946. Yet a usually 
reliable source said that in 1923 the doctor was pinched for peddling 
dope , 23 and a newspaper article from 1936 shows that he was arrested 
for possessine a large supply ($600 worth) of untaxed cigars , cigarettes , 
24 
and tobaccos . The other example concerns a well known bu.sinessman 
who decided to wrok on the opposite side of the political street. Soon 
afterward the state legislature passed a new and heavy tax which exactly 
applied to his business. 
Yet the Crump wrath did not include physical violence , and 
those who speak of killings and goon squads have exaggerated their 
stories beyond justif'iable journalistic limits . Widespread fear and 
public worship can not both be used to describe the sap;e person, and 
it is obvious to me which term applied to hr. CrUJilp. We should also 
rote that thara was hWliOr in his wrath , and when one businessman was 
able to joke about Crump ' s mailed fist, the entire town enjoyed a laugh 
at his expense . This occured when motorcycle police were sent to an 
undertaking establishment owned by a political opponent , and were given 
instructions to arrest his ambulance drivers for speeding each tilre they 
left his driveway. After a few days of this the undertaker placed a 
large ad in the newspaper proclaiming to be the only ambulance service 
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in town with a twenty- four hour police escort . As l·,emphis laughed the 
police were rerr;oved to new assignments . 
Never at a loss for words , Crump once rebuffed a state 
Republican leader , Christopher Napoleon Fraizer, by saying 11 Christopher 
Napoleon ' s intellectual baggaie is very light .•• it would seem one 
would get tired of being a fool. n25 HUJOOr was an important part of his 
public statements , especially \-:hen he drew on his menagede of tern;s to 
describe p:>litical opposition. Because of Kefauver ' s liberal tendencies , 
Crump charged him with having socialistic views , denoW1cing him as a 
"lizard changing his spots from brown to green , but mostly to red, rr26 
Clifford Davis spoke against the prospective senator and persisted in 
mispronouncing his name "Cow- fever , " much to the delight of the Crump 
supporters . Speaking against the Truman administration in 1946 , Crump 
accused the Postmaster General , Robert s . Hannegan , of acting 11like a 
stool duck , trained to lead his wild brothers to their doom. u27 And on 
another occasion , when he called The Corrnr.ercial Appeal to see what 
portion of his latest statement they planned to print , and was read a 
sharply curtailed article , he replied , ":o/hy that ' s thinner than a worn 
out suit on a last year ' s hw.uuingbird . 1128 
On two occasions , however , his opponents were able to turn 
this kind of criticism into political hay to their own advantage . In 
1945 , in the midst of a bitter fight with the anti- Crump Nashville 
Tennessean , Crump replied to one of their articles on 11Crurnp town" 
with a 1700 word tirade , in which the wrd rat appeared 17 times , an:l 
the word liar 20. host of his wrath was spent on the paper ' s editorial 
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writer , Jennings Perry , who , he said, was an "unworthy , despicable 
character--a venal and licentious scribbler . . • Just what one would 
expect of a wanderoo [8. purple- faced , yellow- whiskered , long- tailed 
roonke.i]. He has the brains of a quagga [a now extinct . striped , w1ld 
South African asS]. n29 The next day the newspaper printed the entire 
re}Xlrt , sha..ring pictures of the two animals and i·.r . Crump, labeling 
them: "This is a quagga ," "This is a wanderoo, 11 11This is~ Crump. 11 
The other time that Crump' s zoological verbiage backi"ired 
has become a classic , and preceded /lalt Disney in starting the coon-
skin cap craze. In the election of 1948, Crump likened Kefauver to a 
pet coon "that puts its foot in an open drawer in your rool'l , but 
invariably turns its head while its foot is feeling aroWld 1n the 
drawer. 1'he coon hopes , through its CW'U"ling. by turning its head , 
he will deceive any onlookers as to where his foot is and what it is 
into . uJO The idea was to present Kefauver as a "darling of the 
Cor:mnmists" who was "desperately trying to cover up his very bad 
record 11 in Congress . Instead it boomeranged , and Kefauver put on 
a coonskin cap and invaded .i·.eJil!;his , saying he might be a pet coon , 
but he certainly wasn't Hr. Grump' s pet coon. 
Some mention of Crump ' s state-wide control should be made . 
Before his defeat in 1948, Crump controlled the state legislature 
al.rr.ost as efficiently as he held the •·.el!lphis and Shelby County 
commissions . Basical.l.f, the Crump faction in state ai'fairs had two 
main centers of heavy voting strength: Shelby and neighboring 
counties in western Tennessee and the Republican counties in the 
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eastern part of the state. Crump1s etrength in eastern Tenndssee is 
explained by Senator i·.cY.ellar ' s control of state patronage, and by a 
tacit agreement between the Crump powers and the Republican political 
leaders . In exchange for concessions fran the state government , and 
for a promise to remain out of local politics in their counties , the 
Republican leaders threw their support behind the Crump candidates in 
the state Democratic primAr~. Also important was the fifty to sixty 
thousand vote margin which his machine controlled in Shelby County 
elections, generally sufficient to break a tie in the state- wide vote. 
Despite his interest in state politics, knowing political 
analysts contend that i·ir. Crump was only interested in furthering the 
welfare of the J.:emphis citizen, and entered state politics more to 
obtain this goal than to increase his p;;::rsonal sphere of influence. 
To support this assumption, they point to the following statement 
made by Crump in 1927: 
f.;y whole desire and purpose i s for l-~emphis to progress , to 
have every opportunity for growth. and for its people to 
be happy in their pursuit of everyday business , and for 
the same spirit to reign in their ho100 life. I am deeply 
conscious of rrry responsibility to exercise my privilege as 
a citizen of a free republic, and this I intend to do so 
as long as I have in me the independence of a man. Jl 
Perhaps this also explains wh.f Lr . Crump did not seek a hit;her political 
office . Robert }larks of The Com!'lercial Appeal feels that 1-ir. Crump did 
not seek the governor• s chair because he realized that in such a position 
he would have to treat all areas of the state impartially, while remain-
ing in t.emphis he could exercise political pressure to obtain a dis-
porportionate share of the state 1 s financial assistance. To enter a 
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senatorial race, J·..r •• ·.arks believes , would have split his alliance 
with Senator I·.cKellar, and lost the good will that the senator carried 
in anti- Crump areas of the state. Of course , this is mere speculation. 
Still , the effect of Crump' s participation in state politics 
precipitated political alliances which resembled the permanent two-
party system thought to be the base of American democracy. Similar 
political divisions are W'l.seen in other Southern states, where "voters 
divide into transient groupings around. individual candidates. nJ2 While 
Tennessee is still considered a one-party state, the long life of the 
Crump machine forced all major political battles to be foueht between 
only two major groups , the Crump and anti- Crump factions . 
In reviewing the internal works of the Crump machine , we 
find. , then , that it used few means that were not common practice to 
all JX>liticians . Crump' s absolute control over local JX>l1tics cer-
tainly prevented many good men from seeld..ng public offi ce , but the 
efficiency and order that he was able to maintain seem to outweigh 
this disadvantage . Negroes received a better deal under his rule than 
in any other Southern city, and i·.emphis progressed at a faster rate 
than could have been achieved without the public support Crump carried. 
W1lile I caJ1l'X)t sanction all of his actions , I recognize the 
value of his organization and the good that it was able to effect. 
Perhaps no greater tribute can be paid to him than the complete failure 
of the l·.amphis citizen to handle his own political well-being after ··.r. 
Crump ' s death. t.any Americans are unconcerned with local politics, and 
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do not want to take the t1..me to become informed citizens. They are 
willine to surrerrler their choice of candidates to a man like Crump, 
for "good e;overlll"lent at a low cost. " His machine was foun:ied on this 
principle , and from these citizens it received its <r;a.in source of power. 
CHAPl'ER v:r 
TilE FIVE YEARS CRISIS, 1954-1959 
A STAlEMATED GOVERNMENI' - Seated (left to right) are l'.ayor Edmurd 
Orgill; Conunissioner of Public Safety and Vice-Mayor, Clauie T. 
Anuour ; Commissioner of Finances and Institutions , Stanley Dillard; 
Comnti.ssioner of Public Services , John T. D.zyer; and Commissioner of 
Public Works, Henr.t loeb, III. Elected in 1955 , the commission was 
incapable of action throughout its four year term because of a non-
progressive "worid..ng majority" formed by Armour , Dillard, and Dwyer. 
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A. 
When death brought an end of the Cru."'lp era on October 16, 
1954, a startled h.emphis looked in vain for a new source of political 
leadership. Strong as the Crump machine had been, it was unable to 
produce a successor • and thus could not perpetuate its rule. The 
strength of the organization had always rested on the personal appeal 
of Boss Crump, and without this personality to unite the various 
factions in the city and coWlty government , and to supply the final 
answer on all decisions of policy, the organization could not continue. 
Among the many and trusted lieutenants , Mayor Frank Tobey offered the 
greatest hope for the machine 's survival. Although he had never been 
a member of the organization's inner core, he had dennnstrated his 
abi.li ty to act independently while remaining loyal to the higher 
powers •1 The hope of his ascension to the top of the political 
machine ended, however , when the mayor died in office the following 
September. By the end of 1958, weary from three leaderless elections, 
the Crwnp machine formally disbanded , l eaving several city and county 
commissioners without the supp:>rt that had placed them 1n office. 
One of the first questions brought to the surface by the 
passing of hr. Crump was the future of the commission form of govern-
ment . During the forty-four years that 1-.emphis had had a commission 
system , Crump had been the guiding hand in all political affairs . The 
one-man control of the city under Crump more closely resembled the city 
manager plan than the commission system whose name it carried. The 
city really knew very little about the commission method , and many 
( 
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citizens questioned its ability to provide progressive government 
without machine rule. Other cities the size of t·,emphis had turned 
successfully to the council-manager plan, while some were investigating 
the mayor- council system as a possible source of effective leadership. 
Two days after Crump's death , The Commercial Appeal reported "We con-
sider it likaly that the commission framework will be discarded [in 
favor of a form of government that;! will reveal itself to be something 
quite dii'ferent than we have known while decisions were controlled by 
a single man . 112 l;lhether or not a change occurred , the death of Crump 
had made one thing clear--more effort by the citizens must be made if 
the present level of local government was to be maintained and progress 
continued. 
In the 1955 municipal. election, both major contenders for the 
mayor ' s office supported a change in the form of government. Edmund 
Orgill , entering politics for the first tirr.e, ran as an advocate of 
the council- manager system. While he vowed to remain in office for a 
full four-year term, he hoped the people would choose the council-
manager plan in a special ballot allowing the new system to go into 
operation at the time of the next city e l ection. Watkins OVerton, who 
had served a total of sixteen years as mayor un.:ler E . H. CrUJllp, weakly 
supported the council- mayor (strong mayor) system, w.i.th the change to 
be enacted through a public referendum. The election of Mr. Orgill was 
thought by many to be a public approval of the proposed chanee . Being 
informed of his victory , hr. Orgill said, 11 I believe the people of 
}.ernphis want to go ahead to new , free , and progressive goverrunent."3 
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At the end of his term, however, no change had occurred, and none of 
the above adjectives could be used to describe the bickering and 
reactionary city corronission that had prohibited progress for four 
years . 
Yet , one needed not to wait until the closing months of the 
Orgill admi.n1stration to see the breakdown in the city government and 
to realize that the cotnrlission had ceased to be an effective decision 
making body. The crl.llllbling of the Shelby County Political Organization 
was seen shortly after l'.tr. Crump's death. Local business and newspaper-
men felt that much of the early progress of the Crump era had been 
exchanged for a 11patch-and-mend-philosoph.y"4 of handling municipal 
affairs during his later years . Under the Tobey commission, there was 
a constant fight "to get urgent programs out of the deep freeze where 
they had been laid away by a reluctant, grudging administration that 
prei'erred the status quo • .,5 As the dictator had aged and more of the 
city's planning had to be delegated to men trained in following orders 
rather than in mald.ng decisions . less and less was accomplished. 
The state election of November, 1954. had been planned by 
Crump before his death , arrl was carried out according to his last 
requests . The municipal election of 1955 , however , had not been 
planned by Crump, and 1n the campaign of that year the failure of the 
old organization to work smoothly without their master was easily seen. 
The most vivid demonstration of their lack of leadership was that for 
the £irst time since 1909 the organization had gone to the polls with-
out endorsing a candidate for mayor . One of Crump's g reatest political 
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virtues , and one that contributed heavily to his long tenure of off'ice , 
was his ability to settle political rivalries without having to submit 
them to a public vote. Without this leadership, the factions that had 
developed within the machine ai'ter his death were unable to agree on a 
mayorialty candidate , and could only present a 11 Good Government" ticket 
headed by the fo\U' commissioners then in office . 
Mayor Walter Chandler , who had been appointed to office after 
Frank Tobey 1 s death , attributed the lack of an admi.ni.stration candidate 
for mayor to "insufficient time" since the death of Mr . Tobey to review 
all possible candidates , and on the inability of those businessmen who 
were asked to join the ticket to leave their personal affairs . 6 The 
mayor , himself , declined the nomination , preferring to return to his 
law practice , but wholeheartedly supported the Good Government group. 
Edrnun::l Orgill , it is reported , failed to gain the organization •s 
backing because of his support of the Bro-wni.ng- Kefauver camp during 
the decisive 1948 election. It was felt that state and county officials 
in the organization had persuaded the othe:n.rise agreeable commission not 
to back Z.1r. Orgill 1 s candidacy . Watkins Overton probably failed to 
invoke the support of those faithful to the memory of Ed Crump because 
he had twice left the organization after losing CrUJtlp backing , and 
because he had proposed a slate of his own in opposition to the 
incUJtlbent commissioners. Still JoLT . Overton was endorsed by the pro-
CrUJtlp Shelby County Com.'llission , guaranteeing him some of the captive 
vote. 
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The headless Good Government ticket campaigned on an eight-
point platform, pledging themselves to continua the commission system 
in hemphis; maintain low taxes; and to work with federal , state , ani 
county officials in building a much needed expressway systel!l in tb:! 
city. Underlying each plank in their platforn was a tacit praise of 
the Crump method and a promise to continue in his f'ootsteps, clearly 
showing that their years of following the city's Pied Pi.per had ren.-
de red them incapable o:f indepen::ient action even in the face o£ political 
annihilation. Supported by the city administration were: the four 
incumbent comm1ssioners , Claude A. Armour , Joseph P. Boyle, John T. 
11Buddy" Dwyer, and Oscar P. Williams; City Court Judges , Beverly 
Boushe and John Colton; Juvenile Court Judge , Elizabeth J.:cCain ; an::l 
the City Tax Assessor, Joe S, H:i.cks . 'l'he ticket made no endorsement 
of candidates for the Board of Education , wishing to keep the Board 
out of politics. 
Looking first at the minor offices 1 we find that the Good 
Goverrunent candidates were returned to their respective offices with-
out serious opposition. For instance , the incumbent Tax Assessor , who 
had served the city in that position since 19)6 1 and who had previously 
been a member of the Tennessee Legislature for three terrr.s, Shelby 
County Election Commissioner for two terms. a member of the county 
Equalization Board, and had served as mayor and tax assessor of 
Binghampton before it had been incorporated into the city , carried 
6) . 25 per cent of the 69 , 6ol votes cast for that office . 7 Similarly, 
Judge Elizabeth i"JcCain was re- elected Judge of the Juvenile Court by 
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a phenomenal .5 to 2 majority. Miss hcCain , who was 56, held a master's 
degree in psychology and child guidance , and had served as Director of 
the Board of Education's division of child adjustment and. as President 
of the Tennessee Board of Education prior to her appointment to the 
Juvenile Court in 1950. She received support from both white and 
Negro voters , surrendering only one precinct to her opponent , who 
had been dismissed in 1954 from his job as a complaint investigator 
for the Juvenile Court , being "accused of 'fee splitting' with 
attorneys he recommended to couples in domestic relation cases. n8 
Finally, in the election for the Judges of Divisions I ancl II o:f the 
City Court , the incumbents were re-elected by outstarding majorities . 
Their opponents , however, attracted some support from the Negro wards, 
The three incUITibents who were running for the Board of Educa-
tion were re-elected without a serious campaign , although there were 
sixteen candidates for the four-man post. Julian Bondurant , 50, 
president and. treasurer of the Armored r-:otor Service Company, received 
42, 464 votes to top the list. He was a director of the Chamber of 
Commerce , a member of the advisory board of the M.d-South Fair, had 
been president of several Comnn.mity Chest projects, and was past 
president of the Board of Education (an appointed position). John T. 
Shea, 59, was the only elected board member who was oot a parent. He 
received the second highest vote total, JJ,l9.3. hr. Shea had served as 
vice- president of the board for twenty-two years and was past president 
of the Z..emphis and Shelby County and Tennessee Bar .Associations. He 
was also president of the Termessee Athletic Commission. The third 
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incumbent , Mrs . Arthur N. Seessel , Jr., 40, had been a member of the 
board for four years arrl received 25 , 894 votes. The wi.fe of a grocery 
store owner, she was active in civic , educational , and religious circles. 
Newly elected to the Board of Education was Mrs . Lawrence Coe , 45, a 
former teacher and a member of the YWCA board of directors for the past 
eighteen years . Elected with 29 ,185 votes , she was the wife of the 
chief chemist at }.cliiller Feed P..i.ill and was active in youth and chW"ch 
work. 
Y.ost significant for our study was the entrance of a Negro 
candidate, Rev. Roy Love , who placed fifth of the sixteen candidates 
in the Board of Education contest . He received 20,ll0 votes, tie 
highest vote total received by any oon-elected cand1date . 9 Rev. Love, 
57 , had been pastor o:f the Mt . Nebo Baptist Church for thirty years , 
and was a trustee of Gregg ' s Business and Practical School and of 
s . A. Owen JW1ior College :in hemphis . He had tried to rW1 for the 
Tennessee Senate in 1954, but was barred by a constitutional ban on 
ministers in the legislature,. 
Evidence of single shot voting first became important in this 
election. Since voters cast their ballots for the four candidates of 
their choice . and the candidates with the highest vote total were 
elected. there lay the inherent possibility of giving one carxl.idate a 
disproportionate share of the votes by casting only one vote instead of' 
four f'or the office . This was the single shot method used by the colored 
voters in support of Rev. love . By casting only one vote f'or him, they 
deprived three white candidates of a vote and thus gave their candidate 
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a much higher percentage o£ the total than he would have received had 
. 
all ballots been cast. 
The effect of this technique can be seen by examining a 
typical Negro precinct . In precinct 35-2 , for instance . 90 per cent 
of the registered voters in 1955 were Negro. In the returns from this 
precinct Rev. Love received 700 votes , while the fifteen other can::li-
dates split 986 votes. Assu.ming that every voter in the precinct cast 
a vote for the Negro , three times this figure should equal the vote 
given to the other candidates. This , however , would have given 2100 
votes to the white candidates instead of the 986 they received. In 
this one pracinct. then, lll4 votes were not cast for white candidates, 
giving Rev. Love a higher percentage of the total vote than he actually 
received, 
*Since the single shot method has the greatest chance of 
electing a minority can:li.date in a contest in which many candidates 
are entered for a multi-position office, let us construct an example 
using the above information from the Board of Education contest. In 
our example , then , there would be sixteen candidates (A,B,C, ••• P) 
running for the four school board seats. Let us assume that 50, 000 
voters go to the polls , and of this number a minority bloc of 15,000 
use the single shot method in behalf of a single candidate , "N" . The 
remaining )5 , 000 voters, each having four votes , can deliver a total 
of 14o,OOO votes to be divided among the other fifteen candidates. If 
divided equally, each would receive 9 , ))) votes, far below the 15,000 
vote total assured to candidate "N". But since sone of the candidates 
are expected to be more popular than the others , the white voters can 
be expected to vote for various combinations of the white candidates .. 
When the votes are in, let us asswne that the votes are distributed 
so: Candidate "A" receives )0.000, "B" draws 25 , 000, "C" gets 20,000, 
"D" has 14 , 500, "E" - 12 , 500, and the other ten white candi.dates divide 
the remaining )8,000 votes . It is easy to see how a vote split of this 
type would allow minority-supported "N" to be elected. But suppose the 
15,000 Negro voters use some of their unused votes . Then . i1' only 501 
of them vote for "D", "N" cannot win. 
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The extent to which the single shot rcethod was used is 
ilnpos sible to know • since it can only be seen 1.n the strongly Negro 
precincts . But. as shown in Table 6-1. a total of' 1),478 votes were 
lost in the twenty precincts in which we can prove that this method 
was used. Were this vote divided equally among the fifteen white 
candidates. each would have received an additional 898 votes . Fur-
ther impact of this method can be seen if we can project the findings 
of our table on the total vote for the Board of Education candidates. 
By dividing the votes lost by three . the nwnber of votes that each 
Table 6-1 
Ward- Precinct Votes for Love Votes Lost 
5 ))7 55) 
7-1 119 114 
7-2 )75 666 
11-1 )89 789 
11-2 259 490 
14-1 521 819 
24 518 946 
25-1 687 784 
29-2 647 990 )2-2 204 )80 
)5-1 )1) 556 
)5-2 700 1114 
)7-1 264 296 
)9 )69 4)9 
40-1 )52 ))) 
41-1 749 990 
4)-J 505 85) 
48 485 612 
51-1 ))4 266 
61 715 1488 
Total 8 ,842 1),478 
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person did not cast, we see that 4 , 492 persons in the twenty precincts 
used the single shot method. By comparine; this with the votes for Rev. 
Love, we find that 49. 67 per cent of the ]:ersons voting for the Negro 
used the single shot method . Should this san:e percentage of voters 
have used the technique in all wards, then 9 ,978 persons would have 
cast single ballots , depriving the white candidates of a total of 
29, 9)4 votes . While we have no idea how these votes would have been 
divided among the i'ifteen white candidates had they been cast, we can 
see what the difference would have been had they been divided equally. 
Here each candidate would have received 1,995 extra votes if the single 
shot method had not been used. Needl.ess to say, this can have a great 
effect on the outcome of an election. 
Turning now to the really signif'icant positions, the greatest 
interest was seen in the eleven-man race for the city commission and in 
the contest for mayor , where for the first time in recent history two 
candidates, who represented di.fferent philosophies of government , had a 
chance for victory. Prompted by the Good Government ticket's endorsement 
of the four incumbent commissioners and 1-:.t- . Overton 1 s former association 
with the organization, the main issue of the campaign was whether or rot 
to follow in the tradition of machine rule. "We do not want another 
political machine," The Conurercial Appeal reported. 
Vot ers of 1-.emphis will have to decide i f they are to 
elect lfll'. Orgill and thereby invite partici pation of all 
segments of our hid-South metropolis in local. government 
affairs , or YJ.r . Overton, whose principal backers are 
identi.fied with the machine politics way of doing things . 
They will deterndne i.f we are to have a bold , dynamic 
proeram for meeting our power and transportation demands , 
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oow and in the future , or again embrace a patch- and- mend , 
do- it-only- if- politically- expedi.ent tYJ)e of adnd.nistration . 11 
Mr. Orgill , 56 years ol d , was president of Orgill Bros. 
& Co, • one of the largest whol esale hardware f irms in the nation , was 
past president or the Chamber of Commerce , and was a former vi.ce- presi-
dent of the YHCA , He was a graduate of the University of Virgin:ia and 
represented the liberal , yet aristocratic , circles of the city, Hr . 
Overton, 61, had been mayor of hemphis from 1928 until 1939 and again 
f rom 1948 to 1952. He had also served in the Tennessee Legislature 
and in the state senate, He had attende d Car roll Coll ege in Waukesha , 
Wisconsin , Harvard University, and had received his doctorate in juris-
p r udence from the University of Chicago. His 11chief' virtue , aside f'rom 
personal integr ity, was admittedly car rying out the program of a politi-
cal machine. ul2 Two minor contestants for the post drew only slight 
recognition during the campaign. 
Mr. Orgill, who was supported by The Connnercial Appeal , drew 
t he gr eatest attention because of his l ack of political ties , his 
succe ssf ul business and civi.c record, and his fresh approach to the 
probl ems f acing the growing city. However, he was attacked by his 
opponent for his help i n establishing the Atlantic Union Conference , 
which the American Legion condemned as a "fetish of millionaires ani 
Socialists, n13 and for his support of the oouncil- manager plan, which 
it was charged would "take away from the people their right to choose 
their chief executive."14 The opposition advertised that 1-.tr. Orgill's 
support of both showed that he had "little faith in the democr atic 
process • • • He is interested primarily in zr.aking radical and sweeping 
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changes--not necessarily because they are needed or advisable . but 
because he is curious to see if his ideas will work , • , Let ' s not 
make our city Mr. Orgill ' s J:ersonal guinea pig ."l5 
Several paradoxes arose in considering the qualif'ications of 
Watkins Overton, First. "Hr, Overton served for sixteen years under 
l-1r , Crump , who was acknowledged to be the city's real 'mayor, strong 
mayor , and city manager,' N01-1 , should !>Jr. Overton get credit for the 
unwise actions dw-ing tlx:~se sixteen years and someone else get credit 
for the wise moves? Or should he be credited with the good things, and 
pass to others the bad? Or should he get credit for all of the good 
and bad , or for absolutely none? 1116 The second paradox was equally 
confusing, Mr . Overton had twice left the Crump organization because 
he found it impossible to agree with them on all points. Should he now 
be blamed for oot getting along with his fellow politicians and at the 
same time be criticized for accepting dictation from higher up? 
Similar problems arose in selecting the commissioners for the 
next fow- years . The commissioners , at this time , were elected in the 
same manner as the members of the Board of Ecl.ucation, each voter being 
able to vote for four of the eleven candidates . Between the election 
and the date that the new term began. January 1, the newly elected 
officials would decide among themselves which office each was to hold, 
Since no Negro candidate was entered in the race, there was no threat 
of a single shot vote . Two tickets were presented to the public, each 
representing fow- commission candidates , and three of the contenders 
ran as independents. In addition to the Good Government ticket, 
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'r!atkins Overton presented a slate comp:~sed of Henry K, Buck , L. Stanley 
Dillard , 1-:.alcolm R. Futhey , and Joe J. Thompson. Independents were 
Sam E, Chambers. Henry Loeb, Ill . and F. P, Carpenter . 
The Good Government ticket , composed of Commissioners Arnk:lur , 
Boyle , Dlqer and Williams , sought re- election on a plea of "continued 
good goverrunent by experienced men. nl7 Claude Armour , J6 , was the 
Police and Fire Commissioner , and Vice-Mayor , and had been on the 
commission since 1950. Prior to this he had played professional 
baseball , worked his way up in the city ' s JX>lice force , and served 
several years as the chief of police. He was one of the young veterans 
that received Crump recognition after World War II. John T. ' Buddy ' 
Dwyer , 37 , also joined the police force after his release from the 
servi.ce , and rose to the commission , with Crump ' s blessing , in 1952, 
He had served as Commissioner of Public Service , and was sUpported for 
re-election because of his conunenclable work in this office. Joseph P . 
Boyle , 64 , who had been on the cicy payroll since 1912, was the most 
controversial of all candidates. The Commissioner of Finances arrl 
lnstitutions , he had "made thousatxis of persons angry in his {yrevioUSJ 
roles as poll tax collector, trusted lieutenant, and ' hatchet man ' of 
the old organization. • • On the other hand he {!laS] credited with 
driving organized vice and gambling out of the city, and eliminating 
graft within the police department ."18 Oscar P . Williams , 62, had been 
the Commissioner of Public Works for twenty years , and had served on the 
Tennessee Legislature prior to this time . He had always operated in the 
background, and was not as well known to the public as the other commis-
sioners. 
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Jolr. Armour and hr. Dwyer were backed by The Commercial Appeal 
in recognition of their past service , and because it was felt "that they 
could fit into • • • a program [§"f continued progre~ if they were not 
dominated by the cold- patch thinking that has frequently interferred 
with their projects. 11 9 These two commissioners were expected to draw, 
in addition to the votes the machine could deliver, enough s upport. from 
other areas to elect them. Commissioners Boyle and Williams, the older 
members of the city administ ration , were given credit for the reactionary 
feeling in the courthouse , and were expected to receive only the captive 
vote . 
The Overton ticket ran on a seventeen- point platform which 
resembled the one prop::>sed by the administr ation slate. l-ir. Overton 
tried to include in his record everything good that was associated 
with the Crump era , urgi.ng the voters to drive around the city an:l 
see the "good things 11 that represented his record. His ticket had the 
difficulty of having to be against the city administration candidates , 
in order to att ract the independent vote . and yet be enough like them 
to take credit for the Crump achievements and dr aw on the organization1 a 
aupp:>rters . 
l-lr . Buck, who was 59. was the terminal superinten::l.ent of the 
lll.inoia Central Railroad. He had been active in civ1.c and ch\U'ch work0 
but had no previous political experience. 1-J.r. Dillard. 47 , was the 
only meni>er of the Overton group supported by The Commer cial Appeal. 
He was an autoroobile salesman, but had had twenty- four years service 
with the city. In 1928 he had served as assistant superintendent and 
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director of the recreation department of the ¥.eroph1s Park Commission, 
and was later the director of research and attendance for the Board of 
Education and director of personnel for the Iepartment of Health arxi 
Administration. Mr. Dillard had been fired in 195) by the City Commis-
sion, being charged with inef'ficiency in his department . But he blamed 
his dismissal on political rivalry against him and then-foJ.aYor Overton , 
who resigned shortly af'terward . following years of strife with the Crump 
COlt'JlJission. hr . Futhey, 55 years old, was the past president of Local 
49 of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators , and Paperhangers , ard 
was serving his tenth term as business agent for the local . He was 
also president of the l-:emphis Building and Construction Trades Council , 
having previously served two terms as vice-president of the group. 
The last member of the Overton ticket was hr. Thompson, 60 , who was 
the chief engineer for a local electric company. He had previously 
served as manager of Westinghouse Electric Corporation ' s .hemphis 
installation for sixteen years . He urged the voters to elect him so 
that his past experience could be used in constructing a ~.emphis power 
plant. 
Running as independent candidates were three men who either 
refused association with the two tickets , or were not acceptable to 
them. hr. Carperter, 7J, was the oldest man seeking election to the 
commission . He was a real estate roan and a stock broker , i'avoring the 
council- manager form of government and a consolidation of city and 
county administrative oi'fices . l-11' . Loeb , J4 , was the youngest man in 
the race, one of the most popular men in the city , and carried the 
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endorsement of The Commercial Appeal. He was secretary of loeb •s 
La1mdry and had been named the ci ty• s 110utstanding YoW"'g l'ian of the 
Year 11 by the Junior Chamber of Commerce. A graduate of Brown Univer-
sity , he had served on the Z..emphis Park C()llllllission in 1951 , but after 
helping to :initiate a hearing in which the chairman of the commission 
was repremanded for misconduct in office , he was not reappointed when 
his term expired. Mr . Loeb had won his first political victory by 
defeating Bert Bates , of the old organization , for the Commandership 
of Post No . 1 of the American Legion. The third independent , Mr. 
Chambers , 42, had been an employe of Ford Z..otor Company for twenty-six 
years . He was past president of Ford Local 90) of the United Auto 
Workers and a former vice-president of the Tennessee Industrial Union 
Council . His campaign was directed toward the ttl ittle man . tt 
When the election returns were in , it had become apparent 
that the old organization was incapable o£ holding the captive vote . 
The core of loyal city employes had disintegrated , and the ward 
organization was a shell. Edmund Orgill was swept into o£fice with 
52 ,177 votes , while Overton received only )) , 061. The other two 
candidates for mayor polled l ess than 1 , 200 votes between them . 
l-.r . Armour (Good Goverrunent) lead in the cor.unission race , piling up 
the highest vote total for any candidate in the 1955 election , with 
66,444 votes . Henry I.oeb 1 s (Independent) personal appeal placed him 
second on the comm:i.ssion 1 s vote scale , drawing 54, 262 votes . Mr. 
Dwyer (Good Government ) was also returned to the commission , being 
given 49 , 658 votes . And hr . Dillard (Overton ticket) received 3) ,761 
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votes to fill the commission. Of the other candidates, fill' . Boyle 
(Good Government) received 28 , 781 votes , and Mr. 1.-lilliams (Good 
Government) was given a 27 ,198 vote total. Sam Chambers (Independent) 
gained 19,101 votes and Mr. Buck (OVerton ticket) pulled in 17.95) 
supporters . None of the other candidates received 10, 000 votes . 20 
The twnty Negro precincts (those that had used the single 
shot metOOd in the school board contest) all returned heavy majorities 
for }i.ayor Orgill. In eighteen of these precincts a strong preference 
was shown for Commissioner Loeb , while sixteen of the precincts gave 
their second highest vote to Commissioner Dwyer (he was also first in 
precinct 51- 1) . Negro preferences were also shown for Mr. Chambers 
(who was one of the top foW" candidates in fifteen precincts) , Com-
missioner Armour (among the top four in eleven precincts), and for 
Commissioner Dillard (ten times one of the top four candidates) . A 
few Negro precincts gave high votes to l".r. Boyle and l-lr. Williams. 
Interesting to note is that the average age of the commis-
sioners after the 1955 election was 42 , compared with a 54 year age 
average under the earlier administration. Also worth mention was the 
voters • acceptance of Catholic and Jewish candidates. Mr. Loeb and 
~l!'s . Seessel were Jewish, whlle Commissioner Dwyer , Judge Colton, and 
Mr. Shea , of the Board of Education, were Catholic . The election of 
these people in a strongly protestant Southern city, wit hout raising 
the religion issue , demonstrates the broad- minded outlook of the Y.emphis 
citizen. This, I believe , came only because Mr. Crump had incltxied them 
on his ticket for many years, thus different faiths , like Negro voting , 
had been accepted by the city 1 s voters. 
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The fresh spirit of the election, however, was :oot carried 
into office on January 1 . One of the first mishaps of the new admi.nis-
tration was a premature announcement by hayor Orgill , on a televised 
press conf'erence, that he was considering the app:>intment of a Negro 
to the city hospital board. While this move was certainly a step 
toward progress, and one that should have been made , it drew a storm 
of protests against the rew mayor, and hindered the formation of 
effective leadership at the beginning of his term. 2l hare important 
was the political alliance formed by J.lr. Dillard. With the election 
of two organization and two independent men to the conuni.ssion , }.r. 
Dillard appeared to be the balance of p:>wer between the two factions . 
However , after the election he joined Armour and Dwyer to produce a 
"wor king majority" capable of ld.l ling all action proposed by Mayor 
Orgill or Commissioner Loeb. Through thi.s all.iance almost all action 
stopped and for four years the two sides sneered at each other across 
the commission table . A third hindrance to progr ess was the inabili. ty 
of the 11working majority11 to cornplately b r eak away £rom the Crump way 
of doing things. Crump had instilled in the minds of the people the 
idea that the city could be built on low taxes . Because of this the 
1955 administration became afraid to raise the tax rate for fear that 
the public would not accept the increase. 22 Hence the expressway system 
that had been urged in the campaigns of both }i.r. Orgill and the Good 
Gover nment ticket did not materialize , and all departments o£ the city 
suffered f'rom a lack of £unds. 
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B. 
The formation o:f' a new political organization, the Citizens 
for Progress or CP 1 s as they became known , in March of 19561 brought to 
a cli.rnax the split that had developed in the city government. Despite 
denials by the CP officials , the organization resembled a renewal o:f' 
the old Shelby County Political Organization headed by Boss Crump. The 
men behind the new organization were all former Crump associates . and 
included almost every office holder in the county. Com:nissioners Armour , 
Dwyer, and Dillard . o:f' course , were charter members , while J..layor Orgill 
and Commissioner loeb were not invi.ted to the membe rship meeting . The 
CP platform favored retaining any institution initiated by Crump, whether 
or not it had outlived its purpose , and speeches made by officials of the 
organization praised the memory of Crump and made continual references to 
the many good things that he had brought to the city. But without the 
personal appeal of their former leader, and the foresight that he had 
carried , the new organization could do little more than rebuild a cam-
paign machine , 
The split represented by the Citizens for Progress can be seen 
by their goals and the plati'orm they pro}Xlsed . The group was organized 
to help "elect a l egislative delegation in August [).956] who will sup-
port interposition by the state of Tennessee to the Supreme Court 
decision on segregation , and retention of the commission form of govern-
ment for l-'...emphis . n2.3 Their twelve- }Xlint program also favored maintaining 
the present city tax rate , gaining additional funds by obtaining a more 
favorable distribution of state income , and continuing the unit voting 
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rule for the Shelby County delegation to the state legislature to 
increase the voice of the county in state affairs. 
The organization was a slap at t-..ayor Orgill, who was trying 
to increase the city's tax rate, and who advocated the council-manager 
form of goverrunent . The mayor also took issue with the group's demands 
for continued segregation ani with the praise given the "Dixie Y.anefesto, " 
signed by one hundred Southern congressmen, including Shelby ' s Clifford 
Davis , proposing legal opposition to the Supreme Court ' s decision on 
segregation. Mayor Orgill said the CP ' s were "preaching hate of the 
Negroes , 1124 and that their platform also held strains of anti-Catholic 
and anti-Jewish feeling. Further protests against the Citizens for 
Progress were issued when the organization began to use city employes 
to collect campaign funds, and mailed campaign literature on city 
stationery using the city's postage meter . 
The mayor 's optX>sition to the Citizens for Progress precipi-
tated the formation of a second political organization headed by Mayor 
Orgill, his 1955 campaign leaders, and persons traditionally "in the 
anti- Crump camp. Commissioner Loeb was not directly associated with 
the group. The Good local Government league, the GLGL or "Glug Glugs" 
as their opponents called them, was a non-partisan organization designed 
to promote improved home government . They endorsed qualified men for 
both the Democratic and Republican primaries for state offices. In a 
ten-point program, the GLGL favored the adoption of a "LitUe Hatch 
Act" to control political activity of city employes; home rule for 
l>lemphis , allowing the city to determine its form of government through 
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a referendum vote; legislative reapportionment for the state of 
Termessee; restrictions on political advertising near the polling 
places; an equitable distribution of city and county school funds 
(the city paid 75 per cent of the taxes, received 50 per cent of tffi 
school fW"l.ds , and taught 71 per cent of the pupils in the county); and 
a repeal of the unit voting rule for Shelby County legislators. 
The GLGL refused to recognize segregation as an issue, saying 
that it was 11overtaxed already and nothing good can come of it except 
added hysteria . n25 The extent to which their liberal views were carried 
can be seen by the appointment of Rev. s . A. Owen , a Negro minister , to 
the chairmanship of a GLGL cormnittee and their recommendation of T. L. 
Spencer, a Negro candidate, for the state House of Representatives in 
the Republican primary. 
The election was a tilree-~ne affair , in which a staggering 
ninety- two names appeared on the ballot. In the general election , for 
Shelby County offices , the following positions had to be filled.: 
Attorney General, Sheriff , County Trustee , County Tax Assessor , Court of 
Appeals Judge. a Chancellor of the Chancery Court . a Circuit Court Judge, 
two judges of the General Sessions Court , and three County Constables . 
In the De100cratic and Republican prilnaries held at the same time , 
mininations were made for: u . s . Representative , Public Service Connnis-
sioner , three state senators , eight state representatives , and the state 
Committeeman and Committeewoman for the Democratic Party. 
The CP 1 s carried out an extensive campaign for the twenty-
three candidates they supported , urging the voters to 11 keep Memphis 
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down in Dixie . 1126 The Good local Government League recommended twenty-
two for office, supporting six candidates who had CP backing . When the 
election returns were in, all Citizens .for Progress candidates had won 
heavy victories over the candidates who carried Gl.GL support. The 
only Negro in the Democratic primary for state representative , J . T. 
Walker , received only 4 , 015 votes , placing him sixteenth in the 
nineteen man race. He failed to receive the singular support of the 
Negro voters that Dlai\Y had expected. Because organized labor was 
split on the segregation issue , none of the labor candidates , who 
appeared as irrlependents or under the GLGL banner , received suf-
ficient support for election. 
The general election in November . 1956 , placed all of the 
CP supported Democratic candidates in off'ice without serious opposition 
from the Republicans . The Republican vote in the election was primarily 
Negro , as can be shown by the vote given Herbert L . Harper , Republican 
candidate for the U. S . House of' Representatives against Cl.i.f:ford Davis . 
A correlation between the vote for l-'i.r . Harper , who ran unsuccessfully 
for the school board in 1955 , and the vote given Russell Sugarmon. Jr., 
the l eading Negro candidate in the 1959 municipal election, shows the 
Negro orientation of the Republican vote. Since we can assume that 
l-"J.I'. Sugarmon •s vote was entirely Negro , his votes provi.ded a measure 
to use in evaluating the )5 , 78) votes that flu- . Harper received against 
J.i.r. Davis ' s 90 , 8?4. The correlation. by precinct , between the Harper 
and Sugarman votes was r = . 92. indicating that 84. 64 per cent of the 
precincts r eturned votes :for hr. Harper in direct relation to the 
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percentage of votes they gave the Negro candidate in 1959. Thi.s shows 
that the Republican strength for state offices depenied heavily on the 
Negro vote. However , in the same election, President Eisenhower 
received 65 , 690 votes to Adlai Stevenson ' s 6.2 , 051. But a sufficient 
number of Presidential Republicans or Eisenhower Democrats (those who 
are ordinarily Democratic but crossed party lines to vote for Eisenhower) 
were wlrl.te , so that there was no appreciable correlation ( r = . 164) 
between the vote for Eisenhower and the vote for Sugarmon. 
The politically divi.ded city and county goverrunents greatly 
damaged state- local relations. "Shelby had dropped from the most 
efficient to the least efficient of the four metropolitan counties in 
a span of less than three years. "27 In the expressway controversy, 
for instance, the political ri.ft was noted , and placed State Highway 
Commissioner W. h . Leech in a difficult position. If he had made an 
appointment with Nayor Orgill and Commissioner Loeb and igmred the 
Citizens for Progress group, it would have cau.sed ill feelings among 
the CP officials. If he had worked only with the "working majority" 
on the city commission, it would have been an "obvious breach of 
protocol 1128 to ignore the mayor and the Commissioner of Public Works • 
1-:.r. Loeb . who in ordinary circumstances would have been the most 
logical and the only necessary people to see. Further difficulty 
arose in other instances where state officials had to consult the 
various factions of the CP organization in the city and coWlty govern-
ment. Thus in many cases , state politicians had to call on from six to 
eight officials instead of one , greatly hampering their work and the 
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chance that action would be accomplished. Many state officials remarked 
"we wouldn' t be having this trouble if l-X. Crump were still down there."29 
In the 1958 state an:::l county elections , the Citizens for 
Progress showed early signs of internal weakness . Thomas P . J-a.tchell . 
state senator from the JJrd District , withdrew f'rom the CP organization 
rejecting their nomination, and won heavily over J. Weldon Burrow, who 
was then given CP support. Much bitterness arose in the CP camp over 
which of the six candidates for Governor they should support. After 
Dlai\Y weeks of hassling , they finally decided to support Buford Ell.ington. 
The Cou.mercial Appeal endorsed Andrew "Tip11 Taylor from Jackson , Tennes-
see , and the :t-..emphis Press- Scimitar supported the campaign of Edmmd 
Orgill , who toured the state with a broom, promising a "clean sweep. " 
Although hr. Ellington was elected, he carried. only a few ~~mphis 
precincts, while 1-J.l'. Orgill took second place in his home city, 
surrendering the local vote to 1-ir . Taylor. The Citizens f'or Progress 
had also supported the election of Prentice Cooper to the United states 
Senate over inci.Dllbent Albert Gore. Yet Gore had won the election ard 
the Shelby County vote. The losses suffered by the Citizens for Progress 
brought an end to their organization, as the 1956 l osses had terminated 
the existence of the Good Local Government League . 
In the election, Hayor Orgill had won in Chattarx>oga and 
Kn:>xvil.le , primarily because of his 1948 support of Senator Kefauver , 
b ut placed second in Memphis and Nashville. In lo1emphis , a large portion 
of his 40,951 vote (compared with 44,190 for Taylor and 18, 6)1 for Gover-
nor Ellington) came from the Negro precincts , where he received almost 
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undivided support. In precinct 6o-J , for instance, which was 91 per 
cent Negro in 1959, 865 votes were given Eayor Orgill , while the other 
five gubernatorial candidates received a total of only 7? votes . The 
same was true with the Negroes in Shelby County , outside the city, where 
the strongly Negro I.evi- 2 box returned 975 votes for Mr. Orgill , giving 
58 votes to the next highest cand1date.J0 
Also important in the 1958 election was the Negro use of the 
single shot method for the second time in three years . This time the 
Negro precincts , through use of the technique , were able to give s . A. 
Wilburn. a yoWlg Negro attorney, 26 , 266 votes in his campaign for the 
state legislature. There were eleven ll'.en running for the eight-man 
JX>St , and election officials discover ed that a "surprisingly large 
number of /!fegro] voters had marked their ballots for only one or a 
few chosen candidates. nJl While Mr. Wilburn pl aced tenth (of eleven 
candidates) in the race , the top-heavy vote he received from the Negro 
wards made many white citizens fear that a similar 11ballot blitz" in a 
future election, 1f "carried out with a substantial degree of W"li-
fortrd. ty • • • [would] enable a strong mi.rx>ri ty to thwart the will of 
the majority. n.32 
The threat was substantiated with the election of Robert A. 
Hoffman as Chancellor of Part I of the Chancery Court in the August 
general election. Nr. Hoffman , who had Negro support, won a close 
election over Rives A . !'.anker, who carried the backing of the Citizens 
for Progress and the endorsement of the Memphis and Shelby CoW'lty Bar 
Association. chiefly by the one-sided margins given him by the Negro 
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precincts)J While this was the bloc vote without the refinement of 
the single shot . it was effective and just as powerful a threat in the 
eyes of the white voter . 
S1milar action was used by the Negro voters in the November • 
1958, general election, in which Dr. R. Q. Venson , a Negro dentist , was 
one of twenty- one candidates seeking election to the eight-man delega-
tion to a limited constitutional convention. Dr. Venson received 
disproportionate votes in twenty-seven predominantly Negro precincts . 
The Negroes had also instructed their ranks to vote for Louis E. Peiser 
and Harry W. Wellf'ord , white attorneys . for the same office , and these 
men received considerable support from the Negro areas..34 In precinct 
4J- J , for instance , in which 1 , 612 Negro and 2 white voters were 
registered, Dr . Venson received )52 votes, while loir . Wellford registered 
227 and 1-Jr . Peiser drew 175. The high among the other candidates was 
}2. 
Threatened with the possibility that this would be used in 
future elections, chiefly the 1959 city commission race and the school 
board contest , the white voters sought means to outlaw the single shot 
technique . Two sources of action were open to them. First , they could 
follow the lead set by Alabama, Mississippi , Louisiana , and North 
Carolina, and require each voter to vote for as many candidates as 
there were offices at stake . However , the Negroes argued that they 
should not be required to vote for eight men when only one or two 
were acceptable to them. And, to change the city ' s 700 voting machines 
to void any ballot in which votes were omitted, would cost the city 
$175 . 000. 35 
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The second , and more practical solution , was to require the 
candidates to run for positions, rather than for the office. Under 
this system ni.nstead of a munber of candidates running for • • • eight 
state constitutional convention seats with the eight highest elected, 
each candidate /_WOuld be] required to run for a particular seat , nJ6 on 
the convention, with a winner being determined for each seat. It would 
cost nothing to convert the voting machines for use in multi- office 
races. A bill to this effect was introduced in the state l egislature 
by the SM:lby County delegation in February, 1959, and was made law 
shortly thereafter. This was to become important in the 1959 municipal 
election, and will prove to be signif'icant in later elections for tl'e 
eight-man delegation to the state legislature. But while the new law 
required candidates to run for Position I , Position II , and so .forth, 
it did not divide the seats among the various geographic sections of 
the city or county. Candidates still rtm at large, and Negro voters 
are denied the chance of electing a candidate of their choice in their 
horne district. 
Thus in the five years following the death of Edward Hull 
Crump, came the collapse of his nnchine and the failure of a substitute 
organization to replace it; the development of a politically divided 
city and county government , incapable of overcoming political barriers 
for the sake of action; and the growth and curtailment of an effective 
device to express the wishes of the Negro voters. In the midst of cries 
that this would not have happened had Crump lived, the city began to 
realize that ~lemphis should be ~· not down in Dixie , and that progres-
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sive action would only come through the acceptance of their civic 
responsibilities and the election of men capable of producing the 
needed leadership. The 1959 municipal electi on was looked upon as 
a hope for the future , and a chance to make up the time they had 
lost since 1954. 
CHAPTER vn 
THE CA!illiDATES IN 1959 
A CHANGE - For years }.r . Crump selected the candidates for each post and 
they were ratified by the people . Without his influence, forty-five 
names appeared on the ballot in the 1959 MWlicipal Election. 
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Since the Orgill administration had been unable to provide 
effective municipal goverrunent, the first desire in the 1959 election 
was to elect new men to the commission who could provide this leader-
ship. The office of mayor offered the greatest p:>ssibility f'or a man 
to prove his political strength, and therefore during the campaign it 
was sought by eight candidates . including hayor Orgill and Commissioner 
Henry Loeb . Mr. Loeb's entrance in this contest l eft a vacancy on the 
commission which , without an incumbent to buck , drew six candidates 
into the race for Public Works Commissioner . Another possibility for 
new leadership, and one that seemed necessary if the election was to 
provide effective government was to retire one or DXlre members· of the 
"working majority 11 (viz ., the Armour- D,yer- Di.J,lardr coalition) . Commis-
sioners Arroour and D.lyer had good records in their respective offices , 
despite their unwillingness to co- operate with the iniepenclent menbers 
of the con.mission , and they received only slight opposition. The 
attack on the "working majority , " then , was made on its weakest member , 
Stanley Dillard , and three candidates entered against him in the cam-
paign for Cornn;issioner of Finances an::i Institutions. 
When asked what his proudest accomplishments were during his 
term of office , Nayor Orgill listed "the independence and responsibility 
now given to citizens advisory boards , the vast improvement in civil 
service and personnel • • • , the establishment of an effective Planning 
Commission , and the election of the mw City Connnission . n1 By the same 
token , he considered his faiJ.ure to obtain a division of city ani county 
school funds on a basis of average daily attendance (which would have 
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given the city 7) per cent of the school funds in 1959, instead of 50 
per cent as received under the present plan) , to be his greatest error. 
Despite his failure to get many of his measures through the blocked 
commission , a large nwnber of citizens felt that the Mayor should be 
returned to office, and given new conunissioners to work with, would 
prove to be the leader the cit y needed. It was certain that he would 
attract the 1egro and the labor vote , while his popularity was also 
strong in other sections of the city. Ho\ow'ever , his withdrawal from the 
race six weeks before the election, due to an operation for a stopped 
artery, left Henry Loeb without serious opposition for the post. 
1-l.r . Loeb had rWl for office in 1955 in order to defeat the 
political machine, but being blocked by the working majority , he de-
cided to run for mayor in 1959. His two main objectives of office 
were to improve the school system and bring new industry to the city. 
He had been pushed aside by the 1955 Commission, given the Wldesirable 
Public Works Commissionership instead of the head of the Departnsnt of 
Finances and Institutions that he preferred. Still he had made the 
most of his headache, and had won many supporters by his efficient 
method of handling complaints . He had urged people to tell him about 
vacant lots that were grown over with weeds , about p:~t holes in the 
roads , and about alleys they wanted paved. TtJhen the garbage trucks 
failed to make a pick-up, he himself would make the collection. A 
great letter writer (he averaged a hundred a day), he prided himsel.f 
with sending a personal letter to everyone who wrote or called his 
office , assuring the person that his complaint had been received an:i 
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that action would be taken . These were low-cost services , but were 
expected to add heav:l..ly to his vote total. 2 
Z.ir . Loeb , an executive of loeb 1 s Laundry, had refused 
association with both tickets in the 1955 election , and had not been 
a part of either the Citizens for Progress or the Good Local Govern-
ment league. When asked if he planned to present a slate of favored 
commission candidates in his 1959 campaign , he remarked that the only 
ticket he was interested in was a laundry ticket . J Mr. loeb believed 
in establishing a charter committee to study the possibility of a 
change in the form of government , planned to work for consolidation of 
duplicate city and coW1ty functions, ani believed in comprehensive 
planning for the city ' s future growth. With the withdrawal of l<.ayor 
Orgill from consideration, Cornmissioner Loeb received the support of 
both hemphis newspapers and of the Dedicated Citizens Committee, which 
had been formed by l'laYor Orgill's campaign organization. \Yith the 
prospect of a Negro ' s election in the Public Works contest , Nr . loeb 
came under severe pressure to endorse one of the white candidates. 
While he refused to do so. urging the contenders for that office to 
"thin their ranks . 11 4 he was criticized by the city's Negro population. 
who felt that the mayor was sacrificing their welfare because of the 
demands of the white citizens. 
Because of the dissatisfaction with Commissioner Loeb , the 
Negro Volunteer Ticket endorsed Partee Fleming , 42, for mayor. Mr . 
Fleming had entered the race on 11i.mpulse 11 after l'u-. Orgill ' s with-
drawal, and was not a serious candidate until he received Negro 
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backing. He was the owner of a large wholesale and retail furniture 
store , and was the former national amateur heavyweight wrestling 
champion, The )00-pound candidate said that since t--:emphis was the 
largest city in the state it should have the biggest mayor. 5 Mr. 
Fleming's campaign centered around his promise to provide "10,000 
new jobs for 1-:.emphis--a gold mine 1n your own back yard. n5 Despite 
his claim that he was a "heavy contender" for the off'ice, he received 
less than hal.f the 65 , 000 votes he expected. 7 
Fringe candidates in the race were Willis E. Ayres , Jr. , who 
campaigned as the "foe of integration; 11 Tom };orris Bryan, who "wanted 
to give Henry loeb some competition •• , because he was just sliding 
1n;"8 Albert F. Boskey, J)-year-old chemical worker , who entered the 
race because he felt more people should take part in their city govern-
ment; Robert Gregory, who was disqualified by the Shelby CoWlty Election 
Commission because he did not own property inside the city; and former 
city judee William c. Bateman, who withdrew early in the campaign in 
favor of JV.r. Fleming. 
Claude A. Ar:oour was virtually without opposition in his 
campaign for a third term as Commi.ssioner of Fire and Police and 
Vice-Hayor. An organization candidate in 1955, a leader in the 
Citizens for Progress movement , and a former Crump lieutenant. Com-
missioner Ar.nour ran "as an i.nd.ividual ," in the 1959 election. Again, 
his record in office served as the basis of his campaign. During the 
eight years he had held the post, the Police Department had added 255 
new personnel and the Fire Department had grown by a comparable figure . 
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His departnents had obtained salary increases aroounting to 68 per cent, 
arrl the forty- hour week had been introduced. Cornrnissioner Annour had 
introduced drunkometers , a driver education division , a training center 
for new patrolmen, and had helped provide additional off-street parking. 9 
It was felt that his record more than compensated for his lack of co-
operation, and he received the backing of the two city newspapers and 
of the Dedicated Citizens. 
His only opponent was J . D. Boroor , Jr., 69, an attorney who 
had bean disbarred for llfe some twenty- five years before.10 0 . z. 
Evers , a Negro who had filed an anti- segregation suit against the city 
transit system in 1956, had planned to oppose l'.r . A:noour , but was 
blocked because he had not lived the required five years in the city. 
A Kerophis postal employe , he l ost his $4, 875- a- year job for his 
political activities . 
John T. Dwyer was the second of the incwnbent commissioners 
to receive the bacld.ng of The Connnercial Appeal , the }lemphis Press-
Scimitar, and the Dedicated Citizens Committee. Hhi.le he was an 
"arrogant , dominating fellow, "ll and was several times accused of p:>or 
sportsmanship in his campaign for re- election, he had a commendable 
record and a weak opponent. As Com:nissioner of Public Service, he was 
lau:ied for his work in urban renewal and rehabllitation, slum clearance, 
enforcement of a strict building code , and for the progress made by the 
f..e~ttphis Light , Gas & Water Division. (The Com.'llissioner was liaison 
officer between the LG&·i and the city commission. ) Part of his campaign 
centered around the number of mouths he had to feed . Four of his children 
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wore T- shirts saying 11Re- elect my Daddy, Jolm T. Buddy Dwyer , " and a 
fifth child was born to his wi£e during the camp.rlgn. }iany felt that 
a large portion of his vote was a rejection of his opp:ment rather than 
the approval of his nineteen years as a public servant. 
Lewis Taliaferro (pronounced Toliver) , who opposed l1r . Dwyer , 
was a young attorney who campaigned that he could provide "leadership 
with vision. n Although he was JS , his youthful appearance detracted 
from the seriousness of his campaign , and several politicos quipped 
that they might vote for him for president of the senior class , but 
not for commissioner. His entire campaign was centered around his 
attack of :hr. Dwyer and hi.s policies , and very l ittle original thl.nk:i.ng 
was presented by the candidate. Y..r . Taliaferro charged Dwyer with being 
a member of the "world.ng majority ," and supported a Little Hatch Act 
because Commissioner Dwyer had been using his off'ice employes for 
campaign purposes . While the Negro Volunteer Ticket supported l'lr. 
Dwyer' s re-el ection, Taliaferro received some colored backing. And 
it was interesting to note that while his election was not favored by 
the Press- Scimitar . he probably received more space in that paper than 
any other candidate. The articles were too numerous , editoralized. arrl 
often dealt with trivial lllatters , all of which combined to work against 
the candidate r ather than for him. 
Stanley Dillard, seeking re- election as Commissioner of 
Finances arrl Institutions , was the most susceptible to attack of the 
three 11working majority" com1nissioners . He was cri ticized for delaying 
action on building a new mwU.cipal airport and for requiring members of 
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the tax collector•s department to work in his campaign. hr. Dillard 
was also chargad with keeping a personal photographer on the city 
payroll to take pictW"es of the Commissioner .for frequent press re-
leases. The major charge against him, however , was seen in The 
Commercial Appaal when they reported, 11axpedience too often has guided 
his actions when the interests of the community required forthrightness 
and affirmative action regardless of ' working majorities • or coWlting 
the house to see which faction in a controversy represented the most 
votes . n12 
While Nr . Dillard was not outspoken on the issue of segre-
gation, he had said that he believed "that the best interest of • • 
this city would be served by continued segregation of the races in 
our recreational facilities, schools, buses , and libraries."lJ At 
the sarr.e time he recognized and sup?Jrted W'ith nequal sincerity 
separate but equal facilities for our Negro citizens. 11 Still this did 
not satisfY the Negro voters , who also objected to the segregated 
policies of the city hospitals , which came under hr. Dillard' s juris-
diction. It was evident that their support of l'II'. ~.oore cost Comrnis-
sioner Dillard the election. 
James W. 1Jilrmly1 }.oore . a 54-year-old busines::~ executive and 
political newcomer, attracted the most interest in the race . Running 
on a "plan for positive action, n he promised 11I will bring to the City 
Cocuni.ssion meetings an independent mind, mature judgement , and the 
courage to do what I think is right. I will not be swayed nor dictated 
to by anyone at any time. 1114 He also promised 11not to use my position 
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to make a political fortune , •• [and] to respect the office of Jo.ayor 
and recognize the importance of co-operation with him and the other 
conunissioners . • • 1115 Mr. Joioore drew on his years as an outfielder 
with the Chicago lr1hite Sox and with Carmie lo.ack1 s famous Ph:Uadelphia 
Athletics for the 11teamwork11 needed in the city government, and on his 
years as head of the Yellow Cab Company for the progressive leadership 
necessary for action, 
Mr. Moore carried the endorsement of the hemphis newspapers , 
the Dedicated Citizens' "Unity Ticket," l-tayor Orgill., and the Loeb 
campaign organization. Vice- President of the hetropolitan YhCA, 
Mr. l'.oore was the recipient of Negro support . The JX>litical adver-
tising used by hr. hoore de1110nstrated his quick and original thinking. 
A telephone was installed at the }o;.oore headquarters that would give a 
recorded message to those who called, The phone became the most popular 
in town, receiving more than 5 ,000 calls a day , and a second soon had 
to be put in use. The messages were changed daily and were sharp and 
to the point. "A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, n16 went 
one messaee , and another said "Jimmy ~loore is energetic , independent , 
aggressive , and intelligent. This will produce a much needed change 
when he is elected Commissioner of Finances and Inst1tutions. 1117 When 
".ir. Dillard charged that this kind of advertising was "dirty pool," the 
next day' s message said: "Our opponent has accused us of playing 'dirty 
pool , 1 but how can he do this when he has put himself behind the eight-
ball. n18 Signs outside the polling places on election day read ''Why 
settl e for less when you can have ~~OORE ," and his newspaper ads 
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reminded that 1'Joloore means l-Dro o£ the IOOst for };emphis. n19 
Token support was given to c . E. Hurley, who advocated 
improving the status of I>;emphis State University , raising teacher 
salaries, and attracting new industry. His campaign centered around 
an attack on Joir . Dillard and on the Dedicated Citizens ' support of 
}l~r. l'loore. }'.alone Sims , a salesman for 1-.emphis Tobacco Company, also 
annoWlced for the post, but withdrew in favor oft-'ll'. Hurley. 
Major interest occured in the Public Works contest because of 
the entrance of a Negro candidate. Russell B. Sugarman, Jr. , an attor-
ney and counsel for the Nutual Federal Savings & loan Association, ran 
for office on the Volunteer Ticket, which felt 11the Negro has never 
really realized his political potential here. n20 The JO-year- old 
candidate was the leading Negro running for off'ice, given the greatest 
possibility of winning, and was responsible for most of the campaigning 
done by the Ticket . J<JX. Sugarmon was a graduate of Booker T. Washington 
High School in Eemphis and attended Y.orehouse College in Atlanta , where 
one of his classmates was Rev. l<-artin Luther King, the leader of the 
successful bus boycott in hontgomery, Alabama. Leaving 1->orahouse , 
Suganoon enrolled in Rutgers University, where he received his bachelor 
of arts degree in 1950. Next came Harvard and a law degree in 195). 
He later attended Boston University to complete the course requirements 
for a master ' s degree in finance , although he is yet to write his thesis . 
His wife, the former Miss Dorlores DeCosta or Orangeburg, South Carolina, 
is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Wellesley. He promised that if elected 
he would select Public Works employes on the basis of merit , rot color. 
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The possibility of Mr . Sugarmon' s victory depended on the 
large number of white candidates campaigning for the office . One of 
the leading white candidates was William Farris , who had served as 
administrative assistant to three mayors , and was then director of 
personnel for the city. He had demonstrated his ability in these 
offices , and had piled up an impressive list of civic activities to 
support his interest in the future of .1-Jemphis. Mr . Farris , )6 , was 
past president of Tennessee JW1ior Chamber of Commerce . He received 
the support of the two city newspapers , the Dedicated Citizens , Mayor 
Orgill , and members of the Armour and loeb campaign organizations , 
John Ford Canale , another strong white cardidate , had served 
as the executive assistant to the Shelby County Commission since 1956, 
arrl was personnel director of the coWlty. He too could be commended 
for his public service and for the many hours he had spent in civic , 
charitable , and political organizations . He was the president of 
Spencer- Sturla Funeral Home , and shortly after the campaign became the 
general manager of the l'Jemphis Chicks . the city 1 s professional baseball 
team. l<.tr . Canale and Nr . Farris campaigned as though there were no 
other contestants in the seven- man race . Each charged the other of 
being a machine candidate in disguise . Jo'i.r . Canale had been an active 
member of the Shelby CoW1ty Political Organization and the Citizens for 
Progress . while Mr. Farris had campaigned for Browning and Kefauver in 
1948 , for the Crump organization under the Tobey administration , and had 
supported Orgill in 1955 . Hr. Canale was further charged with not sup-
porting a Little Hatch Act for city employes , and for his failure to 
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colnlllit himself on the issue of dividing city arxi county school funds . 
W. B. ' Will ' Fowler , the veteran city engineer an:i an employe 
of the Public Works Department for the p1st forty-two years , was probably 
the best qualified candidate for the Public Works Coiillllissionershi.p. Yet 
he too had a history of submission to the Crump machine , and his rore 
than 70 years lead many to believe that he would not bring the respon-
siva and independent thinking to the City Cornmiasion that a younger man 
could. Fowler , who campaigned on his knowledge of the department , 
urged the voters , in the face of the Negro threat , "to rally behi.nd the 
leading white candidate 11 and " unite behind the mature , experienced, 
e l der state sman as a compromise candidate. n22 But when all meaningful 
support, by newspapers and the Unity Ticket , was given to J.lr. Farris , 
and when these organi.zations were exerting pressure on all other white 
canii.dates to wi.thdraw, to prevent Suga.rmon ' s electi on, Will Fowler gave 
in and withdraw from the contest five days before the election. He 
stated that he had lef t the race "for the good of }J.6Jilphis." and to the 
white citizen this was true , for without his withdrawal it is very 
likely that Mr. Sugarmon would have been el ected. 
The only labor candidate in the contest was Sam Chambers , 
who had run unsuccessfully for the City Commission in 1955 and for the 
state senate in 1956. He favored co- ordination of purchases by the 
various departments of the city govarrunent and believed in long- range 
pl anning for urban devel opment . However , he did not believe that city 
employes should be "denied the right to participate in partisan politics,1123 
and therefore did not support the Little Hatch Act . It was expected that 
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those Negroes who were dissatisfied with }il" . Sugarmon would cast their 
ballots for Chanbers because of his labor stand, Many persons were 
angered that he did not w:i.thdraw from the race as l-'.r. Fowler had done , 
and on the eve of the election Chambers reported he had received a 
threatening phone call, promising injW"y to him if' the Negro were 
elected. Fringe candidates were Sam Hawkins , a laborer , and Sam 
Clark, a carpenter who campaigned in overalls, l'.r. Clark was denied 
the right to run for office because he did not own land within the city. 
In the race for Judge of the Juvenile Court , four white 
candidates were pitted against a Negro entry, and some felt that a 
condition similar to that which existed in the Public Works contest 
would develop. However , Judge EUzabeth HcCain drew enough support 
from the white voters that a fractioning of the vote among the white 
candidates was prevented, Miss McCain had proved , through years of 
devoted service, to be worthy of re-election , and her opponents foWld 
l ittle in her program that they could attack. During the campaign , hiss 
~icCain annoW1ced that she would soon name a Negro assistant probation 
officer for the court , who would handle complaints invol ving Negro 
children. The proposal was submitted to the City Commission by 
Stanley Dillard (the JuvenUe Court operates Wlder the Department of 
Finances and Ins titutions) , ani was approved. The measure also gained 
the support of both city newspapers as "a step towa rd giving Negroes 
more voice in handling their governmental affairs . u2J 11It is justif'ied" 
they reported , tton the same principle that Negro officers were added to 
the police department some years ago . It should increa se the efficienc y 
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of the Juvenile Court and improve race relations . "24 However , the 
appointment has not yet been made . 
The Ju::l.ge ' s chief white opponent was Joseph B. HcCartie. a 
competent young attorney , Jro'U" , l-lcCartie , who had grown up in an 
orphanage , campaigned on his first - hand knowledge of "the abandoned , 
dependent , and delinquent child. n He drew support from those who 
believed that .I<J.iss J>.cCain had not been firm enough in han:Uing some 
cases, and from those who thought that a man would make a better judge . 
Another male candidate for the post was Hearn W. Tidwell , Jr ., a 45-
year-old lawyer , businessman , and a member of the Youth Guidance 
Collllllission , In a ten-point program advocating "}lom and Pop" baseball 
leagues , family fishing clubs , and a teenage canteen, hr . Tidwell ' s 
"basic aim is to prevent delinquence and dependence before it occurs . n25 
A late entry in the race , it was apparent that he could not overtake 
the front rwmers , and resigned ten days before the election. Latozyers 
Robert V. Bickers and Abe L. Roberts had also entered the contest , but 
withdrew a month bef ore the election. A second lady 1n the race was 
l>Jrs . na Huff I who had been director of the Girls Club in l>~erophis for 
twelve years . She had previously served three terms in the Oklahoma 
House of Representatives and had been superintendent of the Child 
Welfare Department in that state. She charged Judge ¥.cCain with not 
separating the dependent and delinquent children. 
The Negro candidate for the J OOgeship was )4-year- ol d Rev . 
Ben L. Hooks . Rev. Hooks , al so an attorney, was one of the three 
founders and the present treasurer of 1-iutual Federal Savings and Loan 
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Association. He was a member of the Lincoln league (Republican) and 
the NAACP, and had run unsuccessfully for the state legislature in 
1954. His grandfather, Charles Hooks, was the first Negro Juvenile 
Court officer in hemphis and operated the first Negro juvenile detention 
home in the city. He was killed by an escaping juvenile in 1917. His 
grancboother, fl.rs . Julia Hooks , who received her B. A. degree from Berea 
College in Kentucky , was the second Negro woman in the South to receive 
a college diploma. 26 Rev. Hooks had received his law degree from DePaul 
University in Chicago . He believed that a Negro would be particularly 
effective on the court because of the high n\Uilber of Negro cases that 
came before it. 
John P. Colton was unapposed for Judge of Division I of the 
City Court. Judge Beverly Boushe of Division II was opposed by Ray 
Churchill, who had made an Wlsuccessful attempt to W'l.Seat Judge Colton 
in 1955. hr. Churchill charged Judge Boushe with running a "court of 
injustice and revenue. rr and with siding with the }Xllice in disregard 
of citizens' rights . \olhile there may have been some truth in his 
statements • his examples were minor and often reported falsly and out 
of context. hr. Churchill was given the endorsement of the CIO Commit-
tee on Political Education and of the Negro Volunteer Ticket , who termed 
Boushe their "long time ene;nw. 11 
Judge Vlilliam B. Ingram of Division III of the City Court , the 
traffic division , was opposed by Attorneys Robert Aclden and Bernie 
}.ullikin, Judge Ingram, who had Negro support , waged a continuous 
battle against the police department in the name of protecting 
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ird.ivi.dual freedoms . While many of his actions were justified, he was 
charged with "headline hWlting" and "trying to create petty controversies 
to use for his own political gain. 112? Police Chief James MacDonald said 
the judge was inconsistent , "he frees vicious drunk drivers on techni-
calities and turns around to throw the book at aoother drive who may 
have a better excuse , really. rr28 After the election, The Commercial 
~ urged: "Judge Ingram has demonstrated his courage convincingly. 
Now let him demonstrate discretion and co-operation. n29 
Joe Hicks, veteran city tax assessor, who was runni.ng for his 
"last term of office , 11 faced two opponents. George Lenow, Jr, , an 
inspector for the City Licenses and Privileges Department , campaigned 
for a readjustment of taxes through reappraisal of assessments and :for 
a five-year tax waiver for new industry locating in Joiemphis, El.iehue 
Stanback, Negro, was also entered 1n the contest . The weakest of the 
five Negro candidates, !'II'. Stanback was not a member of the Volunteer 
Tl.cket, although he carried their endorsement. He said in }.emphis "the 
tax rate is applied equally [to white and colored residents], but the 
benefits are applied unequally. 11JO Therefore he proposed to "force 
integration on the city by threatening to cut assessments on Negro 
property by JO per cent. nJl Mr. Stanback was poorly educated, although 
he had at terrled a local college, and many of his votes were pulled 1n 
by the appeal of the other Negro candidates to the colored voter. 
The last positions to be filled by the voters were the four 
seats on the Board of Education. Since the candidates were running for 
specific posts , the JX>ssibili.ty of the two Negro candidates being elected 
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was slight. The four incumbents , John Shea , Julian Bondurant . Mrs . 
Arthur N. Seessel . Jr. , and Nrs. Lawrence Coe , were sUpJXlrled by the 
city ' s newspapers and the Dedicated Citizens , and were assured of an 
easy victory. They did little campaigning , and spent between them 
only $107 . 50 on the campaign. 32 
George M. Anglin , a life insurance agent, received token 
support in his campaign for Position I on the Board held by incumbent 
Shea. Hr . Anglin had campaigned for adequate planning for future 
school expansion . Rwming for Position ll , against hrs. Seessel , 
were Rev. Roy Love , h . D. Holmes , Jr., an::i Dixon T. Gaines , Jr. 
Mr . Holmes , was an avowed segregationist who dressed in ill-white 
clothing . an:i Mr. Gaines was rtmning to represent the lower and. 
middle incone groups on the Board. Rev. Love, president of the Negro 
Baptist Pastors Alliance and pastor of Nt . Nebo Baptist Church , had 
tried to run for the state legislature in 1954 but was stopped by a 
constitutional ban against ministers in the Tennessee Senate , and was 
an unsuccessful candidate for the Board of &iucation in 1955. In 1959 . 
integration was the first plank in his pl atform . although his approach 
was calmer than that used by many supporters of desegregation . 
For Position III, Henry c. BWlton , T. l-Jason Ezzell . and hrs . 
Natalie K. Canada were opposing l-lrs. Coe . The Negroes erred in enter-
ing Rev . BW1ton against hrs . Coe , since the incumbent was noted for her 
moderate stand on integration • and had been the guest speaker at several 
Negro rallies. Mrs . Canada , a native of Rhode Island . attacked J•1rs . Coe 
for her stand on segregation and promised a strict division of the races 
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if she were elected. .hr. Ezzell was the president of the hemphis Title 
Company and was expected to draw a sizeable vote total. Rev. BW1ton 
was pastor of the Joit . Olive Christian JV.ethodist Episcopal Church and 
had spent the 1957 Christmas season in the Holy Land. He was a grad-
uate of the lliff School of Theology at the University of Denver and 
had served as director of youth work for the C~lE Church in Chicago and 
as an AnJzy" chaplain in Europe during World War II. He also listed 
integration as his number one aim, but like the other merr,bers o£ the 
Volunteer Ticket , his approach was moderate, altf>.ough firm. For 
position IV, Lloyd Burgan drew token support against incumbent 
Bondurant. 
With the entrance of so many candidates in the municipal 
election, and w1 thout the guiding hand of an organized ticket or a 
uniform party platform, it seems only logical that various civic 
organizations and the newspapers would consider it their duty to 
propose a slate of acceptable candidates. There is also lltUe 
won:ier that these same organizations would urge the white candidates 
to reduce their numbers in the i'ace of a possible Negro victory. The 
development of the "Unity Ticketn by the Dedicated Citizens, and the 
aggressive campaign carried on by the Negro Volunteer Ticket were the 
t\oiO most important developments 1n the election. Both had depended on 
the large number of unorganized white candidates for their origin ani 
development. 
cHAPrER vm 
THE NEXlRO var;;: AND THE 1959 ELECTION 
THE NmRO SPEAKS - As he states his views for the office, Russell B. 
Suganoon, Jr., (rie:ht) draws the attention of the four leading white 
candidates in the contest for Commi.ssioner of Public Works. They are 
(left to right) John Ford Canale, Sam Chambers, William Farris , alrl 
Will Fowler. 
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Remarkable in the organization of the Volunteer Ticket was 
the fact that integration was not an immediate concern. Instead, tile 
Negro ticket made 11an appeal to the Memphis conscience" "on behalf of 
the Negro candidates and Negro community for a wider participation in 
municipal matters. n1 The Negro , through this political organ, was 
seeking "to join the oommunity a.rrl be a part of the community's insti-
tutions • • • to accept his share of the community load ani fight to 
reduce provocations without destroying the essential elements o:f 
progress ••• to work with the white people with a self-dedication 
to maintain the bonds of brotherhood and love. 112 Negro leaders re-
mi..OOed that "to say that the NAACP had cotJe all the way from New York 
to inspire the Negro 1 s hope for freedom is a cruel method of turning 
the fair- minded white people against the Colored candidates •••• 
Fair- minded white citizens know that our determination is inspired only 
by the desire for more participation in government affairs.") 
The political maturity expressed 1n these statements received 
the ilmnediate support of The Commercial ApPeal. Although they did not 
support the election of the Negro candidates , many of their editorials 
recognized the need of giving the Negro citizens a chance to participate 
in civic affairs. The stand taken by this paper during the election 
demoretrated the clear-thinking present in 1-:.emphis, and will be as impor-
tant to the future of the Negro in the South as the election itself'. 
This was the first time in the history of an.v Southern city, to my 
knowledge , that a major news medium actively supported improving the 
political status of the Negro citizens. In an editorial three weeks 
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before the election, The Commercial Arpeal said: 
IJ~emptd.s must face] up to the reality that if the 
Negro is to assume leadership and responsibility, he must 
have the opportunities to do so . If we are to dwell side-
by- side in harmony and prosperity , then the white community 
must offer lllelans to economic advancement. 
The Negro should have more voice in the handling of 
his governmental affairs . Why coul.dn 1 t the city hall pro-
vide for an assistant city attorney, for example , or the 
municipal or juvenile courts set up a division for Negro 
problems with members of that race administering the 
offices? 
We provide schools and training for Negroes, Only 
archaic thinking prevents utilization of those talents 
for the good of the community and of the Negroes them-
selves , We do not want social amalgamation, We must . 
!!:nb~~~~~:po~~t~~~~~~~ ~r~:e P;:e~~~4 
Yet , there were two sides to the Negro campaign, and while 
one said, 11The Negro wants to walk the streets of }.emphis with the 
dignity of a human personal1ty"5 and asked for participation in 
government because 11the Negro ' s sell- respect is at stake, "6 the other 
was more radical and used primarily at the all- Negro gatherings. Here 
campaign literature urged "Don' t listen to ' Uncle Toms,' Vote the 
Volunteer Ticket! n and pro!Id.sed that the white 11demogogues will be 
buried by such an avalanche of ballots on election day it will take a 
thousand cans of baklng powder to make 1 em rise again . 117 The Volunteer 
Ticket was extremely skill£ul. in handling this dual role. On one hand, 
the candidates had to aPPBar radical and demand i.rnn:ediate steps to 
comply with the Supreme Court order on integration in order to attract 
the Negro vote. On the other hand, they had to maintain a subdued public 
appearance , interested only in community well being , to gain the support 
of the 11fair- minded11 white citizens and prevent the rise of a strong 
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anti- Negro force. A skillful manipulation of these two approaches was 
probably the greatest achievement of the Volunteer Ticket and contrib-
uted greatly to its good showing . 
Any hope for a Negro victory deperxled on a major turnout of 
the Negro voters. "Negro candidates will win i.f you vote for them 11 
Volunteer campaign literature prophesied; "They can onl.y be defeated 
if' Negroes do not votel 118 Consequently , the chief efi'orts of the 
Volunteer Ticket were to get Negroes registered, before the July 21. 
deadline , and then to get them to the polls a month later. To help 
them build Negro interest , the Volunteer Ticket held several large 
political rallies, someti.mes with the help of outside celebrities. 
hore than 5 ,000 persons turred out to hear Rev . ~Jartin Luther King , 
of l>1ontgomery bus boycott fame , chant ''We just want to be free . n9 
Another 400 Negroes paid ten dollars a plate to attend a banquet in 
honor of Mrs. Daisy Bates , leader in the fight to integrate Little 
Rock schools. other attempts to insure a large Negro vote included a 
pre- vote fast and SW'lrise services at forty colored churches on the 
morning of the election.10 
In contrast to the Crump tradition , the white candidates made 
numerous speeches , primarily at civic clubs and on television. Yet it 
was the Negro campaign that was noted for its "oratorical eloquence. n 
Candidates Sugarman and Hooks and the influential Negro leader, Lt . 
George W. Lee (chairman of the VolW1teer Ticket steering collUTlittee) , 
were the pride of the Negro community for their stirring speeches. In 
one speech , Rev . Hooks charged that Commissioner Loeb, by urging the 
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white candidates in the over- crowded Public Works contest to "thin their 
ranks , " had "crucified" the ~egro candidates "on the cross of political 
expediency. n11 Lt. Lee , at the mass meeting with Rev. King, said "We 1 re 
going to fight 1 till hell freezes over and, if necessary, skate across 
the ice in order to keep freecbm moving in the right direction. ulZ The 
desire of the Negro collllllunity to co- operate with the whites was a con-
stant theme at every political rally. To show this , Rev. Hooks , in a 
five- minute telecast , compared the 1-:.emphis political situation to the 
keys of a piano: 
Just as full harmorzy- and beauty cannot be achieved by a pian-
ist Wlless he uses both black and white keys , so Jl.emphis will 
never reach its full potential as a city unless quali.f'ied men 
of both black and white races are utilized in the conduct of 
affairs . lJ 
It was interesting to note that during the campaign the members 
of the Volunteer Ticket always appeared as , or in behalf of, the Ticket 
and never as individual candidates. Sugarmon and Hooks carried a large 
portion of the campaign burden, but all members o£ the organization were 
active. Another interesting feature of the campaign is seen when we re-
view the Bunche report on the t ernphis Negro in 1940. Bunche criticized 
the Negro ministers £or not tald.ng an active part in politics and £or 
urging their nocks to stay out of political affairs . 14 In contrast, 
in the 1959 election three of the five N'egro candidates were ministers 
and a great deal of the support given the Volunteer Ticket came from 
the Negro clergy. Most of the political rallies were held in the Negro 
churches . One explanation for the present lead taken by the Negro 
ministers in urging political equality is that they , of all l>:egro 
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citizens, are the freest from the economic pressures of the white 
commwri.ty , being dependent entirely on their Negro congregations. 
Also they are highly respected in their com:nunities and are in a 
position to influence many people. The political activity of the 
city ' s Negro ministers prompted Hambone, a philosophizing 11Uncle Tom" 
cartoon Negro in The Col'IID)';!rcial Appeal, to sa:y , 11De closer a preacher 
gi t to pol ' tics, de further he gi t 1 way f 1 um de Lawd I I I "l5 
Throughout the campaign it was apparent to both white and 
Negro leaders that the work carried on by the Volunteer Ticket would 
affect the political status of the Negro throughout the South. The 
importance of the Negro vote across the nation is seen by the fact 
that although the Negro candidates did not wln , almost every major 
newspaper in the country carried articles on the election. Thlll 
interest was certainly justified, for based on the latest available 
.figures (compiled in 1958 by the Southern Regional Council), the 
57.100 Negroes registered for the }.emphis Municipal Election in 1959, 
represented )0. 81 per cent of the 185,000 registered Negroes in the 
state of Tennessee and 4.)8 per cent of all registered Negroes in tile 
ten Southern states (Virginia was excluded from the tabulation) . Fur-
ther impact of the size of the Negro registration in }smphis is seen 
when we realize that a.l.Joost three times as many Negroes were registered 
in :hemphis than in the entire state of hississippi (20,000 qualified 
Negro voters) and that colored registration in !>.emphis was virtually 
equal to that in the state of South Carolina (with 57.978 Negroes 
registered). The registration books of neighboring Arkansas carried 
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only 64,02) Negro voters and Alabama listed but 70, 000 eligible colored 
voters . 16 No wonder Memphis has been called the 11voting oasis for 
Negroes in the entire South. nl7 
Although the Volunteer Ticket had increased Negro registra-
tion to 57,100, representing )0.4 per cent of the eligible voters in 
the city • and, based on the vote given Russell Suganoon in the Public 
Works contest, had gotten a phenomenal 61. 90 per cent of their caste to 
the polls on election day , they could have no chance of electing one of 
their members unless the offices were filled by a plurality rather than 
a majority vote . When the voting laws had been changed to el.i.mi.nate 
the single shot technique and when the 19.59 election had been moved 
from November to August , so that if segregation became an issue it 
would be settled by the voters before school opened , the city fathers 
believed that they had established blocks that would prevent a Negro 
beL>'lg elected to any city office. However, their early preparation had 
neglected the possibility of m.unerous white candidates splitting the 
white vote in a contest, allowing a single Negro candidate for the post 
to be elected by a plurality vote. Under CrUltlp, when only few opposition 
candidates appeared , there was no need for a preferential vote (run off 
election) in either the municipal election or the Democratic primary 0 
as practiced in other Southern states. Consequently, county officials 
could rot foresee the need for a preferential. vote after his death , and 
ro provision had been made for one by the ti.Ir.e of the 1959 election. 
1-Ir. Sugannon was given the greatest possibility of being 
elected because of the absence of a preferential vote and throughout 
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the campaign the chance for a Negro victory centered arotmd his bid 
for Commissioner of Public Works . Rev. Hooks was also given a better-
than- average chance to cash in on the present voting system in his 
campaign for Juvenile Court Judge. Despite the fact that Miss l1cCai.n 
had been judge of the Juvenile Court for two terms and that white 
can:iidates Canale , Farris, Fowler , and Chambers in the Public Works 
contest had been active in politics, none of the six white entries 1n 
each of the two contests was a seasoned campaigner, and oone were well 
known to the public . There was serious question whether any one of 
them would be able to become thoroughly identified with the voters by 
election time. The two Negro candidates for the Board of Education , 
Reverends BW1ton and Love , faced fewer white opponents (and each had 
a well-known incumbent to buck) , and thus were oot given the odds that 
Sugarmon and Hooks received. 1-ir. Stanback, although supported by the 
Volunteer Ticket, was given alroost no chance to defeat long-time 
incumbent Joe Hicks for the Tax Asaessor ' s position. 
Realizing that the election of a Negro to the City Commission 
rested on the absence of a pref'erential vote , an early attempt was made 
by Commissioner loeb to secure legislation allowing a run off vote for 
the election. But this would have required a special act of the 
Tennessee Legislature and Governor Buford Ellington said he knew of 
"no emergency" that would make him call a special session of the legis-
lature to enact a run off law for hemph1s . 18 The governor considered 
it a local problem and did not feel that it was his responsibility to 
make up for the county's mistake in not providing for a second election. 
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Still convinced that City Com:nission members should be elected by 
majorities , and not simply required to receive more votes than any of 
the other candidates , Commissioner L:leb said he intended "to search 
for another legal method"19 of preventing Sugarmon1 s election. 
The first alternative method proposed was to hold an W'lOffi-
c1al rW'l off election for the candidates for Public Works Com:rn1ssioner 
and pay for it out of the city treasury rather than with state funds. 
However , the city attorney questioned the legality of using $40, 000 in 
public funds for an 1m0fficial election, and the plan was discarded. 2Q 
An:>ther plan, in the same vein of thought , was to get the white candi.-
dates in the contest to agree to a voluntary primary, with the t wo 
receiving the highest votes to compete in the August 20 election. But 
again the cost was prohibitive, and at least one of the siX white 
candidates was unwilling to enter such a plan on a "gentleman' s agree-
ment. 11 A system used 1n some Florida cities was also suggested as a 
possibl e solution. 11Each candidate who enters a race is required to 
put up a $2,.500 bond. If one candidate gets 51 per cent of the votes 
in the election the money is ref'unded 1n full . If not, the deposits 
are used to finance a r un off election. u2l Yet this system was not 
applicable when the campaign was already underway, an:l it was obvious 
that any system would have to be acceptable to the white entries 1n 
the contest as well as to the general public. 
As the el ection day approached and public sentiment became 
more concerned about the possibility of Mr. Sugarxoon1 s election, a 
host of additional suggestions were made . Some of the approaches were 
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ridiculous , such as the attempt to get A.l Sugarman, a white employe of 
the Public Works Department, to enter the contest to confuse the Negro 
voters . 22 Others , however, were roore realistic even if they were rot 
acceptable . On this side came the suggestion that Sugarmon be appointed 
to a responsible city office, such as a city attorney, and thus remove 
him from the election. When these approaches failed, two solutions were 
presented which received wide approval and were important to the outcome 
of the election. These suggestions were: (1) to receive the endorsement 
of a number of prominent civic leaders , politicians, and the newspapers 
for one candidate in each race threatened by a Negro entry • in the hope 
that a bandwagon movement would be started, and (2) to conduct a 11straw 
vote" to determine the leading candidate in each race and urge the low 
men in the }:011 to withdraw in favor of the strong white candidate. 
These methods should be discussed. 
The second of' the two solutions , that an unbiased party eon-
duet a poll to determine voter pref'erence bei'ore the election, came to 
light when it was discovered that "any number of responsible citizens 
are now saying openly that , while having a favorite , they would 
willingly switch to the candidate who is apparently out front"2J to 
prevent the election of a Negro . The Commercial Appeal decided to 
conduct a series of public opinion polls , believing them to be both 
newswortlzy" an::i a service to the public. However, their polls were 
unrepresentative , poorly conducted, badly biased, and r eported in a 
misleading manner. In f'our polls conducted throughout the city, a 
total of 1)22 voters ( 924 whites and J98 Negroes) were expected to 
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forecast the outcome of a vote in excess of 129,000. The only correct 
polling procedure used in the survey was that in each of the sample 
votes 30 per cent of the participants were Negro , corresponding to the 
colored percentage of the total registration. 
The first poll was conducted on July 18, two da,ys before 
registration ended, a month prior to the election , several days before 
all the candidates had qualified for office , and weeks before the 
average citizen had made up his mind on which of the lllal'\Y candidates 
to support . The poll was conducted in precinct 51-2, whi.ch was billed 
as a "typical precinct" because it had voted for winners in 1955 and 
because its 27 per cent Negro registration ran close to the city 
average. Yet the precinct was in one of the poorest sections of the 
city, was composed largely of Italian workers, and was a transient 
rather than permanent neighborhood (as indicated by the fact that 
"about 22 per cent of the 235 Negroes 11 who were listed as registered 
voters "had moved ••• arrl about 28 per cent" of the 680 registered 
"white residents had rnoved rr24 since the election four years before). 
Thus the area could hardly be called representative of the entire city. 
The precinct was also wu-epresentative in that nearly half of the 
voters who had not moved either refused to co-operate. had not made 
up their minds , or were not at home when the JXlllsters made their 
survey. In all, only 26 per cent of the Negro and 37 per cent of the 
white voters participated in the JXlll . 25 
The poll was also poorl.y managed. While the object of the 
survey was to determine the leading candidate in the Public Works and 
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Juvenile Court races , all f'ourteen offices appeared on the sample 
ballot and people were expected to choose from forty-one listed 
candidates. Some pollsters attempted to influence the outcorr.e of the 
poll by suggesting to reluctant white voters that they mark the sample 
baJ.lot for certain cand.idates in the contests in which Kegroes were 
entered, to prevent the election of a minority candidate. While the 
ballots did not list the oolor of the candidates, the pollsters were 
all too willing to remind the white voters that Sugarmon was not to 
receive their "X". The additional effort used to get the white votes 
and fact that the Negroes were reportedly asked not to participate in 
the survey and reveal their true strength combined to give higher 
representation to the white voters. 
When the poll was completed, William B. 1Will 1 Fowler led 
in the Public Works race with 104 votes , John Ford Canale was second 
with 62, then came Sam Chambers with 54 votes . Sugarman was fourth 
w:i. th )7 • and \olilliarn Farris was fifth of the then eight candidates 
with 21 votes . Rev. Hooks placed third in the Juvenile Court contest . 
with Y-i.ss Jo;cCain taking the lead and l'a-s . Ua Huff placing a poor 
second. The incUJnbents on the Board of Education and for the other 
City Commission posts led by commanding majorities. 
The three subsequent polls were conducted under similar 
conditions • except that voters were polled in widely scattered areas 
rather than in a single precinct. In each poll 261 whites and lJ.2 
Negroes were surveyed. In the secord poll only the names in the Public 
Works and Juvenile Court contests were presented • but the third and 
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i'ourth JX)lls again used the complete ballot in their surveys. Fowler 
again led in the second ]X)ll , Canale was second, Suganoon third , and 
then Chambers and Farris. InciJJllhent he Cain held her lead in the 
Juvenile Court contest by a col'!Uilal"ld.1.~ majority, while hrs . Huff' was 
again second and Rev. Hooks third. 26 
\fuile the first two pol ls were not conducted on the soundest 
of polling principles , they were at least presented 1n an honest and 
str aight- i'orward manner. However, during the ten days between Poll 
No. 2 ani Poll No , J The Commercial Appeal had made its endorsement of 
candidates in the e l ection an;i had decided that William Farris , rather 
than Will Fowler . should be given their support. Jo';r. }.oore was given 
preference over Stanley Dill ard for Commissioner of Finances and Insti-
tutions . Consequently, the third and fourth polls were presented in a 
misleading manner to give support to these men. "Farris Gains l-10st 
Support In Third Survey o£ Votars"27 read the headline o£ Poll No . J. 
Yet, voters had to r ead two paragraphs before they realized that 
candidate Canale had actually received the rost votes in the poll and 
that Farris had merely risen £rom £i..fth to second place. 1-..oore was 
also shown to be "gaining" on his opponent. 
By the £ourth poll , a week later, Farris held a commanding 
lead in the Public Works contest . Sugarman had risen to second place , 
then came Canale. Fowler , and Chambers . Dillard still led ~.core , 
although the s~head in the rewspaper ' s report o£ the poll read , 
11J immy :Hoare advances in campaign to unseat Dil lard. nZB Mi.ss 1-~cCain 
continued her lead in the Juvenile Court Judge race and Rev. Hooks 
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placed second in both the third and fourth :rolls . By poll No . 4 
Mrs . Huff' had dropped to fourth place in the then five-man race . 
Hearn Tidwell had withdrawn from the Juvenile Court contest between 
the third and f'ourth polls , but it is doubtful if' his decision was 
based on tile survey return.s . His withdrawal was of little importance , 
since he was not a strong enough candidate to have really affected the 
outcome had he remained in the race . 
Both of the latter polls were obvious attempts to create new-
support for the newspaper candidates and to convince l>lr . Fowler that 
he should resign before the election. However, Dillard published the 
poll results showing that he was the leading candidate for his race, 
and until the fourth survey J.lr. Fowler believed that he was still the 
peopl e ' s choice . Thus until .five d<cy"s before the election the polls 
had not accomplished their purpose, to get a leading white candidate 
in either contest to withdraw, and instead had given some candidates 
an undue feeling of security. The polls also failed in that those who 
were :oot shown to be on top by the survey resented the newspaper ' s 
behavior in attempting to roold public opinion and refused to abide 
by the results of the poll . 
The other major strategy used to minimize the chances of a 
Negro being elected , a problem which was drawing concern throughout 
the South , was to W'lite the support of many important citizens and 
politicians behind one candidate in each race in the hope that the 
public would follow their endorsements . The principal force in this 
line was the Dedicated Citizens Committee , which was a continuation of 
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the Orgill campaign organization after the Mayor had decided not to 
run for re-election. The DCC presented a "Unity Ticket" of candidates 
who had pledged themselves to "maintain conununi.ty patterns of segrega-
tion by all legal means. ,,Z9 Support was given to William Farris for 
Commissioner of Public Works , but the Committee could not decide on a 
suitable candidate in the Juvenile Court J\dge contest, Endorsement 
was also given the four incumbent members of the Board of Education, 
although Hrs . Coe was considered moderate on the integration issue. 
Her endorsement was credited with her excellent work on the Board, 
despite her liberal views , her long time support of the Orgill clan, 
ani the chance that her Negro opponent , Rev. Bunton, would be elected 
1f support were given to a lesser known whi.te for the position, JO 
The Memphis Press-Scimitar immediatelY gave its support to 
the DCC candidates , and The Commercial Appeal came to the same con-
clusions when their slate of canctl.dates was presented a few weeks 
later. Both newspapers gave their support to Y.iss McCain for re-
election as Judge of the Juven:Ue Court. When Edmund Orgill returned 
to the Mayor ' s off'ice, after recovery from the operation that had 
caused his withdrawal from the campaign , he also gave his support to 
the DCC candidates. Although Commissioners Loeb and Armour did not 
wish to endorse cardidates for other positions, leading figures in 
their campaign organizations supported the "Unity Ticket. n Despite 
1ts strong backing, the efforts of' the "Uni.ty Ticket" were hindered by 
the other organizations that endorsed opposing candidates. Mr . Fowler 
had the support of' former Mayor Chandler and others formerly associated 
( 
\·:ith the Crump machine, hr . Canale was endorsed by the Business and 
Professional hen of Jl.emphis and by the Veterans for Better Government , 
while Mr. Chambers received the support of several labor councils,. 
The Veterans had also endorsed two new candidates for the Board of 
Education positions held by Mrs . Coe and }.rs. Seessel (the two posi-
tions in which Negroes were candidates) . 
Thus while the Dedicated Citizens Committee was more success-
ful than The Commercial Appeal poll in drawing public support behind Mr. 
Farris , the endorsement of other Public Works aspirants prevented the 
withdrawal of any major candidate in the race , and it was doubtful if' 
the 11 Unity Ticket 11 alone could prevent the election of Mr . SugarlDOn. 
Other means had to be used , and it required a combination of forces to 
secure the withdrawal of Will Fowler five days before the election. 
l1any citizens, the newspapers , and the Mid- South , felt that Commissioner 
Loeb , who was assured election as Mayor , and Commissioner Armour, who 
faced only token opposition for re-election as Commissioner of Public 
Safety and Vice-1-.ayor , should join in support of one candidate. Yet 
there was no assurance that the candidate of their choice would be 
elected , and if another gained the JX)st it would be hard for the new 
commission to provide the unity that the city so badly needed . Instead, 
the two commissioners met with the four leading white candidates for 
the post and urged them to "thin their ranks " for the good of the city ) 1 
But there was still no agreement over who was the "strong" candidate in 
the race, and which were the "weak" . All were convinced either by the 
poll, by an endorsement , or by a disbelief of both, that they were the 
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leading candidate. and each annoW1ced that he was in the race to 
the finish. 
When Will Fowler withdrew on August 15. a day after the Loeb-
Arzoour meeting . there was 11shock and surprise" over why he . who was 
obrtously one of the two front rwming white candidates , had resigned 
instead of the weaker Canale or Chantbers . hr. Fowler said, 
It is apparent that no other candidate in the race for public 
works conunissioner is willing to make any sacrifice . I have 
no desire to be a hero but simply to follow the dictates of 
my own conscience •••• In the interests of my city and its 
people I am withdrawing from the race for coll'.ndssioner of 
public works with the hope that this wlll solve the problem. 
I'm oot a quitter but the time comes in every man •s life 
when he should put his coW1try, his city and its people 
above any selfish ambition.J2 
However , informed sources point to a behind the scenes deal and add1-
tional pressure that helped persuade l'.r . Fowler to leave the race. 
Frank Ahlgren, editor of The Commercial Appeal, met with the Fowler 
orgarll.zation after the loeb meeting and presented the outcome of the 
.fourth poll (which listed Fowler in fourth place), explaining that he 
had no chance to win and that by staying in the race he was helping to 
elect l-ll'. Sugarman. In compensation for his withdrawal , it was reported 
that a rather ingenious deal was presented. t'll'. Loeb would resign from 
the commission after the election (under the pretext of using the next 
four months to prepare himself for the l'.ayor1 s ofi'ice) and the City 
Col!llll1ssion would aPJX)int Will Fowler temporary Public Works Commissioner 
(until Mr . Farris was inauguration on January 1 , 196o), which would 
allow him to retire at a hieher salary than his present job as city 
engineer would provide (which was further reported to be the cl-..ief' 
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reason that Mr . Fowler was running anyway) )3 Ho\o.'eVer , the public 
acclaim that he received for his "W1seliish" act in the face of 
"disaster" prevented the plan from materializing. 
'lhe withdrawal of WUl Fowler clinched the bandwagon move-
ment for }',r . Farris , and while he received less than 45~ of the vote, 
he was elected over the Negro candidate. It is impossible to show 
where the Fowler votes were cast , but 1 t can be assumed that the 
majority of them were given Nr. Farris. In the official tabulation , 
Farris received 56 .925 votes , Sugarmon pulled J5 , J~ (the highest vote 
total a Negro had ever received in the county) , Canale was a poor third 
with 19 , 297 votes , Chamber s received 1),090, and Fowler (who resigned 
too late to remove his name from the billet) was still given 2 , 218 
votes . 
The Negroes placed second in each of the other contests that 
they had entered , although none pulled the vote total received by J..r . 
Sugarmon. :t-a.ss }lcCai.n was re-elected Judge of the Juvenile Court with 
5J , 6o4 votes , while Rev . Hooks received )2 , 205 votes from the Negro 
wards. Joseph B. McCartie was thi.rd in the race with 22 , 652 votes and 
Mrs . lla Huff was given only 16, 481 favorable ballots . In the Board 
of Education contests , Rev , Love p;>lled 31 , 901 votes for Position II 
against incumbent Mrs . Seessel's 54, ?36. The third running white candi-
date received only 23 ,563 votes . For Position III , }J.rs . Coe retained 
her seat by receiving 55 ,?4o votes to Rev . Bunton ' s 28 , ??4. Neither of 
the two white opp:ments received a lj , CXX> vote total , El.iehue Stanback 
also placed second in the Tax Assessor ' s race , receiving 25 , o64 votes , 
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while incumbent Joe Hicks was given 74, JJ7 votes to return him to 
of:fice. The other white candidate was a poor third in the election.J4 
Although the Public Works contest drew the most interest 
during the campaign, because of the race issue, much excitement cen-
tared around Henry Loeb ' s bid for the :hayor' s office and JiJrurer Jl.oore ' s 
attempt to unseat Stanley Dillard on the City Commission. The Negroes 
played an important part in these contests, although they did not have 
a candidate of their own entered. The Southern Regional Council, in a 
survey of Southern states, ".found that many Negroes already registered 
have seen their vote shrink in importance as racists sought to n:ake 
support by Negro citizens a liability rather than an asset. n35 This, 
however , was not true in hemphis. In addition to the voice they had 
in support of the five candidates of their race, their support of 
certain white candidates !'or other posts was most welcome. 
During the campaign the wh:ite candidates endorsed by the 
Negro groups • and several who were not. appeared at Negro rallies to 
make a bid for the Negro vote . The Volunteer Ticket reminded that the 
"Negro represents a protest vote . n)6 Before their endorsement of white 
candidates was made. the Negroes said, "let them know we're dissatis-
fied • and that ii' they want our vote we want something for the Negro 
in return. n37 It was apparent from the outset of the campaign that 
this "protest vote" would be used agains t Henry Loeb. He had received 
Negro support when he ran for the City Com:nission in 1955. but tb9 
Negroes now felt that he was their outspoken enemy, and that someone 
else should receive their votes. Although the Negroes had also been 
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dissatisfied with tho aid given them by Eayor Orgill , "'ho received 
their support in 1955 and in his 1958 bid for the Governor ' s seat , it 
was certain that he would have retained their backing had he remained 
in the campaign. Instead the colored vote was given to Partee Flemming , 
a minor candidate with no chance of a victory. The Negro protest was 
also levied against Commissioner Dillard, and Ji..rrmtY Moore received their 
endorsement in his campaign for Commissioner of Finances and Institutions . 
Mr. }.oore , according to Sugarmon , was llk)re acceptable to the Negroes than 
either Loeb or Orgill had been, and it was hoped that he ~uld be of 
service to them when el ected. The Negroes made no endorsement of candi-
dates in the Vice- Hayor 1 s race , where pollee brutality was an issue , 
finding both Commissioner Armour and his weak opponent to be unacceptable 
to them. Commissioner Dwyer was supported for re-election , and William 
Ingram received the Negro vote in his campaign for re- election as Judge 
of Division III of the City Court because of his attack on the police 
department . Ray Churchill was given Negro bacld.ng for Judge of Division 
II of the City Court as a protest against Judge Boushe , who was not felt 
to give equal justice to Negro citizens . 
While the Negro endorsement of white candidates was an impor-
tant aspect of the campaign , the desire for the election of men wOO 
could co- operate to bring progressive leadership to the city ...,as even 
more important . It was essential that men be e l ected to the City 
Commission who could work with each other for the "good of E.emphis . 11 
and that a divided commission not be returned to stop progress for 
another four years. The desire for unity had been overshadowed in the 
Public Works contest, because of the entry of a Negro candidate , b ut 
without the Negro issue in the other contests the central theme of 
unity could be given more attention. .Again the Dedicated Citizens 
Committee , with their "Unity Ticket , 11 were important in helping the 
votersdecide from the long list of independent candidates. 
At the time of its formation, after !-a-. Orgill withdrew from 
the Mayor ' s race, the "immediate aim of the DCC '&as] to encourage 
candidates to infonn the electorate of their stand on nine specific 
issues. "JB Endorsement by the Committee was made partially on the 
basis of the answers received on these questions. The DCC favored 
the appointment of a charter committee to s t udy possible changes in 
the form of local goverrunent , consolidation of duplicate functions 
within the city and county, division of school taxes on an average 
daily attendance basis , rapid annexation of adjacent built-up conunu-
nities , a complete reappraisal of assessments , continued segregation, 
and the enactment of a "Little Hatch Act 11 for city employes . Except fo r 
their stand on segregation, the Dedicated Citizens closely r esembled the 
former Orgill organization, the Good Local Government League , and was 
promptly labeled 11GLUG GLUG, JR. 11 by the anti- Orgill forces . 
When the 11Unity Ticket 11 was QlUXlunced , support was given to 
Henry Loeb for hayor, Cl.au:ie Armour for Vice-1-.ayor and Commissioner of 
Fire and Police , John T. Dwyer for Collllllissioner of Public Service , 
James W. ' Ji...tnnu' 1-.oore for Co111lTli.ssioner of Finances and Institutions , 
and William Farris for Commissioner of Public Works . hr . Farris and 
hr. l-.oore , of course, received the most attention. This selection was 
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also given the backing of The Commercial Appeal , the 1-'-erophis Press-
~. and Mayor Orgill, Ho;..--ever. each of the endorsed candidates 
quickly made it clear that they wera still independents and that the 
endorsement of one candidate by the nlJnity Ticket" did not necessarily 
mean that the other endorsed candidates supported him, This led some 
to doubt the ability of the Dedicated Citizens , or any other civic-
l'!li.nded organization, to supply the city with a W'lited commission, 
feeling that disunity was probably inherent in the commission form of 
government, Again, the presentation of a unified slate of officers 
by the DCC was hindered by the endorsement of other candidates by 
other organizations , also in the name of 11unity, harrrnny, and progress." 
When the election was over , all of the "Unity Ticket'' commis-
sioners had been elected. rrnst by substantial majorities, Henry Loeb 
walked into the 1-;ayor's office with 85, 292 votes (the highest given any 
candidate), while hr. FlelllDling pulled only J2 ,19J votes , chiefly from 
the Negro areas, Jolr, Armour was returned as Vice- !-J8,j"or with 80,8)1 
votes to his opponent ' s 12, JJ8, Ji.m:rqy Hoore won a decisive election 
over Stanley Dillard for Conunissioner of Finances and Institutions , 
being given 66, 314 favorable ballot s , while Mr. Dillard received 45 , 209 
votes . It was apparent that Mr. 1-'.oore could attribute his victory to 
the top heavy vote recei ved in the Negro precincts, although he was 
favored in lll8.l\Y white areas , also, John T. D..oyer retained his office 
as Commissioner of Public Service by defeating ?-:..r , Taliaferro 72, 888 
to J9,58o. 39 And, as we have seen, Wil.J.ia:m Farris was elected Cornmis-
sioner of Public Works over the Negro candidate • Sugarmon. The 
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incumbents for the three divisions of the City Court , the Juvenile 
Court Judge , Tax Assessor , and the Board of Education , were all re-
elected by substantial majorities , although the Negro bloc of 
approximately )0, 000 votes went to the candidates they supported. 
B. 
"Beyond a list of innovations such as a record total vote 
and a field of nothing but independ.ent white candidates , , • • the 
election affirmed certain basic political philosophies • .,4o Tl'e first 
supported, but modified , Heanfls observation that "Negroes behave like 
other groups of comroon origin • • • • they stick together when their 
interests as a group are at stake .•.. When their political rights 
are at issue. they oppose with a high degree or solidarity candidates 
who challenge their right to vote, and they support those who uphold 
it. n41 In hemphis, however , the right to vote was a long established 
tradition , and a higher order of political rights , the privilege to 
seek public office , was being challenged. Still the Negro vote was 
extremely cohesive 1n behalf of the candidates, both white and colored, 
who were supported by the Volwtteer Ticket. Their vote was probably 
more unified, because of their long history of ballot box participation, 
than Negroes 1n other cities whose 11right to vote 11 was 1n jeopardy. 
The cohesiveness of the Negro vote can be seen by the follow-
ing correlations. Diagram 1 shows the relationship between the 
percentage of registered Negroes in each J>:emphis precinct and the 
percentage vote that each precinct returned for Russell Sugarman. The 
supposition to be tested in this scatter- diagram is that an increase 
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L~ the percentage of Negro population should bring a corresponding 
increase in the percentage of the vote returned to the Negro candi.date. 
A perfect correlation would be 1 . 00 and presented as a 45 degree line 
on the graph. The unanimity of the Negro vote was revealed by a 
phenomenally high correlation, r = . 99 , indicating that 98. 01 per cent 
of the precincts in the city returned votes for Suearmon in direct 
relation to their Negro percentage of the voters . 
The correlation between the Negro voter percentage o£ each 
precinct and the percentage vote given Partee Flemming for M~or indi-
cates the solidarity of the hgro support of a white cardidate (Diagram 
2). The cor relation between the "protest vote" given l>'Ll", F1.emming and 
the percentage of Negro registration by precincts was r = . 98. In 
Diagram J, a high degree of' correlation is also seen between the 
percent of Negro voters and support of Jilnmy Eoore. Here the correla-
tion wa s r = . 88, indicating that 77. 44 per cent of the precincts 
returned votes for hr . 1-:00re in direct relation to their percentage of 
registered Negroes. The lower coefficient of correlation given J. r. I-.oore 
reflects more the white support of the candidate rather than a failW"e 
of the r.egro voters to follow the endorsement of the VolWlteer Ticket. 
However , there was mre defection among the Negro voters in this race 
than in those previously mention. 
Further indication of the W18.llimity of t he Negro vote can be 
seen in Hap 5 . which shws the precincts returning majority votes for 
the candidates supported by the VolWltaer Ticket . Thirty- feW" of the 
thirty-seven precincts in which D"~re than hal.f of the registered voters 
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were Negro returned a majority of their vote for Sugarmon. Flemming, 
ard lioore. Two of the Negro precincts gave majorities only to Suganoon 
and Z..oore , while precinct lJ-J , which was the only Negro precinct fail-
ing to give at least 51 per cent of its vote to SugarnwJn (although it 
gave 46 per cent) . returned a majority vote for }Jr . J-:,oore . A comparison 
w1 th Z.~p J shows how this vote corresponds with the distribution of 
Negro voters. Map 5 also shows the white precincts voting in the 
majority for Jimmy J.;oore . By checking this against Table 8-1 , we can 
see that many of the precincts in the eastern part of the city that 
votad for Moore also returned a higher percentage of their vote to 
Mr. Sugarmon than the percentage of their registered voters that were 
Negro. 
Inspection of these three graphs reveals a still more signifi-
cant political truth. that is "that an aroused majority can rise up to 
display its strength even as can a determined minority. "42 The tremen-
dous registration drive sponsored by the Volunteer Ticket prompted a 
corresponding increase in registration in white areas . The threat of 
l>i.r. Sugarman's election inspired the majority to an unusually f"ervent 
interest , and the percentage of white voters at the polls on election 
day was some eight points higher than in the Negro wards. As shown in 
Chapter II of this essay, the vote total for the various off"ices changed 
according to the Negro interest in the race, yet the variation in voter 
participation was reflected more in the white than in the Negro wards. 
Examination of Diagram 1 shows that a great majority of the 
dots (each representing a precinct) lie below the 45 degree line 
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(perfect correlation) showing that there was a tendency in all wards 
for the percentage vote for Sugarman to be lower than the percentage 
of registered Negroes (or the percentage vote against the Negro higher 
than the percentage of registered whites) . Also the cluster of precinct 
dots around the origin (0) shows that while Sugarmon received DXlre votes 
than registered Negroes in some white precincts , the all- white precincts 
vary only J per cent (from 0 to J per cent of the votes given to 
Sugarmon) , while the all-Negro wards , those with 100 per cent Negro 
registration, gave from 88 to 97 per cent of their vote to the canii-
date of their caste, a variance of 9 percentage points. A similar 
observation can be made in Diagram 2. Here the wards without Negro 
voters returned between 4 and 8 per cent of their vote for .1-ir. Flemming, 
while the all- Negro precincts varied between giving 75 and 95 per cent 
of their vote to the anti- Loeb cardidate. In neither the Flemming nor 
the Sugarmon coiTelation did a Negro precinct give 100 per cent of their 
votes to the Negro supported candidates. This all adds up to show that 
Negroes are C.:J.pable of supporting candidates for reasons other than the 
racial issue, while white voters fio::i all l>iegro candidates W'lacceptable. 
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TABLE 8-1 ( Percentage Vote Given 
\.Yard-Precinct Percentage Negro Sugannon n.-ng Y.oore 
44 28 23 46 
2 13 8 11 
"" 4 29 13 15 54 5 98 94 84 87 
6 41 27 37 59 
7-1 85 69 53 66 
7- 2 99 98 95 94 
8 42 35 32 50 
9-1 49 37 29 51 
9-2 J8 27 22 45 
11-1 100 96 90 94 
11- 2 100 94 87 88 
12 81 73 65 74 
13-1 96 66 63 80 
13-2 68 66 58 72 
13-3 53 46 46 59 
14-1 96 95 91 92 
14-2 71 74 67 73 
15 18 14 15 53 
16-1 1 8 45 
16-2 2 8 44 
16-3 1 8 50 
17-1 10 12 52 
17- 2 2 2 6 52 
17-3 13 13 15 53 
17-4 10 9 45 49 
18 8 7 9 48 
19 8 11 11 
"" 20-1 7 55 20-2 9 49 
20-3 3 3 10 48 
21- 1 23 19 19 46 
21-2 10 7 12 32 
21- 3 97 93 85 88 
22 68 72 62 67 
23 14 14 20 47 
24-1 100 88 75 81 
24-2 99 93 88 89 
25-1 93 86 97 89 
25-2 18 17 19 42 
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( Percentage Vote Given 
liard- Precinct Percentage Negro Sugarmon Fl- .,~re 
25-J 1J 1J 16 JJ 
26-1 J7 J5 J2 51 
26-2 81 79 75 80 
27-1 15 11 1J 42 
27-2 66 59 58 67 
28-1 1 J 5 51 
28-2 1 J 6 54 
29-1 11 10 12 48 
29- 2 97 9J 85 86 
JO J 2 7 58 
}1-1 4 2 7 4J 
}1- 2 17 11 16 42 
J1- J J2 16 20 45 
J1- 4 25 28 27 59 
}2-1 J 8 42 
J2-2 98 9J 79 89 
JJ-1 J 2 11 50 
JJ-2 2 2 5 J4 
J4-1 12 10 11 J2 
}4-2 62 57 51 6J 
J5-1 97 9J 84 82 
J5- 2 99 94 91 90 
J5- 3 100 95 91 92 
36-1 5 4 55 
J6-2 2 7 44 
36-3 0 2 6 48 
37-1 9J 84 73 80 
37- 2 49 49 43 70 
38- 1 0 2 4 45 
38- 2 0 1 7 34 
38-3 0 0 7 40 
JB-4 0 0 5 42 
39 95 90 BJ 86 
40-1 90 80 71 74 
40-2 22 22 23 55 
41-1 99 94 84 86 
41- 2 21 22 18 56 
41- J 92 92 91 89 
42-1 10 6 10 37 
42-2 59 54 48 72 
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( Percentage Vote Given 
Ward- Precinct Percentage Negro Sugarmon Flemming J.Dore 
43-1 0 1 5 44 
43- 2 0 1 6 42 
43- 3 100 96 95 95 
44-1 0 1 7 50 
44-2 0 3 6 62 
44-3 2 3 5 62 
44-4 0 3 5 62 
44-5 19 33 31 56 
45-1 2 3 6 58 
45-2 3 3 1 47 
45- 3 0 2 47 
45-4 0 2 57 
46-1 1 5 59 
46-2 0 2 46 
46-3 0 1 53 
47-1 56 52 44 61 
47- 2 42 28 28 54 
47-3 0 0 6 44 
46 98 95 61 92 
49- 1 0 0 5 32 
49- 2 1 1 5 36 
50-1 53 73 66 68 
50-2 17 15 16 39 
51-1 89 83 74 80 
51- 2 27 25 25 49 
52-1 14 12 14 51 
52-2 1 1 7 44 
52- 3 34 31 28 52 
53-1 0 0 6 42 
53- 2 0 0 5 41 
54-1 0 1 7 44 
54-2 0 1 6 46 
55 0 2 7 62 
56 8 10 10 66 
57 1 2 7 64 
58-1 0 51 
58-2 5 47 
58-3 0 4o 
58-4 0 42 
58-5 0 57 
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Percentage Vote Given 
iVard-Preci..nct Percentage Negro Suganoon F1.elti'11ng >.core 
59-1 1 5 39 
59-2 0 1 8 46 
59-3 1 1 6 44 
60-1 14 10 13 43 
60-2 9 5 9 40 
60-3 91 93 92 92 
61 98 94 88 88 
62 0 0 4 42 
63 0 1 5 44 
64 4 6 6 63 
65-1 7 54 
65- 2 ll 59 
66-1 5 53 
66-2 4 53 
67 6 53 
68-1 2 8 54 
68-2 3 7 66 
69 1 5 36 
70-1 0 5 46 
70-2 1 6 46 
71 5 6 50 
72-1 0 5 49 
72-2 0 6 47 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
IN Mi!:li,:DRY OF A I.EA.!lER - The Hon. Clifford Davis , U. S. Representative 
from Shelby County , delivers the dedication address at the unveiling 
of a statue of Edward Hull Crump. 
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While little has been done since the election to elevate the 
political standing of the Negro citizens , much has been accomplished 
in the lines of unity an:l progress . The threat of Sugarman ' s election 
forced united action by Loeb and Armour , who had seldom seen eye-to-eye 
during the past four years , and they developed a respect for each other 
which has been carried into the new commission. Although the two new 
members on the commission, f".oore and Farris , have at ti.mes demonstrated 
a lack of political kn>w-how, they appear willing to learn and are cer-
tainly more co-operative than the past commissioners . Even .Hr . Dwyer 
seems to be giving in to the new spirit of Wlity , and as a result many 
long overdue changes have been effected by the Loeb Conunission durlllg 
its first few months in office. 
Since January 1 , 196o, the city has approved a tax boost to 
$2. 15 per :;1100 of assessed property (up from $1 .80) and the }.emphis 
Light, Gas & Water Division has also increased its rates . The major 
portion of the additional funds have been given to the Board of Educa-
tion for expansion of facilities and for a needed raise in teacher 
salaries. (It is interesting to note that the three highest paid 
teachers in the city are the principals of the three largest Negro 
high schools.) Some of the additional revenue has been set aside for 
city planning ani to help make the civic center and a new airport , 
which are still on the drawing boards, a reality . lluch headway has 
been made toward consolidation of city and county schools, and toward 
combining duplicate fWlctions in the two tax departments. But toore im-
portant, perhaps, are the increased meetings with state and county 
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o.fficials , which have returned efficiency and respect to the city 
government, Mayor Loeb has also initiated lWlcheon meetings with the 
mayors of' other Shelby County towns in an effort to promote unif'ied 
:interest and understanding on county- w1.d.e problemsa 
Of interest during the next few years will. be the political 
future of }~or loeb, Many persons question whether or not hr. loeb 
will attempt , or be able to, build a new political organization around 
his public support, Like CrW!!p, he entered office duri.ne a period of 
political unrest , has proven hilnself to be an efficient administrator, 
and has the personal appeal that carried Mr, Crump into office fifty 
years earlier. Once before , the city surrendered its f r eedom of 
choice for the sake of efficiency, order , and progress , and many feel 
that a new machine can be built on the same principle. However, I 
doubt that this will occur, It has taken the city two mwrl.cipal 
elections to realize that an effective city government can only be 
maintained by active participation of the entire community. While I 
am sure that 1-J.r. Loeb will retain his popularity, I also believe that 
the 1959 election has taught a lesson that c8.llnlt be easily f orgotten. 
Although the Volunteer Ticket failed to place a member of its 
race in a city office, its activity in the 1959 election enables us to 
draw some conclusions concerning Negro participation in 1-'.;emphis poll-
tics and, perhaps , make some remarks on possible 11fut ure trends" in 
Negro voting in the South. First , the activity of the Volunteer Ticket 
reflects a political maturity uncomm:m to the Southern Negro , and we 
can only asslJJTI8 that it has come from the Negro •s long established right 
( 
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to use the ~.ernphis ballot box. Despite the fact that the Negro vote 
was maintained by a political organization that manipulated the Negro 
(and the white) vote at will , it enabled the Negro to grow with the 
ballot and to l earn to use it to his advantage . The depend.ancy of the 
Negro vote on the Crump machine was of value in still another way: it 
allowed the white citizens to accept Negro voting as a part of the 
progressive roovement and the Crump era, without developing the hostility 
that is still present in other areas where Negro leaders strive for this 
right on their own. 
A second observation that can be made concerning the 1-jemphis 
Negro is a reiteration of the political truth , that "progress in one 
field strengthens the Negro 1 s ability to advance in other fields . 111 
We have already seen that with the right to vote , which he used to his 
advantage , Mr. Crump gave the };emphis Negro a f'airer share of the city ' s 
services than received by Negroes in other Southern cities. The same 
political maxim was carried into the 1959 election , where the develop-
ment of a strong poll tical organhation to support Negro candidates 
drew the backing of nfair-mindedn white citizens for placing colored 
leaders in ap}Xlinted offices . 
With a slightly different twist . this same idea can be seen 
in the fact that political maturity can bring a mature approach to 
other civic problems. This can be demonstrated by the activity of the 
l'iemphis Negro in the 11sit-intt demonstrations of the spring of this year . 
Demnstrations in J-;emphis were held in Brooks !-'.eoorial Art Gallery , the 
Memphis MuseUlll , and the Public Library , rather than at a ten cent store 
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lunch counter , suggesting that white supremacy leaves the Negro with a 
more important h1mger: that of knowledge. Certainly a mature approach 
of this nature will be mre effective than a demonstration of students 
rallied by professional news agencies an1 outside Negro organizations . 2 
A. third conclusion that can be drawn from the 1959 election 
is that to be effective in municipal affairs , a Negro organization must 
be led by reliable middle or upper class Negro businessmen and min1sters 
and not by the Negro Republican leaders , who are tradi tiona.J.J.y inter-
ested in national. rather than (the more meaningful) local politics . 
Although Republican leaders were active in the Volunteer Ticket , they 
were not the backbone of the organization. The development of a force-
ful Negro organization, based on Negro talent , as we have seen, is a 
product of the established right of ballot box participation, but 
paradoxically , this maturity could only be developed in full after the 
death of the Crump machine . For while Crump gave the Negro his vote , 
he also made it impossible, or at least fruitless , :for the Negro to 
use this vote against his candidates . Such actirtty would have lost 
the Negro the advantages he gained :from his ballot (in support of 
Crump) by girtng it to a candidate incapable of being elected. 
It is significant to realize why the Negro was given a vote 
by the Crump machine , in opposition to all p:ltterns of Southern feel-
ing . Dr . William H. Riker supplies a generalized answer : "The great 
di.:fficulty of suffrage extension is that those who extend it necessarily 
jeopardize their political future. Hence , party leaders can be per-
suaded to disturb politics with new participants only by the hope of 
( 
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perpetuating their tem}Xlrary majority with a supply of fresh SUJ>-
porters. "3 This brings to the surface the fourth, and perhaps most 
important, observation that can be deduced from the 1959 election. 
That is , that while the Negro can push for p:>litical equality, and 
can develop an organization capable of becoming a serious threat to 
white supremacy in the city government , it is impossible for the 
colored citizen to gain more than the whites are willing to give. A. 
minority in all Southern cities (only Washington , D. C. has a majority 
of its population Negro) , the Negro is destined to remain on the side 
lines in politics unless he can de100nstrate to the white citizen that 
it is to their advantage to develop and use the Negro skills. This is 
adapting to the political world the economic stand taken by Booker T. 
Washington at the turn of the century (that it was to the advantage of 
the whites to hire Negroes) , and thus by- passes the approach used by 
W. E. B. DuBois and the National. Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People . 
Mr. Crump saw the advantage of developing the Negro vote, 
and both he and the Negro prospered because of it. The Commercial 
~ has now announced that it has seen the advantage of Negro par-
ticipation on a higher level of civic responsibility , and when it is 
able to convince its readers of this fact , l'Jernphis will take one of 
the largest steps toward progress ever made in a Southern town. But , 
this is a step that must be taken by the Memphis white , not the Negro 
citizen. The Negro , through his activity in the 1959 election can 
show that he is mature enough to accept this responsibility, but the 
( 
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o£fer must be made by those in power: the white citizens. 
It is here that the l'.emphis election gives us some indication 
of 111'uture trends" in Negro politics in the South. The conclusions I 
have drawn from the Negro in l.emphis politics can provide a pattern for 
political activity in other Negro areas . Voting must necessarily be 
the first step, then can come the economic advantages of the ballot 
(the services Eoore will have to give in return for the Negro vote) , 
then independent Negro leadership, and finally the matW'6 state o:f 
office holding. While it takes time to complete these stages in 
developing full Negro equality, and consequently full. self-respect , in 
politics, it need not take the fii'ty years that it has required in 
1-..emphis. Still, each step can come only through the acceptance of the 
white citizen to this pattern of Negro development 1 and to their willing-
ness to disregard white supremacy at each of these points , 
Vihile this appears to be too much to hope for , especially in 
the light of increased t\egro demands for integration of public facili-
ties , it is just these deman:is which should hasten the steps toward 
Negro office holding . As dissatisfaction of the inferior po.sition in 
which they are held in the South mounts , it seems inevitable that the 
Negro will attempt to 11strika back" at the wh1te majority through 
physical violence and terrorism. Racial riots, I believe, can only be 
prevented. by placing Negro leaders in positions where they can check 
the use o:f force in their own caste, arrl where they have a chance to 
demonstrate their civic responsibility. A Negro officer on the Juvenile 
Court to handle Negro cases , a Negro city ja:ige for the same reason, and 
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finally Negro representation on the city commission . all seem to be 
to the advantage of the white as well as the Negro citizen. But rona 
can come without the wi.llingness of the white citizens to extend to 
the Negroes of their area the first step toward civic responsibility: 
the right to the ballot. 
Summed up , the ballot box is the refreshing source of 
rededication to the American way of doing things . It is 
the instrument of inspiration to try for civic betterment. 
It is protection against things i.nimi.cal to our scheme of 
life. 
When we use it we strengthen ourselves . That is why 
~~!~c~:~i~. nave spirited elections and community- wide 
In so stating , the hemphis that Crump built , the ~:emphis that was down 
in Dixie , has reached a level of political maturity unattainable in 
other Southern cities , and has becorr.e the political , as well as economic , 
leader in the Hid-South . 
( \ 
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Figure -1 
Scatter diagram showing corr~tlation bfttween percentage of registered Negroes in Memphis precincts and percentage 
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